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ABSTRACT
This dissertation constitutes an economic history of 
the aluminum industry of the United States during the years 
from 1940 to 1947* The study was undertaken to discover what 
Important industrial changes had been made in the industry 
during that period, and to relate these changes to the field 
of economics. Purposes which were outlined for the study 
were as followst
1* To continue the study of the aluminum industry 
of the United States from the year 1940 to the present time, 
In order to show what has taken place during the "defense,1* 
’•war,** and "postwar” periods of the past seven yearsj
2* To present, both in terms of economic history 
and economic theory, the major economic aspects of the vast 
aluminum industry as it developed during the years from 1940 
to 1947f and
3* To show the postwar economics of the industry, 
as the field today is influenced by the extensive productive 
capacities developed during World War II and by the entry 
into the field of production of competitors of the Aluminum 
Company of America, which for many years held the outright 
monopoly of ingot aluminum production in the United States.
The material has been presented in five chapters.
An historical background of the industry prior to 1940 has 
been presented in Chapter I. Various phases of the history
of the aluminum Industry have been discussed, such as (a) the 
period of discovery and experimentation; (b) early commercial 
manufacture of aluminum; (c) the status of the industry near 
the turn of the century; (d) the role played by the Aluminum 
Company of America in World War I and in the interim between 
the two world wars; (e) court litigation concerning monopoly 
control in the industry; and (f) the position of the aluminum 
Industry in 1940# when the United States embarked upon its 
defense program*
Changing conditions in the aluminum Industry after 
the beginning of the defense program of the United States 
are described in Chapter XI* The various stages in aluminum 
production which were affected by the program of expansion 
were* (a) mining of bauxite and other ores; (b) production 
of alumina (reduction of the ores); (c) production of pig 
aluminum (reduction of alumina to the virgin metal); (d) the 
fabrication of ingot aluminum; and (e) production of finished 
aluminum products* The expansion program which was inaugu­
rated by the Aluminum Company of America in 1940 is described*
A brief history of the entry of the Reynolds Metals Company 
into the field of primary aluminum production is given* The 
beginning of competition of Reynolds Metal© Company with the 
Aluminum Company of America was financed throtAgh the Recon­
struction Finance Corporation and its subsidiary, the Defense 
Plant Corporation* Activities of the Defense Plant Corporation
in the building of ̂ Important alumina, aluminum, and fabri­
cation plants during the emergency are an Integral part of 
this chapter*
In Chapter III the history of the aluminum industry 
in World War XX is presented under nine headings, as follows:
(a) expansion of plant facilities to supply adequate amounts 
of aluminum for the war effort; (b) dispersal of the industry 
throughout the United States; (e) creation of potential post­
war competition; (d) development of new alloys and processes 
in aluminum reduction; (e) integration of aluminum processes 
in one plant, as exemplified by the Eeynolds plant at Lister- 
hill, Alabama; (f) success of additional private companies in 
the aluminum industry during the war; (g) extension of the 
industry in the Southern and La stern portions of the United 
States; (hi development of the new aluminum industry of the 
Pacific Northwest; and (i) a summary analysis of the total 
contributions of the aluminum industry to the war effort*
These factors were instrumental in the breaking down of the 
great monopoly in primary aluminum which had existed prior to 
World War XX*
The postwar aspects of the aluminum industry are 
presented in Chapter IV, which deals with such factors as the 
following: (a) surplus productive capacity resulting from 
aluminum industry expansion during the defense and war periods;
(b) disposal of alumina, aluminum, and fabrication plants owned
by the Government; (e) analysis of administration policies in 
regard to disposal of aluminum facilities; (d) the partial 
settlement of the problems of disposal; and (e) the develop- 
meat of potential competitive enterprise for the postwar 
aluminum Industry of the United States.
The postwar economics of the aluminum industry is the 
subject matter of Chapter V* Various interpretations of the 
events which occurred in the industry during the years from 
1940 to 1947 have been made in the light of economic theory* 
It has been found that the postwar economics of the industry 
differs greatly from the prewar situation* The enormous 
expansion of the industry during the emergency gave rise to 
surplus capacity which has not been utilised to its fullest 
extent in the brief period which has elapsed since the end 
of World War II* The presence of active competitors of the 
Aluminum Company of America in the field of primary aluminum 
gives promise of a great expansion of production and con­
sumption of the metal in the years to come* Present day 
conditions point to the continuance of both Reynolds Metals 
Company and the Kaiser interests in the various phases of 
production and fabrication of the metal, but the long run 
analysis of the situation will depend upon developments after 
the periods of leases of government-built facilities run their 
course*
Potential competition of Canadian producers of alumi- 
nu» with American interests is considered as a definite 
possibility* particularly in the absence of postwar cartels 
in the industry. Consideration is given to the philosophy 
of cartelisation of the postwar aluminum industry* fhe 
establishment of a philosophy of abundance in the aluminum 
industry appears as the best solution to afford a maximum 
amount of aluminum products in postwar markets* Scarcity 
production and high prices in the field have militated against 
extension of uses of aluminum in the past* A flexible price 
program* accompanying abundant production of the metal* will 
result in the maxi mi. sat ion of consumer satisfaction in the 
use of aluminum* Producers may find It to their advantage 
to make their profits on the basis of volume production, with 
low profit per unit* rather than restricted production and 
high profit per unit*
CHAPTER X
INTRGBUCTION~HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ALUMINUM INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The history and economic development of aluminum 
show a rapid growth hardly equaled by that of any other 
industry♦ Students of the aluminum industry have had a 
most fertile field for study. The literature describing 
the industry is considerable and in a variety of forms. 
Technical studies describing the industrial processes 
involving aluminum production have been presented in 
various books and periodicals* Economic studies covering 
more than half a century have described the unique aspects 
of monopoly or monopolistic competition. In some treatises 
writers have sought to show the economic and historical 
development of the aluminum industry from the standpoints 
of both practice and theoryt particularly in the light of 
the elements of monopolistic competition. In this study 
an attempt is made to trace the economic development of 
a great industry* and, also, to apply some of the facts In 
the field of economic theory to the interpretation of the 
aluminum Industry as it exists at the present time.
Certain major purposes may be set forth in regard 
to the present study of the aluminum industry of the United
1
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States during the years from 1940 to 1947* These purposes 
as outlined below will serve as the main guide for the 
present descriptive analysis and interpretations which the 
study of the aluminum industry encompasses* Three main 
purposes are presented* as follows:
(1) To continue the study of the aluminum industry
of the United States from the year 1940 to the present time, 
in order to show what has taken place during the ndefense,w 
■war,* and “postwar* periods of the past seven years;
(2) To present, both in terms of economic history
and economic theory, the major economic aspects of the vast
aluminum industry as it developed during the years from 1940 
to 1947; and
(3) To show the postwar economics of the industry,
as the field today is influenced by the extensive productive
capacities developed during World War II and by the entry 
into the field of production of competitors of the Aluminum 
Company of America, which for many years held the outright 
monopoly of ingot aluminum production in the United States*
These purposes, as outlined here, will be carried
out as a program to build upon previous work done by the
writer in presentation of the development of the aluminum
1industry of the United States prior to 1940* That previous
Paul T. Headershot, "Develppment of the Aluminum 
Industry of the United States,* {Unpublished Master’s thesis, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, 1941)*
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study o£ the history and economic implications of the aluminum 
Industry served to enhance the writer1s interest in aluminum, 
as well as to show the possibilities of further studies of 
this important industry* The present study appeal's to be of 
even greater significance, because of the rapid expansion of 
the aluminum industry during the past seven years*
Many facts appear in the history of the aluminum in­
dustry of the United States, but the recent wartime expansion 
of the industry, with the shifting of a great part of the 
industry from one location to another, constitutes an economic
phenomenon needful of description* Some of the most important
*
features which serve to show the greatness of the industry are
presented in a publication by three University of Washington2
professors, whose work was published in 1944* Four reasons 
given by Professors Engle, Gregory, and Mosse for the
^Nathanael H* Engle, Homer E. Gregory, and Robert 
Mosse, Aluminum (Chicago: Richard D* Irwin, Inc*, 1944)* This book was published as one of the "Industrial Series" of the Bureau of Business Research of the College of Economics and Business, University of Washington, Seattle# It is one of 
the most recent published surveys of the aluminum industry.Its chief interest in aluminum appears to be from the stand-* 
point of the metalfs market appeal, because the sub~title 
of the book reads, "An Industrial Marketing Appraisal*" However, it should be noted that this book does make very 
significant contributions to the entire field of study of 
the aluminum industry* Although it was published during the 
war, it served an interesting purpose, inasmuch as the authors 
themselves stated that it was written to give a picture of 
the aluminum industry as it would be when the war ended, and 
to serve as a guide both to businessmen and the officials of the national government in their decisions on future policies 
in regard to the aluminum industry of the United States.
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publication of their book, entitled Aluminum, are as follows*
(1) the enorsous expansion of aluminum producing capacity
during the defense and wartime periods; (2) the depletion of
the limited bauxite reserves of the United States; (3) the
shifting of the center of gravity of the aluminum industry
from the hast and Southeast to the Pacific Northwest; and
(4) the beginning of competition in the field of primary
aluminum production, an area which historically has been
monopolised by only one producer in the United States* Many
additional specific facts connected with the aluminum industry
in toe years from 1940 to 1947 will be presented* Various
economic Interpretations of the facts will be given in the
presentation of material throughout the study*
It is felt that in the first chapter of the present
study a brief resume of the history of the aluminum industry
will serve as an introduction to the more detailed discussions
of recent wartime aluminum industrial and commercial develop**
3ments* An understanding of the past is most essential in
2As the title of this first chapter indicates, its 
chief purpose is to acquaint the reader with the facts in the 
case in terms of the pertinent historical background necessary 
to the understanding of the aluminum industry of the United 
states after 1940* This summary can in no way substitute for 
a more careful analysis of the industry for those years from 13&6 to 1940, but will merely serve to place the present study on a sound historical foundation* A wide variety of 
publications are available to the rea iexi concei'ning prewar 
conditions in the industry* Many of the references are 
cited in this study*
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order to understand and interpret the present. This back­
ground is perhaps more vitally applicable in the aluminum 
industry than in any other type of business enterprise, 
mainly because of the violent upheavals that have occurred 
in the industry in a very short period of years.
Discovery and Experimentation in Aluminum Productions
At one time aluminum was more precious than silver
and gold* Its rarity even in the nineteenth century may be
shown by the fact that at the time of Emperor Napoleon III
of France a set of aluminum knives, forks and spoons was
used for state occasions, while the gold and silver ones
4were used for everyday purposes. Less than 100 years ago
(in 1352), the price of aluminum was &545 per pound, but
extensive scientific research within a few years had caused
increased production and a consequent decline in price. Within
ten years, in 1362, the metal sold for $12 per pound, but not
5In large or commercial quantities. It remained for many 
years simply an oddity in chemical laboratories, until Charles 
Martin Hall, in the United States, and Paul Heroult, in France 
both discovered the electrolytic process of aluminum reduction.
4"Aluminum Marks 50th Birthday,,f Newsweek. Vol. XII, 
(November 21, 193#)» P* 42.
5An Outline of Aluminum (Pittsburgh: William G.
Johnston Company, 19£5), P* 5.
6
The discoveries of these two men were made in the year 1$86, 
while each was working independently of the other and knew 
nothing of the work of the other chemist. It was one of 
those strange coincidences in history: the invention was
perfected simultaneously by two men who had not known any­
thing of the work of the other inventor* Charles M. Hall 
obtained the patents in the United States for his invention, 
and gave the impetus to the vast American aluminum industry* 
Xn the same manner, Paul Heroult obtained the European
patents, and the great aluminum industry of Europe is the6
fruit of his invention*
Economic historians of the aluminum industry have noted the strange coincidence that gave exactly the same type 
of invention to two widely separated inventors in the very same year* Such a coincidence is not a great rarity in the field of industry, but it adds interest to the study of the 
aluminum industry* A parallel instance in the field of study 
of economic theory was the discovery of marginal utility 
analysis* Economists, will recall the fact that three men 
were mainly responsible for the early development of the marginal utility school of thought in economics* Jevons, 
Menger, and Walras were the founders of the Austrian School of thought* These three men arrived at their own basic con­clusions independently of each other, and in different 
nations of Europe, at approximately the same time* Each of 
these men had expounded his own philosophy of economic theory concerning marginal utility before he knew of the 
work of the other two economists*
The lives of Charles M. Hall and Paul Heroult were 
most interesting from the standpoint of their similar biogra­phies, and are of particular interest to the historian of the 
aluminum industry* For a more detailed analysis of the period 
of discovery and experimentation, plus intimate details on the 
lives of these two men, the reader is referred to the writer’s previously cited work, in which Chapter II is entirely devoted to this period of discovery and experimentation in aluminum 
reduction*
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It must not be felt by the reader, however, that 
Gharles Martin Hall and Paul Heroult were the only Important 
men In the history or aluminum research and experimentation* 
Many other sen had preceded them in the field, and had made 
valuable and lasting contributions. A list of these men 
would include the names of such distinguished scientists as 
Lavoisier, Davy, Oersted, Wohler, Ross, Berzelius, Bunson,
7Deville and Gastner. Particularly it must be noted that
both Deville and Gastner had produced aluminum on a large
scale for their day, although neither had been able to set
up commercial production of the new metal. Hamilton y, Gastner,
an American, had succeeded in producing aluminum at the rate
of about 500 pounds a day in l££9, but its cost at that time
&
was about £4 per pound.
^This list does not exhaust the complete roster of men who contributed to the scientific discovery in the field of 
aluminum through the ages. However, it does include those men whose contributions have been most outstanding, and to whom 
the great majority of credit for pioneering in the field has been given*
aAt least two writers have given enormous credit to 
Hamilton Young Castner for his great work in the aluminum 
field in the United States even before Charles M. Hall,o re­
volutionizing discovery of the electrolytic reduction process 
for aluminum. It is impracticable at this point to recount 
the facts they have presented, but the reader is referred to 
the two following articles about Castner: V. H. Lord, Hamilton 
Young Gastner (185&-99); a Forgotten Pioneer in the Aluminum Industry," Journal of Chemical Education. Vol. XIX, (August, 
1942), pp. 353-^6; and John M Gskison, "The American Creator 
of the Aluminum Age," World1s Work. Vol. XXVIII, (August, 1914), 
p • 439*
la the discovery of the electrolytic process in 1&&6,
Charles Martin Hall actually laid the cornerstone for the
great aluminum industry of the United States* He opened up
a wide field for the expansion of this new metal into the
railroad, automobile, airplane, and other types of industries
which use aluminum in such huge quantities at the present time*
Extension of the uses of the raetal has been rapid since Hallvs
day* Aluminum is employed today in such a variety of ways
9that a list of its uses covers several pages* Later chapters 
in the present study will show the particular adaptations 
of aluminum to industrial usage, mainly in terms of demand 
and supply, the possibility of expansion of its industrial 
and commercial uses, and possible substitutes for aluminum*
Early Commercial Manufacture of Aluminum:
Commercial manufacture of aluminum was developed 
slowly, mainly because Charles M* Hall found difficulty in 
convincing industrialists of the importance of the new metal* 
The early history of his attempts to secure the interest of 
capitalists constitutes an important chapter in itself, but
^See Engle and others, op* clt*. "Appendix 3,” pp. A complete alphabetical list of the many uses
of aluminum is given in this reference* It is difficult to imagine all the varied uses of aluminum, until confronted 
with such a complete list, which extends from "accessories” 
to "xylophones•" The technical ancl chemical qualities of the metal have made it a versatile light metal.
9
his later successes tend to make the early trials of a young10
inventor appear less significant. After many failures to
attract capital, Hall made contact with a Pittsburgh concern,
the Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories, Inc, As soon as Hall
had convinced Captain Alfred E* Hunt of the importance of
his invention, a reorganisation of the Pittsburgh Testing
Laboratories, Inc*, was accomplished, and the Pittsburgh
Reduction Company was founded* The history of this company
is relatively short, but it is most important to the history
of the aluminum industry of the Uhited States* This new
company took over Hallfs process and operated it, with a11beginning capital of $20,000* From this rather meager be­
ginning, the industry grew into the industrial giant which 
is known today as the Aluminum Company of America* The 
company had been reorganised with a capital of $1,000,000
^*Three references which tell the history of Charles M* Hall and his attempts to master aluminum reduction tech­
niques are as follows: M* K* Wisehart, "The Wonder Story of
Aluminum,” American Magazine* Vol* XCIII, (May, 1922), p* 62; Harry H* Holmes, "A Great £upil and a Great Disco very— Both 
Supported by a Great Teacher*" Science* Vol* LXXXIII,
(February 21, 1936), p* 173; and Karl F. Geiser, "Charles Martin Hall,** Ration* Vol* C, (February 25, 1915), p* 22*
^"The Aluminum Company of America," Fortune* Vol* X, 
{September, 1934), P* 49* This article gives one of the most Interesting accounts of the early history of the industry* The human side of the story is well presented, along with many of 
the important facts concerning capitalization of the Pitts­
burgh Reduction Company*
10
in 1B&9, and was still known as the Pittsburgh Reduction
Company until it became the Aluminum Company of America in 12
1907*
Two prominent families contributed to the success of 
the early company when it needed both business acumen and real 
financial assistance* These two families, which remain today 
as synonyms of power in the aluminum industry of .the United 
States, were the Davis and Mellon families, represented in 
the early years of the industry by Arthur Vining Davis and
13Richard Beatty Mellon* Great success attended the attempts 
at commercializing the aluminum production which Hall had 
initiated* The net result was that millionaires were made in 
the field of aluminum in the United States*
In this study, the Aluminum Company of America will hereafter be referred to simply as Alcoa, since that is the name which most writers have attached to it* One distinction 
shosild be made, however* In Tennessee there is a city which is known as Alcoa, but when this city is mentioned at any place in the discussions, it will be designated as Alcoa, Tennessee* Any future references to the company will simply 
be to Alcoa*
^Arthur V* Davis, together with Charles M. Hall, officiated at the birth of the aluminum industry proper when, on Thanksgiving Day, 138#, he and Hall worked a 24-hour stretch to produce the first aluminum at the Pittsburgh plant* Davis became a millionaire in the aluminum industry, and was the 
president and chairman of the board of directors of Alcoa for 
a period of many years*
Richard B. Mellon, who succeeded to the presidency of the Pittsburgh Reduction Company in 1&99* represented the 
famous Mellon company which later caused Alcoa to become known as a ‘•Mellon company*” Apparently this family*s relation*- ship with Alcoa was the cause of an amazing incident in
11
Fortunately Charles M. Hall had been shrewd and had 
retained a 40 per cent interest in the company. This fore­
sight made him a millionaire along with the others. The 
great success story of Charles M. Hall has made him one of 
the unusual inventors of the United States. It gave him an 
opportunity to become a prominent benefactor of Oberlin
College, in Ohio, where his experiments had reached a
14successful conclusion. Likewise, Berea College, In
American history in the early 1920*s. At that time both 
Andrew W. Mellon, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Harlan 
F. Stone, the Attorney General of the United States, were in President Coolidgevs Cabinet. As the Attorney General, 
Stone was interested in bringing monopoly suits against 
Alcoa. But this prosecution, if continued, It had been alleged, would have been embarrassing to Secretary Mellon. 
It is interesting to note that at the time Harlan F. Stone was kicked upstairs to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. His successor, John J. Sargent, did nothing to jeopardize the position of Alcoa or Secretary Mellon* In fact, the Republican era following the First World War was 
one of almost complete laxity in the matter of anti-trust proceedings against monopolies after Stone assumed his 
position as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States*.
^Holmes, o p. cit., p. 176. The story of Hall1© close association with Dr. Frank F. Jewett, his chemistry 
teacher at Oberlin, is one of the stories which is almost 
without parallel in the educational circles in the United 
States. It is truly a great example of the influence of 
teachers on young minds and of the power of both teacher and pupil to work out difficult problems together. It was 
this association which Influenced Hall to leave a huge 
bequest of one—third of his $27*000,000 estate to Oberlin 
in 1914*
12
Kentucky, has been a significant beneficiary of Hall’s
15generous philanthropies*
Status of the Aluminum Industry Near the Turn of the Century:
Hear the end of the nineteenth century* aluminum had 
been established as one of the important new metals for use
in the twentieth century* The Pittsburgh Reduction Company
was one of only three companies in the world which were pro­
ducing aluminum at that time* An interesting account written
by Samuel Rideal in 1396 gives production figures for several16years, as follows:
According to Richards* the world1s production up to 1592 was only 2,586,000 
pounds; but in 1593 about 1,474,000 pounds were produced, and in 1694 a total of2.244.000 pounds* Last year (1695) the American output has been estimated at830.000 pounds, and it is believed that 
the production of the present year will reach over 2,000,000 pounds, as the Pitts­burgh Reduction Company will have ready 
by the first of June plant capable of making 10,000 pounds per day*
^Gther bequests made by Hall include a large sum to the American Missionary Society and approximately one- 
sixth of his estate for the advancement of education in 
the Near and Far East* While not of too much significance directly to the economist or economic historian, neverthe­
less these facts concerned with Hall’s fortune serve to 
extend one’s appreciation of the power of a great new 
industry to be a boon to the world in both an educational and religious way* Thus it may be seen that aluminum has been of great value in many ways, and not only in terms of 
its service to the economic system in which we live*
and t J « P S £ ^ t u re
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It is remarkable that the closing years of the nine­
teenth century saw such an astounding development of the new 
Industry of aluminum manufacture* It was truly the dawn of 
the “Age of Aluminum," as many of the writers of the period 
chose to call it* Patent troubles resulted in some court 
litigation, but in the settlement of the cases the Pitts­
burgh Reduction Company did not lose too much in terms of 
control over the new industry, although it did have to pay 
damages to the complaining company over a period of years*
In reality, the court litigations may be said to have bene—
17fited both the company and Hall in some ways* Fortified 
by adequate financial backing, the company looked to the 
twentieth century full of hope for the future of the aluminum 
industry* As time has shown, the hope was not in vain*
17'A brief history of the court litigations concerning aluminum patents will show that infringement was charged against the Pittsburgh Reduction Company by the Electric 
Smelting and Aluminum Company, for whom Hall had worked in 
lSS7—1&S&* The case arose out of the granting of patent rights to C. S* Bradley for the reduction of aluminum com­
pounds, in 1S92* Actually, it should be noted that the final court decision was rendered against Hall and the company, 
and that until the expiration of the Bradley patents in 190B- 
1909, damages and royalties had to b© paid to the Cowles company, which had taken over Bradley*s rights* When it is 
stated that the court litigation benefited Hall and the com­
pany, it is meant that, although payments had to be made, th© 
net result was the strengthening of the company through the 
courtfs permission for the continuation of the company*© activity in the production of aluminum* See H* T* Warshow 
led*}» Reoresentative Industries of the United States, (New 
forks Henry Holt and Company, 192o), p* 8*
Rapid expansion of the aluminum industry of the 
United States was made possible early in the twentieth century 
by a series of events which left their imprint upon its 
structure* These events weres (1) the changing of the name 
of the Pittsburgh Reduction Company to the Aluminum Company 
of America; (2) the program of expansion inaugurated by 
Alcoa; (3) the early attempt of Alcoa to fix prices and 
control the industry as a monopoly; and (4) the partly suc­
cessful attempts of competitors to gain a foothold in the 
industry, particularly in the fabrication of aluminum* The 
recapitalisation of the Pittsburgh Reduction Company took 
place in l£&9« This move was followed in 190? by the chang­
ing of the name of the company to the Aluminum Company of 
America • The new company immediately launched out upon a 
vast program to gain control of the essential mines (bauxite 
areas), most of the important reduction plants and fabri­
cating facilities, and the greater part of the important 
distributing agencies for the products of aluminum* Even 
early in the century an early and partly successful attempt
by Alcoa to fix prices and control the industry as a monopoly Id
was made*
^Monopolies customarily find that price-fixing is one of their stocks in trade, and the fact is that Alcoa must 
have realised this from the beginning. With such extensive 
control over bauxite deposits, fabricating plants, and the 
marketing of aluminum ingots, sheet aluminum, wire, tubing, and other products, Alcoa found that it could dictate terms and prices to most of the companies with which it dealt* See 
Report of tne Federal Trade Commission, House Furnishings In­
dustry* Vol* III, (Washington: Government IPrinting Office, 1925
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Later attempts of competitors to gain some control 
in the industry were hindered, in large part, with the pos­
sible exception being in the fabricating business* Some 
companies were attracted to this phase of the industry* A 
virtual monopoly in the production end of the aluminum indus­
try existed until after the entry of the Reynolds Metals 
Company and the Glin Corporation into the field of ingot 
production after the United States embarked upon its defense 
program just prior to World War XI* The significant fact is 
that Reynolds and Glin did not enter the field of primary 
aluminum production until after 1940* Even at that late date, 
the entry of potential competitors to Alcoa was made possible 
by the United States Government, through the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation and its subsidiary, the Defense Plant
Corporation, which financed enormous plant expansion during
19defense and wartime periods*
^These statements move us a little ahead of the 
historical trend of our story, but they serve to show the 
necessity of the historical background* Entry of the federal government into the field of aluminum production in reality 
was not such a surprising move, because it was a well-known fact that the plant capacity of Alcoa at the time of the 
beginning of the defense activities of the United States was woefully inadequate to supply all of the needs of the nation*s 
defense program* Reynolds Metals Company and the 01in Cor­
poration both were in a favorable position to get federal assistance In their moves into the field of ingot aluminum production* The subsequent entry of the United States into 
World War IX enhanced the position of these two companies 
as it did all wartime industries* Later chapters will treat 
adequately the story of the Reynolds Metals Company and the 
011m Corporation in their influence on the aluminum Industry 
after 1940*
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Early complaints against Alcoa were the order or
the day after 1907* with some of the companies themselves
charging Alcoa with price fixing and monopolistic control*
Many of the critic isms against the company t however, were
made by companies which previously had thought aluminum to20
be entirely impracticable from a commercial viewpoint*
Since Alcoa had been the company to demonstrate the feasi-
billty of aluminum, it had gone ahead of the other companies
both as a producer and as a fabricator of aluminum* Some of
the other companies which entered the field as fabricators
soon began to complain of the monopoly of Alcoa as a producer*
Nevertheless, the position of alcoa was so secure that In
190$ and 1909, when the Bradley patents ran out, no new com*
pany arose to challenge Alcoa* s supremacy in the field of21primary aluminum production*
20A case in point is the experience of Charles M* Hail 
with the Electric Smelting and Aluminum Company, of lockport, H*Y* He had been unable to convince the company of the prac­
ticability of commercial production of aluminum, and his con­
tract with them had been terminated at the end of one year* However, this was the same company that later brought suit 
against him for infringement of patents, and which also charged 
Hall*s company with monopoly practices* The story of this episode is given fully by John M* 0 ski son, .op* cit*, p* 444*
^Many factors may aid an infant industry in its opening drive for supremacy in an industrial field* In the 
case of Alcoa, it apparently was a combination of many factors, 
such as an early start, control of essential patent rights, 
the domination of both production and fabrication fields in the aluminum industry, and the advantage of a protective tar­
iff* As la the case of other types of industries, however, the aluminum industry continued its rise to power even after . the essential patents had run out. The reason was that even 
then other companies could not hope to compete faborably and 
on equal basis with Alcoa*
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Many companies in the early decades of the century 
continued their antagonism toward the Alcoa monopoly by 
openly advocating the importation or foreign aluminum* A 
constantly increasing supply of scrap aluminum gave them a 
great measure of relief* These companies did not look upon 
Alcoa as the "father of the aluminum industry*" but rather 
as the "dog in the manger*" which was biting the hands of 
other industries that gave it the extensive markets for the 
sale of aluminum products* The Ford Motor Company and 
General Motors Corporation may be cited as examples of com­
panies whose dependence on Alcoa placed them in a disadvan­
tageous position in terms of bargaining for the essential 
aluminum parts that went into automobiles produced by them* 
These two companies employed two solutions to reduce their 
dependence on Alcoa*a fabricated products* Henry Ford simply 
turned to other aluminum fabricators after he had been un­
successful in his attempts to fabricate the metal for himself* 
General Motors Corporation used a different method* that of 
using smaller and smaller quantities of aluminum in its car3. 
General Motors products* even in the modern era, contain 
smaller amounts of the metal than those of other similar 
companies*
The Ford Motor Company* the Bohn Aluminum and Brass 
Corporation* and the Bausch Machine Tool Company were three p 
examples of potential competition to Alcoa in the early years
lg
of the twenties century* It must be pointed out, however, 
that Ford*8 attempt to become a fabricator was an unsuccessful 
effort to rid himself of dependence on Alcoa for materials for 
his cars* After spending about $5,000,000 in setting up shop 
equipment with which to make the necessary parts for his 
automobiles, Ford was faced with rising prices of ingot alumi­
num during World War X* The net result of his attempt at 
fabrication was the complete scrapping of the $5,000,000 
worth of equipment* His decision was to turn to steel as 
the solution of his problems* This decision has had an im­
portant long-run effect upon the market for aluminum in the 
automobile industry* It accounts In great measure for the 
difficulties faced in later years when producers of aluminum
sought re-entry into the automobile industry as a potential22
market for the metal*
The stories of Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, 
in its attempt to withstand pressure from Alcoa, constitute 
another interesting phase in aluminum history, to which much 
attention has been given by many writers* The significant
22Full particulars concerning this bold move on the 
part of Henry Ford may be obtained from the following sources 
"The Aluminum Company of America," Fortune* (September, 1934)» 
o p* clt** p* 100* The story shows the extent to which one 
industrialist may be moved to change his entire plans when he 
is subjected to pressure from another industrial group or from 
the economic system. In this case, particularly, it was a 
combination of both, because Ford had stood for two raises in 
aluminum prices before he abandoned his whole plan for fabri­
cation of aluminum*
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feature about this company is the Tact that it still exists 
as a strong company in aluminum fabrication. Additional in­
formation is on record about a famous quarrel between Alcoa 
and the Bausch Machine Tool Company* The net result of the 
trouble mas that Alcoa came out on top in a series of argu-
meats over United States Navy contracts and the new water-
23power sites on the Saguenay River, in Quebec, Canada*
Many writers, including H* T. War show, have shown
that the history of the aluminum Industry of the United
States in the twentieth century, up to the time of World
War XI, had been mainly a history of Alcoa and its activi—
24ties* As Warshow has stated:
Monopolisation of the bauxite deposits of 
the United States by this company and its monopoly on the domestic production of aluminum, which is 
fortified by high import duties, make it impossi­
ble to consider conditions In the aluminum industry separately from the position of the Aluminum Company 
of America*
Professor Donald H* Wallace, whose book, Market Control in 
the Aluminum Industry* is a classic in discussions of the 
aluminum industry of the United States, stated the case
^”The Aluminum Company of America,” Fortune. 
(September, 1934), op* cit». pp. 100-02* This article gives a full story not only about the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Cor­poration, but also about th© troubles that the Bausch Machine 
Tool Company had with Alcoa through the years.
2/*h. t. Warshow, ££• cft*» pp. 44-45*
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briefly when he said that wfor the student of monopolistic 
and competitive forces the aluminum industry presents an
25unusually interesting specimen.”
The extent to whlch foreign competition had been 
early eliminated from the American aluminum scene can be 
shown with reference to the attempt to establish a French 
company, known as L*Aluminum Francais, tried to get into 
the production field in this country in 1913• lb was or­
ganised in the United States as the Southern Aluminum Company, 
but was under the control of the French concern. This poten­
tial producer and competitor to Alcoa began a plant at Badin, 
Horth Carolina in 1913» but partial completion was all that 
was possible before the outbreak of World War I. The French 
company had been forced to withdraw, and the result was that 
Alcoa was enabled to purchase the properties which had been 
owned by the Southern Aluminum Company. This move served 
to eliminate the threat of foreign competition on American 
soil, and since that time no foreign producer has had the
audacity to erect plants in the United States to compete with26Alcoa in ingot aluminum production.
25•'Donald H* Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum 
Industry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), P* ix.
26This incident appears to be adequate proof of the 
supremacy of Alcoa in the United States in prewar years. In a way* it might have been an unfortunate thing for the con­suming public in the United States when the French company
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Oae m s t  not infer from the foregoing statement, 
however, that foreign aluminum ingots have not found a 
market in the United States. The domestic fabricators of 
aluminum in this country customarily have had three sources 
of supply as far as aluminum ingots are concerned. These 
sources are to be noted as (1) Alcoa products; (2) the 
aluminum-scrap market; and (3) foreign producers of alumi­
num* Alcoa products have been available to the domestic 
market typically on a basis of high prices and restricted 
productions. A certain amount of scrap aluminum usually was 
available to domestic fabricators, but the supply was uncer­
tain and in many instances lacked the uniformity of quality 
that was desired* Foreign aluminum was imported into the 
United States on a limited basis, because high tariff rates 
on ingot aluminum made it difficult to send the metal into 
this country to compete with Alcoafs product* Both the 
aluminum-scrap market and foreign ingot importations have 
varied considerably through the years* At times domestic 
fabricators actually were able to obtain more metal from the 
scrap market and from imports than was being made available 
by Alcoa, but they could not always depend upon these 
conditions.
was forced to retire from the field. It was more than 27 years 
later when any semblance of competition appeared in the field, 
at the time Reynolds and Olin Corporation began ingot aluminum 
production in this country.
Alcoa Aluminum jU| World War I. and in the Interim Between 
World War I and World War II:
Although the chief concern of this study is the 
presentation of material facts and economic interpretations 
connected with the aluminum industry of the United States 
during World War II, it is of importance to recount some of 
the pertinent information dealing with the aluminum situation 
during World War I* Few extensive or thorough analyses have 
been made of the contributions of the aluminum industry 
during World War I, but enough has been written to show how 
Alcoa took up the new burden and responded rather well during 
these years* Production to satisfy the increased demands for 
-new aluminum products made expansion of the aluminum industry 
a necessity* One of the outstanding and noticeable character­
istics of the industry during the war years was the extension 
of its field of usefulness* Whereas before the war the auto­
mobile industry had become the greatest purchaser of aluminum, 
vast research projects on aluminum during the war years ex­
tended the areas of demand for the metal, and new markets were 
opened up for both aluminum and its alloys* It is safe to say
that no other metal received more scientific attention during
27World War I than did aluminum*
^This description appears to be an interesting case 
of the fact that history repeats itself, because the same 
thing happened in the aluminum indue try during World War II* 
Scientific research was greatly expanded, particularly in 
aluminum reduction processes and alloys*
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Of significance to an understanding of the aluminum
industry during World War I is the treatment given to the
subject by Bernard M. Baruch in his book, American Industry
in the War* Briefly, this is the story of aluminum in the
war as told by the report of the War Industries Board, of
2$
which Baruch was chairmans
The chief war use for aluminum was in the manufacture of ammonal, which is a mixture of 
aluminum dust and ammonium nitrate, used in the 
manufacture of munitions* Other military uses were for fuses, flayers, castings for engines, personal equipment, mess equipment, and as a deoxidizer in steel manufacturing••••••»•
Not enough aluminum could be produced to supply the war needs of ourselves and the Allies and at 
the same time supply normal civilian requirements* Hence the control to be exercised by the Board had 
to be directed chiefly to two problems: Control ofdistribution and control of prices. The Board also 
assisted the Aluminum Co* of America in securing power for increased production and encouraged the 
recovery of secondary metal from scrap*
The normal prewar price of aluminum is about 2 0 cents per pound* When this country entered the war, open-market prices were about 60 cents, while 
contract prices rhnged around 3& cents*
The war requirements for aluminum were being 
studied by the commissioner of raw materials of 
the Council of National Defense in March, 1917, 
and on April 23$ 1917, with the market at 60 cents, Mr* Davis, president of the Aluminum Co. of Amer­ica, offered to provide the United States Government
^Bernard M. Baruch, American Industry in the War.
(New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1941), PP* 156-57* Thisbook is a report of the War Industries Board, for March, 1921*
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with whatever it wanted for its preparedness campaign at whatever price the Government should 
put upon it* This offer was accepted for 2,000,000 
pounds of aluminum ingots at 2?i cents a pound, and 
a few days later enlarged to 3,000,Q0G pounds, to 
be delivered before August of that year* In Sep­
tember, 1917, the company agreed with the War 
Industries Board ttto accept direct and indirect 
orders at the prevailing contract prices" (33 cents), 
and to refund to the Government any difference which might exist between this contract price and any
fixed price which might be decided upon at a laterdate*
••••**•*32 cents per pound was recommended on February 23 (1913), and approved by the President 
on March 2*«***«**A compromise was (later) reached at 33 cents, and this was continued until March 1, 
1919#
A further history of aluminum production during 
World War I, and in the period immediately thereafter, shows
a rapid increase in the metal from 1914 to 1913, and then a
rapid slump in production from 1913 to 1921* Production had 
been so great during the war that a large "surplus" existed 
in the market during the years following* The disposal of 
this so-called surplus was made possible only after the 
company had reduced prices from a level of 32*9 cents per
29pound to a level of 19 cents per pound in November, 1921*
^Technically, economists are cautious in designating 
quantities of goods an "surplus” when in reality the price 
situation is such that consumers will not take them off the market* In this case, it is noticeable that as soon as the 
price was made flexible, instead of rigid, the aluminum was disposed of in normal ways to the consuming public* Most economists would agree that in strict economic theory there 
is no surplus "until supply exceeds demand at a x>rice of zero.” See Harlan L* McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles 
(New fork: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1936), p. 201*
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However, changing conditions in the aluminum industry meant
that this price reduction was not to last long, because by
1926 the price had been raised to a level of 2& cents per
_  30pound for primary 93-99/6 metal. This ability of the 
company to meet varied circumstances in the economic system 
is unique* In later years Alcoa fell into line with other 
companies in the industrial field and used the familiar 
technique of reducing production rather than using flexible
31prices to meet the economic depression in the early 1930fs*
In the years immediately following World War I, the 
interest shown by Alcoa in foreign buildings was very 
noticeable* The company began a program of expansion both 
in international and domestic spheres* Norway became the 
object of Alcoa's attention in 1921, mainly in terms of the 
expansion of the company's control over adequate and cheap 
hydroelectric power for greater operations in that country. 
The company soon had extended its control over some out­
standing waterpower sites, and had gained control of two 
of the Norwegian companies, Det Norske Nitrid and Norsk 
Aluminum Company* Both of the Norwegian companies had been
30h . T. Warshow, op. cit.. p. 29*
^High, rigid and sticky prices have characterized 
many fields of industry, and aluminum is no exception. More will be said in later chapters about such prices and their 
effects on the economic system.
eagaged in aluminum reduction in Norway before Alcoa appeared 32
an the scene* Alcoa extended its control in the domestic
sphere in 1924 by acquiring important fluorspar mines in
both Kentucky and Illinois* Acquisition of these mines made
the company's manufacture of artificial cryolite (for elec~
t roly tic reduction of aluminum from bauxite) easier and more
certain in terms of its control over the natural resources
involved in production of ingot aluminum*
The extent to which Alcoa had actually extended its
►control over the various fields of aluminum activity can 
best be illustrated by the statement that In 1926 the hold** 
lags of the company could be grouped under eleven different 
headings* as followss (1) mining properties; (2) bauatlte;
(3) magnesium; (4) carbon electrodes; (5) alumina; (6) alumi- 
num; (7) aluminum manufactured goods; (6) sales; (9) railroads 
(10) power and public utilities holdings; and (11) miscel­
laneous holdings* which included brass* paper* iron* tar
33products* and fluorspar companies* Xn terms of these 
widespread holdings* Alcoa was one of the world1s outstanding 
examples of integrated domination in any kind of industrial 
field*
32H . T. Warshow, tit». p* 29 ff-
33?or a complete picture of the domination of the 
company in these respects* consult Warshow* op. cit*. p* 53* 
or Hendershot* op * cit*. p . 69*
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The account, given above is not a picture of the
control exercised by the company in 1940* however, because
several significant changes had been made in that interim
between 1926 and 1940. Changing conditions in the aluminum
Industry had resulted in Alcoa*a disposal of a great many
ef Its foreign properties and subsidiaries prior to the
latter date* The number of companies controlled and doml~
mated by Alcoa had been reduced from a total of about 75
(as shown by Warshow in 1926) to the number of 26 companies
34in 194Q» according to Moody*s Industrials for that year.
Eighteen of these 26 companies, owned entirely by Alcoa at
that time, were to be found in the United States, Canada and
Dutch Guiana* The other eight companies, most of which were
owned by Alcoa to an extent greater than 25%, and mostly
more than 50%, likewise were scattered through the three
35countries named above.
Court Litigation Concerning Monopoly Control in Aluminum?
A history of the aluminum industry prior to 1940 
would not be complete without some mention of the many cases 
that case into the courts as a result of the charges of 
monopoly and unfair trade practices against the Alcoa
3i*noodr,B Industrials. 1940 (New fork: Moody*a In­
vestor* s Service, Inc., Annual Publication), p. 365*
35Ibid.
2&
system* Active prosecution of the Alcoa monopoly in primary 
aluminum began in 1912, and since that time many cases in­
volving such charges have come before the various courts of 
the United States*
One of the famous consent decrees in the aluminum
Industry litigations was handed down by Judge James M* Young
36as a result of the prosecution of the company in 1912*
Many important subjects were covered in Section 7 of this 
consent decree* The prohibition of the following types of 
discrimination and unfair trade practices was specifically 
a rationed:
(1) Combining with other companies to restrict out­
put and control prices of aluminum;
(2) Delaying shipments of material or furnishing 
known defective material to its customers;
(3} Charging higher prices for crude or semi­
finished aluminum to competitors than to subsidiaries;
(4) Refusing to sell crude or semifinished aluminum 
to competitors in the field of aluminum fabrication;
(3) Requiring competitors to divulge Information 
concerning the expected usage of aluminum sold to them;
complete text of this consent decree is to be 
found in a Report of the Feder il Trade Commission, House 
Furnishings Industry. Vol. Ill, 0£. clt. » pp. 237-91*
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Requiring the making of agreements not to 
compete with the Alcoa system in certain lines;
(7) Intimating that the failure to enter into such 
agreements would deprive competitors of raetal; and
(3) faking the position that enlargement of com­
petitors1 plants would be a signal for cutting off the supply 
of aluminum materials to them*
This decree in 1912, covering all of the above phases 
of the abuse of other companies by Alcoa, served a very good 
purpose, bat it did not prevent other cases in the courts* 
There are five cases that deserve mention in the history of 
aluminum prior to the time of the administration of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt as President* These five cases dealt with the 
SawyervAustin Lumber Company, the Southern Aluminum Company,
the Norsk Aluminum Company, the Aluminum Rolling Mill Company,
37and Aluminum Manufacturers, Inc* The prosecution of Alcoa 
In these cases was not successful, however, and the Govern­
ment and the companies were unable to break up the monopoly 
held by Alcoa in primary aluminum production* Laxity on 
the part of the Department of Justice in vigorous and out­
right prosecution of Alcoa at other times in the 1920*s led
3#one writer to exclaim:
When is a monopoly not a monopoly? 'When it belongs to the Secretary of the Treasury, and
37,or a complete description of these cases, the 
reader is referred to Hendershot, op. cit.. pp. 85-121.
3^0.-G* Villard, Editorial, Nation. Vol. GXXX, 
(April 16, 1930), p. 437.
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when an Inconvenient Attorney General is promoted 
to the Supreme Court* If you don,t believe it, 
ask the Federal Trade Commission, which on April 4 dismissed all monopoly complaints against the Aluminum Company of America*«.»«••.When Mr* Stone 
left the cabinet for the Supreme Court, his great 
successor John J. Sargent forgot all about aluminum, and William D. Mitchell has not happened to think about it*
A case involving the Bausch Machine Tool Company w*$s
brought into the courts in 1932, but after two years of fight-
39ing* Alcoa emerged victorious* The Roosevelt Administration,
at least in Its earlier years, appeared as a formidable
opponent of Alcoa, and in April, 1937, brought suit against
the company on the specific complaints of price control and
antitrust violations* This case was still in the courts in
1940? at the time when the United States launched its defense
program* It was one of the longest case3 in the history of
American jurisprudence* Settlement of the case was not made
until after the United States had become involved in World 
40War II* The wartime disposition of the case will be dis­
cussed in later chapters. Political considerations and 
industrial expediency have been the guiding principles in 
all of these long series of litigations against the aluminum 
monopoly, according to many observers in recent years.
39**Aluminum Victory,f* Business Week. Nos. 227-2^2, 
(January 6, 1934), P* 34*
40n^aj_xvay Mark," Time. Vol. iXIV, (July 3, 1939), 
p. 49. This inference gives the early history of the case.
Status of the Alumi m m  Industry in 1940?
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Careful analysis or the aluminum Industry of the 
United States reveals that this country was placed in a 
disadvantageous position when the defense program was begun 
after war broke out in Europe in September, 1939 • Adequate 
aluminum supplies to fill the needs of the defense program 
of this country could not be furnished by Alcoa, although 
company officials at first indicated that Alcoa*s productive 
capacity would be sufficient* One of the most caustic com­
ments ever to be made about Alcoa and its response to the
new defense program is the following statement made by Mew
41Republic as late as February, 1941•
Alcoa's response to the defense program 
was typical of a monopolistic industry* Alcoa went to the NDAC (National Defense Advisory 
Commission) and offered to cooperate— if the 
Commission would bring pressure on the Justice 
Department to call off Its two-year old anti­
trust prosecution* This was too much even for the MDAC*
As a further indication of its desire to 
cooperate in the defense program, Alcoa, as soon as the anti-trust hearings were concluded, cut the supplies of raw aluminum to the Reynolds 
Metals Company by 40 per cent* The Reynolds 
Metals Company, a potential competitor of Alcoa1s, was, and is today, engaged in defense orders. Its deliveries are incomplete because it lacks aluminum.
W^Why Vie Are Falling Behind,” Mew Republic- Vol. CIV, 
(February 17, 1941, Fart Two), p* 233*
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This statement is typical of the attitudes which 
were expressed in many circles about Alcoa and its strangle­
hold on the aluminum industry of the United States by 1940.
It will be possible in the next chapter to carry this analysis 
still further* Our discussions will revolve around the vari­
ous aspects of the aluminum industry in the defense program* 
The gigantic expansion of the aluminum industry under the 
supervision of the United States Government constitutes an 
entirely different pattern from that followed by Alcoa in 
prewar years*
CHAPTER II <*
ALUMINUM AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM; ThE BEGINNING 
OF THE MODERN ERA OF ALUMINUM INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT
The foundation was laid in Chapter I for the further 
discussion of the aluminum industry of the United States 
during the years* 1940-1947* In Chapter II the first phase 
of this recent period of aluminum development will be pre­
sented* The whole period from 1940 to 1947 1®, in reality, 
the most important and far-reaching period of aluminum 
development in this country. The importance of the period 
should be considered in each of the three phases of "defense* 
"war," and "postwar” activities. The initial period of 
defense activities covers about two years, 1940 and 1941* 
During this time the aluminum industry of the United States 
was girding itself to fulfill its many commitments to the 
national defense program, and to the actual war program 
after 1941*
Outbreak of war in Europe in September, 1939, had 
been a signal and a forewarning that the United States in­
evitably would become involved in World War II. Our time- 
honored policy of isolationism, which had held sway in the 
United States since World War I, was painfully being swept 
away by the knowledge that Hitler had begun his program of
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world conquest;* It was apparently natural that th© United 
States should begin in 1940 a great program of defense, and 
that the sympathies of this nation should be turned toward 
the Allied cause*
Leaders in governmental circles and in high military 
positions apparently felt that protection of the United States 
necessitated an adequate air defense* It was evident from 
the beginning that aluminum would play an important role in 
the preparedness program* But air defense, as such, was 
not the only reason why aluminum was destined to play such 
a highly significant part in World War II* It had been well 
established in World War I that aluminum was valuable in 
many ways in the waging of war* The chief use of the metal 
in that war was in the manufacture of explosives, although 
aluminum was used In a variety of other ways* Both technical 
and engineering developments during the interim between the 
two wars resulted in a wider variety of uses for aluminum*
It is true that the great demand for aluminum in the 
defense program was for airplanes, which are made almost 
entirely of aluminum* However, the military uses for alumi­
num extend to other types of equipment, such as equipment 
used by individuals in the armed forces, pontoons, parts of 
the fixtures and even the basic structures of torpedo boats 
and large ships, parts of automobiles and truckls which are 
essential for the mobility of fast^moving troops, radios and
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other types of communications equipment for both land and 
sea operations, and a variety of other types of products 
and military supplies which use the metal in lesser quan­
tities* Indeed, as has been said by other writers, the 
modern god of war carried a shield of aluminum in World 
War II.
This dependence upon aluminum during the period of 
defease becomes more apparent when it is realized that World 
War IX in Europe in late 1939 end early 1940 already had 
shown the necessity for dependence upon warplanes as a means 
of offensive actions as well as defensive measures* It may 
be pointed out that ninety per cent of the weight of the 
average modern plane is made up of this light metal* During 
the war it was noticeable that an average warplane might have 
as much as 7*000 pounds of the metal in it, while a modern1bomber at times used as much as 16,000 pounds of aluminum* 
These figures by themselves may not appear to mean much,, but 
when it is recalled that President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
had spoken in 1940 of as many as 50,000 planes a year as a 
goal of our defense program, the dependence upon aluminum 
becomes of great significance*
The sympathy of the United States toward the Allied 
cause turned into something akin to alarm early in 1940 when
^"Aluminum and the Emergency," Fortune« Vol* XXIII, 
(May, 1941), p. 66.
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the successes of Germany were making the headlines nearly 
every day* The United States became quite concerned, es­
pecially with respect to the shortages of aluminum and the 
methods for providing adequate supplies of the metal. This 
task became more difficult than was at first expected, mainly 
because Germany had not been negligent in the matter of alumi­
num production* In fact, a brief account of Germany1s success 
in production of the metal will show that the Hitler program 
had resulted in such progress in the production of the metal 
that Germany as early as 1934 had actually outstripped the 
United States* This great German production of aluminum had 
made possible the building up of the great scourge of Europe, 
the German Luftwaffe* When war came, the air ana of the 
German military forces was well prepared for the works of 
devastation that it accomplished in France, England and the 
other smaller countries of Europe* The German nation had 
risen farm a position of only negligible importance to one
of the greatest of aluminum producers within a few short 
2
years*
In reality, the American public must have been most 
startled to read in the hew Republic for January 27, 1941, 
that in 1939 Germany had outstripped the United States in
2See Table I for a complete study of the production 
of the world in regard to aluminum in 1933 and 1940*
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aluminum production, leading this country by a quantity of 
73 1111101 pounds. German production for that year amounted 
to about 400 million pounds, and United States production 
was only 327 million pounds# But this fact was not the most 
startling, because it was further pointed out that in the 
year 1940, subsequent to the acquisition of French and other 
aluminum production properties, the German program might hare 
been able to extend production of the metal beyond the
3billion-pounds-per-year mark# Germany, apparently dedicated 
to a program of air supremacy over Europe, was making good in 
her efforts to put more and more warplanes into the 3ky.
In almost direct contrast to the pattern of production 
shewn for Germany, Great Britain was not in such an enviable 
position in regard to her own aluminum output. Despite aid 
which had been forthcoming from both Canada and the United 
States, Great Britain could not approach Germanyfs great 
productive capacity. Even before France and her aluminum 
facilities had fallen into the hands of Germany, the com­
bined operations of England, Canada and the United States 
were not favorable in comparison with the German output of 
the metal# Production in the United States will be seen to 
have been Increasing gradually prior to 1940, but the real
^"Monopoly versus Defense,n Hew Republic. (January 27, 
1941), PP» 104-05#
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aluminum situation was not much improved by that time- It 
was a significant fact that Inventories of aluminum were de­
clining rapidly, and this condition left the defense program 
in a more vulnerable position than it might otherwise have 
been* As a matter of fact, the dependence on day**to-day 
production of the metal was imminent when several events 
occurred to make the situation look somewhat better* These 
events, together with outstanding facts concerning the major 
features of the vast aluminum industry, will be presented in 
the following discussions*
The big questions in the aluminum industry late in 
1939 and early in 1940 revolved around the problems of 
production, plus the entire industrial structure of the 
industry as it was then constituted* The problems of pro­
duction of aluminum did not change overnight, but the 
realisation of the greater impact of the defense program 
made a new appraisal of the industry imperative* Some of 
the problems of the industry in the initial stages of the 
defense program concerned! (1) the various stages and 
processes in the manufacture of aluminum; (2) the natural 
resources which wbre available for production of the metal;
(3) the electrical energy for aluminum plants; (4) labor 
resources; and (f>) tne capital and management in the industry 
at the outset of the defense program* Some of these problems 
were of greater importance than the others* Each of the
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problems had bo be met, however, in order bo obbain greater 
production of* aluminum bo supply both Allied needs and those 
of the United States in our own program of preparedness • A 
brief statement of each problem will suffice at this point 
to show the difficulties involved at the beginning of this 
new era of aluminum progress*.
While no extended exposition of the technical pro-* 
cesses in aluminum manufacturing is contemplated here, it is 
necessary to point out that throughout the history of the 
aluminum industry, and especially in 1939» it was Impossible 
to speak of only one integrated aluminum industry, in the 
sense that all the stages and processes of production were 
carried out in one place* In fact, the field of aluminum 
consisted of a series of* industries, Integrated more or less 
Into a cohesive pattern which produced the familiar auto­
mobile parts, aircraft metal, and kitchen utensils* Analysis 
of the industry based on this type of integration will show 
five various stages through which aluminum passed to reach 
the ultimate consumers. These five stages, each one of 
which posed a different problem in the matter of national 
defense, are as followss
1* Mining of the raw materials or ores;
2* Production of alumina (reduction of the ores);
3* Production of pig aluminum (aluminum ingots);
4* Fabrication of aluminum ingots; and
kO
5* Production of the finished aluminum products •
Bauxite is the chief ore of aluminum, and is to be 
found in the United States in the State of Arkansas in great 
quantities, and in high quality ores. It is found, also, in 
other states, hut in the form of lower* grade ores. In Ark­
ansas, where the "Grade A" bauxite is obtained principally by 
the ©pen—pit mining method, two counties, Saline and Pulaski, 
have been the chief sources of supply. The finest ores of 
the United States are found to contain usually more than 25$ 
alumina and not more than about 7$ silica. Even before the 
war, however, it had been customary for the aluminum industry 
of the United States to import bauxite from abroad, chiefly 
from Surinam (Dutch Guiana} in South America. Prior to the 
defense program, about one-half of the ores processed in the 
United States were imported, while the other half was mined in 
this country, with Arkansas supplying about 90$ of the domestic 
bauxite of the nation. Other states which have produced smaller 
Quantities of low-grade ores are Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and Virginia. The possibility of employing lower- 
grade ores had been considered, but it was not until the 
United States was actually in the war that pilot plants for 
using such ores were established. The Kaluadte Corporation 
built a plant for the extraction of aluminum from alunlte in 
Utah, near Salt Lake City, and three other companies later 
erected similar plants to test certain types of clays* With
the advent of the defense program in the United States, this 
problem or obtaining adequate supplies of bauxite meant two 
things! first, the extension of mining operations in Arkan­
sas; and, second, the further importation of additional ores 
from South America*
Alumina is the end product which is necessary for the 
reduction process that results in ingot aluminum. It is ob­
tained from the bauxite ores, or from ores of lesser quality, 
through the use of either the Bayer or Bedersen processes, 
both of which have been highly successful in alumina reduction. 
One of the greatest problems connected with this stage of the 
production of aluminum was to be confronted during the war 
period, when it became necessary to use ores with a higher 
Silica content* Under normal conditions, the Bayer process 
works best with ores of about three per cent silica, but 
could process other ores with an high as seven per cent 
silica* However, under the press of wartime production 
needs, the soda—lime-sinter process was devised* This process 
was capable of processing ores with as high a silica content
X
as fourteen or fifteen per cent* Such problems had not faced 
the aluminum industry before, and in 1939 and 1940 they were 
still ahead of the reducers of bauxite ores. Only one re­
duction plant, at East St. Louis, Illinois, had been operated 
before the war by Alcoa interests. Introduction of new 
reduction methods had been retarded, because this plant had
4 Z
b w a  using only the highest grade of ores* Later alumina 
reduction facilities were built to handle the low-grade 
ores, and the soda-lime—sinter facilities were incorporated 
into the new government plants which had to be built*
Production of aluminum ingots is the reduction of 
alumina, carried out through the process of electrolysis* The 
process was invented by Hall and Heroult, and was the only 
process employed commercially by Alcoa, although the other 
processes of reduction by chemical action, such as the 
Castner process, had been known for many years* The elec­
trolysis process is highly technical, and one of its chief 
problems is sufficient electrical energy for the proper 
reduction of alumina* A brief glance at the ingredients 
necessary for the production of one pound of virgin aluminum 
metal will show the problems of materials involved in the
productive process* The various ingredients necessary are 
4as follows:
2 pounds of alumina;
3 to 10 kilowatt hours of electricity;
♦05 pounds of cryolite;
•03 pounds of aluminum fluoride;
*53 to *65 pound© of carbon paste; and 
*015 man-hours of labor*
4Engle and others, o p * cit>. p* 7*
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Necessarily* then, it must be considered that the great 
problem in the reduction of alumina are concerned chiefly 
with the production of enough electrical energy to reduce 
the alumina to virgin metal* and the provision of adequate 
amounts of skilled labor to work in the reduction plants*
This latter item of labor was one of the chief problems in 
the aluminum industry in the initial stages of defense 
activities* It was particularly necessary in the years of 
1939 and 1940 to train additional men to operate the various 
facilities provided by Alcoa1s expansion, the entry of 
Reynolds Metals Company into the field of aluminum production, 
and the entry of the Government into the field at a later date* 
Both the reduction of alumina from bauxite and the 
further reduction of pig aluminum from the alumina are the 
two necessary processes which must take place before actual 
fabrication of the virgin metal can be done* Ingot aluminum, 
as it comes from the aluminum reduction plant, Is a metal of 
high purity, with a great portion of it being as much as 
99*7% pure, or even more than that amount. By the process 
of alloying this light metal with such metals as copper, 
silicon, magnesium and manganese, or even other metals such 
as iron, zinc, nickel, etc*, aluminum is made stronger and 
more adaptable to various industrial usages* Fabrication of 
the metal is done In huge aluminum rolling mills, such as 
the ones now located at Alcoa, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois;
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a&d Spokane* Washington* Prior to the war, however, the 
rolling sill facilities were adequate only for the prewar 
production of aluminum, so it became one of the major projects 
of the defense program to provide more rolling mills to take 
care of the increased production of the metal* One of the 
unique features of the aluminum rolling mill is the fact that 
it could he used for steel, but steel rolling mills could not 
be used for aluminum, due to the greater sensitivity of 
aluminum* in the process*
Xn the fifth, and last, stage in the production of 
aluminum, the production of various shapes, forgings, cast* 
lags, and extrusions is necessary from the aluminum sheet which 
has been produced in the rolling mills* This is the most de­
tailed level of the entire industry, because of the various 
usee to which the finished products are put* Suffice it to 
say that particular applications of aluminum in the various 
fields of aluminum consumption number more than 2,500, and 
that these many markets constituted one of the great problems 
facing the industry in 1940* The fact that one market, the 
aircraft industry, was being built up to take over a great 
majority of the entire output of the aluminum industry caused 
grave concern to Alcoa and others* This probably was because 
Alcoa was looking to the post-defense era, when it again 
would be necessary to consider all of the various markets 
noted above* Civilian demand continued steady even after the
defense program began, but the aluminum to fill this demand 
was not forthcoming from the industry* Diminution of the 
supply for the civilian market was perhaps a natural result 
of the defense program, but it still remained a peculiar 
problem for Alcoa to solve* This situation will be considered 
in the discussion of the expansion of Alcoa to meet the grow* 
ing demands being made on the aluminum industry for defense 
purposes*
Since all of the five stages of production mentioned 
above had their particular problems during the defense era, 
it can be seen that their impact upon Alcoa and upon the 
Government was of immense proportions* The discussion of 
the stages of production brought out some of the features 
of the other problems which were listed before. The problem 
of natural resources is one which revolves around bauxite 
and the other ores that may be used in the production of 
altmina* The problem of electrical energy posed even greater 
difficulties for those in charge of the expansion of facili­
ties, because it is much more difficult to provide for the 
building of dams and hydroelectric facilities than it Is to 
extend mining operations for bauxite* Labor for the working 
of the expanded facilities constituted a problem at first, 
but the training of additional personnel did not loom as 
too difficult for the industry to handle. Although unionism 
in the industry did create some special difficulties with
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respect to jurisdictional disputes, production of aluminum 
did not lag because or an acute labor shortage* Men were 
recruited and trained in the technical processes of aluminum 
reduction and fabrication in time to take over the operation 
of the expanded facilities in the industry*
A resume of the problems of production in the indus­
try would not be complete without reference to the problem of 
eapital and management as it appeared in 1940* The extent to 
which this one problem Influenced the entire course of the 
aluminum industry subsequent to the inauguration of the 
defense program may be summarized in the statement that
prior to the second World War only one corporation in the 
United States produced primary aluminum* That corporation
was Alcoa* a company which was integrated to include all of 
the phases of aluminum production mentioned in previous dis­
cussions* In the brief summary given by Professor Engle and
5his collaborators, the following Is of significances
This corporation was— and still Is— an integrated 
one which, by itself or through its subsidiaries, owned and operated bauxite mines, sea and railroad 
transportation facilities, power sites, dams, and houses, alumina plants, reduction plants, rolling 




A further analysis of Alcoa in terms of ownership
and management in the aluminum industry in 1939 is provided6in those additional s tat wants t
Mo picture of the Aluminum Company of 
America would be complete without reference 
to ownership and management* Recent inves­
tigation made by the Temporary National Economic Committee provides us with considerable inf or-* 
mat ion which thus far has been used very little *•*••*••Some £,000 shareholdings are listed, 
but the data show that more than three-fourths of all stock is in the hands of approximately 
100 shareholdings* The * small*9 shareholdings 
of less than 1*000 shares possess less than 200,000 common shares out of a total of 
1*473*000 or 13 per cent, and about 25 per 
cent of the preferred stock* Changes in ownership have been minor since 1939 and the situation no doubt still remains that the 
neb worth of about $250 million belongs largely to 100 shareholdings* But the analysis may be further narrowed* The data 
show that the 20 largest holders had two*- tbirds of the common stock and more than 
one-half of the preferred stock*
Such data as these show that the aluminum industry 
at the outset of -the defense program was so closely held by 
Alcoa that the policies of that company were concurrently 
the policies of the entire industrial structure of primary 
aluminum, almost without exception* The company*s own 
policies apparently were the policies of the Federal Govern­
ment, also, until it was found out that the real problems of 




fhe Industrial structure of the aluminum Industry
in 1940# therefore, showed inadequate facilities to take
care of the program of the United States, muck less the
extra program of foreign demands» Fabrication and finished
products in the aluminum industry could not be expanded on
short notice to take care of the civilian consumer demand
and at the same time take care of the new defense program«
Costs of production in the industry apparently were net
along the pattern which had been operating in the Industry
for several years* In retrospect, it appears that the
aluminum industry definitely was not in the proper position
to meet the expansion demanded of it by defense and war*
although at the time both Alcoa officials and government
officials were apparently content to say to the American
public that enough aluminum was available to meet every con­
tingency* The extent to which these statements were true
can be judged impartially by the history of the industry 
since 1940, to which we now turn for a study of the expansion 
program which Alcoa itself launched In that year* This pro­
gram of expansion by Alcoa was only one of three important 
events which took place in the'era of the defense program*
It could not be considered by Itself, because the other two 
events are of great importance, also* The two other events 
which will become a part of the discussion In this chapter 
are the entry of the Reynolds Metals Company into the field 
of ingot aluminum production, and the entry of the Government
late the field through its plans for the erection of addition- 
al production facilities to aid the whole program of defense* 
A H  three of these stories will become the subject matter for 
our remaining discussions in this chapter*
Expansion Program of the Aluminum Company of Americas
It has been noted previously that some writers have 
been most critical of the way in which Alcoa met the problem 
of increasing demands for its aluminum products* That par­
ticular analysis of Alcoafs moves and motives was not at all 
flattering to the company, and it may be said to have been a 
bit harsh, even though it was probably true in its entirety* 
The obvious attempt on the part of Alcoa to eliminate pres­
sure of prosecution by the promise of more and more aluminum 
for the defense effort was deplorable* If the charges were 
true (and they have not been denied, as far as the writer 
knows), then Alcoa is to be censured for such practices, 
despite its later efforts to make amends*
Other writers, perhaps with a more sympathetic turn 
of mind toward Alcoa, have written interesting accounts of 
the expansion program inaugurated by the company in 1940*
It is with these reports that we shall be primarily concerned 
here* Perhaps the most favorable review of the operations 
of Alcoa during the year 1940 has been put into print by 
I. W* Wilson, who was the company,s vice-president in charge
of operatio&s at that time* Writing a rather lengthy
article for The Commercial and Financial Chronicle in January*
1941* Mr* Wilson reviewed the aluminum situation as it had
existed during the previous year* The result was that Alcoa
was made to appear as the hero in the stcry rather than as
the monopolistic industry that had been pictured in the New
Republic♦ Some of the passages are pertinent for a variety
of reasons* One of the most forceful paragraphs which he
7wrote is as follows s
Aluminum focused its efforts on National 
Defense in 1940* Highlights of the develop­
ments during the year of importance to Aluminum 
Co* of America were: Its decision to carry outnow at a cost of more than $150*000,000, In the interest of National Defense, a program of ex­
pansion which would normally occur in the next two decades;; the announcement by the National 
Defense Advisory Commission that the program 
of the Aluminum Co* of America, together with that of others in the industry, makes present and planned production adequate for all esti­
mated defense needs; and continued price re­
ductions by the Aluminum Company at a time when the price trends of most commodities were distinctly upward*
Obviously, this kind of writing makes Alcoa appear 
to be a public-spirited company, particularly at the time 
when the organization needed to make such an impression on 
the American people* If it could be made to appear that
^1* W. Wilson, "The Aluminum Industry,11 The Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle* Vol* CLIII, (January 25* 19411* pp*53°- 31* While apparently written as a piece of institutional ad­
vertising for Alcoa, this article contains some basic material 
on the aluminum industry as it appeared at the end of 1940*
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Alcoa was rendering great public service in the interest of 
national defense, and without regard to its own pocketbook 
or profit and loss statement, then the public desire for
Bmore intensive action in the antitrust suit would be lessened* 
The fact that the company did embark upon such a program of 
expansion might also have been motivated by the fact that , in 
spite of.the reduced price of aluminum, profits were still 
to be made in the field* At least that Is the conclusion 
which one might draw from a survey of the industry at the 
time*
An article in Fortune (May, 1941) brings the story
of Alcoa*s expansion into a better focus by showing the
specific steps which had been taken in the matter of in-
creasing production of ingot aluminum immediately* Excerpts
from this article which have a bearing on the present dis—
9cussion are as follows s
Meantime, what has Alcoa done about aluminum 
capacity? In 1939 the company produced 327 million pounds of raw aluminum, the then all-time high, practically all of which went into commercial 
products* Its actual capacity was around 335 million, and it would have produced more than 
3^7 million had it not been for the drought and consequent water power shortage ....... .The company
^A further discussion of this antitrust suit will 
be given in a future account of the settlement of the suit 
and the decision handed down by Judge Caffey in the New York 
court* More court litigations followed Judge Caffey's decision.
Aluminum and the Emergency,n Fortune. Vol. XXIXI, 
(May, 1941)t PP* 66-6d*
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increased its capacity at the end of 1939 to about 
435 million pounds a year by adding facilities at 
Massena, New York* and Alcoa, Tennessee* Early in 1940, while the war was still pursuing a lan­
guid course, it announced #30,000,000 expenditures on improvements that included, besides the Van­couver plant, additions to sheet capacity for air­craft, an extrusion plant near Los Angeles dedicated mostly to shapes and rivets for planes, and by 
April a further addition not only to finished alumi­
num facilities at various plants, but to primary or raw aluminum capacity. All this occurred before 
President Roosevelt*s speech about 50,000 planes*
There can be little doubt, however, that the pressure 
of cosaaitnients to Allied countries in Europe had much to do 
with the expansion program, along with the extension of de­
fense program activities at home* Although it has been 
charged that there was a tendency on the part of the Demo­
cratic administration to forget about the preparedness program 
during the election year of 1940, there was still the fact to 
be considered that Roosevelt had spoken of $0,000 planes a 
year, plus all of the other types of armaments that would use 
aluminum* Hence the necessity for a reappraisal of productive 
capacity in the aluminum field, and the further decision on 
the part of Alcoa to do even better in its program of expansion* 
In October, according to Fortune * the company launched its
whole program, urged on, perhaps, by the conditions described10
In the following paragraph:
Came October, 1940, with passage of the excess profits tax amortisation bill, and Alcoa promptly
10Ibl<U. p. 145
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Kade the headlines with an announcement that It was 
going to spend $150#000,000 on expansion. Since 
then the figure has been upped to $160,000,000-*** some #65,000,000 goes for primary capacity (in** 
eluding #15,000,000 on a steamship line and 
$16,000,000 on power) and $95,000,000 for finishing capacity* Starting with a capacity of 435,000,000 
pounds of the raw metal at the beginning of 1940, 
Alcoa hopes to have 720,000,000 pound capacity by 
July, 1942. If its request for Canadian power at 
Massena, New fork, is granted, it will up the figure by as aueh as 60,000,000 pounds. This means that Alcoa may turn out some 575,000,000 pounds in 
1941 and perhaps 700,000,000 pounds in 1942.
Such were the hopes of the company concerning the
uuccess of its expansion in terms of post-emergency profits
and demand for aluminum that Alcoa did not even bother to
solicit aid from the Government, through the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation or any other government agency. All of
this expansion was to be financed out of cash and bank loans.
It apparently was one of the greatest financing ventures ever
attempted by the company. This type of financing of defense
expansion was in direct contrast to what the Reynolds Metals
Company and the Olin Corporation did when they decided to
enter the field of ingot aluminum production in the United U
States.
U$ee the later discussions concerning both Reynolds 
Metals Company and the Olin Corporation in their relations with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Defense 
Plant Corporation. Alcoa must be remenfbered as the company 
which operated all but one of the later government plants.
The significance of all of 'these new and vast
preparations for greater production in the aluminum industry
to Alcoa may be shown by a further statement which was made12
by I. W. Wilson* This statement is as follows:
Following a schedule which calls for the 
increase of its ingot production to something in excess of 700*000,000 pounds by July, 1942, 
as compared with the 1939 level of 327,000,000 pounds, Aluminum Co* of America will thus more 
than double in three years a production built up over more than half a century*
One may have occasion to wonder, in the light of the above
statement, whether or not the company had been missing a good
opportunity of expansion in the past* If in the period of
fifty years the company had not expanded to its full capacity
in terms of satisfying the demand for aluminum products, it
may be imagined by some that Alcoa had not taken any too
much trouble to examine the shape or slope of its demand
curve for aluminum* Since all of the contemporary accounts
of the company*s expansion Indicated that the hopes for the
future were for an expanding demand for the metal, it may
not be unfair to say that such a domestic demand for aluminum 
might have been built up even before the preparedness program
began* This type of analysis will be pursued further in the
3^1. W* Wilson, o p . cit.. p. 531*
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chapter which deals with the economics the present-day 
aluminum industry of the United States*
Following only briefly at this time the line of 
argument presented above, ,we may point out further statements
which show the impact of the defense program upon the industry
in 1940* Attributable to I* W* Wilson, the analysis goes into
the problem of the obligation of Alcoa in the defense program
and the possibilities for the future as they were seen In the
14early part of 1941* Excerpts of importance are as follows:
At the same time the company fully realized 
the obligation of all industry, insofar as possible, 
to keep men and plants at work, after there havd disappeared the demands of a crisis forced upon American industry by the warmakers of totalitarian nations* The company is naturally concerned about 
the future when the defense and emergency demands come to an end* Therefore, it has started now to 
develop new peacetime uses and wider peacetime markets for aluminum, intensifying the peacetime research which in the short space of 50 years has raised aluminum from a brush-and-comb novelty to one of the most useful of all metals*
Continuing its frequently reiterated policy of passing along to the public the benefits of 
research and economies of operations, the company three times reduced Its price of aluminum ingot during 1940* Its price was 20 cents a pound when
^This economic question of the elasticity of the 
demand curve for aluminum Is one of the most important from the viewpoint of the entire industry* Suffice it to say now 
that the demand curve for aluminum has been generally regarded as elastic* More detailed discussions of this point will be 
forthcoming in later chapters*
w. Wilson, op* cit** p* 531*
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tire year started and is now 17 cents. It has been the hope of the company that these reductions would assist in meeting the country1s emergency responsibilities* **.*•*.
In this connection It should be recalled that Aluminum Co* of America does not as a rule make consumer goods; but there are some JO large Indus** 
trios which used Alcoa products in more than 2,500 applications during 1940* The company is confident that these industries appreciate that the supply­ing of aluminum for the National Defense constitutes a greater service to them than if they actually received the metal to the full extent of their 
normal industrial uses********
Defense comes first........When the emergencyis past, there will be more aluminum available than 
ever before*••••••*
The companyf s new metal-producing plant at Vancouvert Wash., originally Intended to produce 30,000,000 pounds of ingot yearly, went into 
operation in 1940 with a capacity of 60,000,000 pounds, and is now being expanded to produce more than 150,000,000 pounds annually* Although the Aluminum Company is the largest industrial power customer of both TVA and Bonneville, it has under 
way two great hydroelectric projects in the South­east* New fabricating facilities are beings built or planned for the companyts plants at Alcoa, Term.; 
Lafayette, Ind.; Los Angeles, Calif*; New Kensing­ton, Pa*; Detroit, Mich.; Cleveland, Ohio; Edgewater,N* 3.; and Massena, N. T* These additional fabricating facilities will increase the company’s output of cast­
ings, sheet, tubes, strew machine products, rivets, extruded and rolled shapes, rods and bars, and forgings.
In addition to the features pointed out In this summary
of the activities of the company during 1940* it Is to be
noted that several laboratory research experiments had been
brought to a successful conclusion during the same year*
Alcoa’s research facilities, known as Aluminum Laboratories,
Inc*, have been notbd through the years as being capable of
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technical research activities of a high caliber* A descrip*
tlon of the work accomplished in research in 1940 is as 
15follows:
The most Important single development in the 
research laboratories this year probably was the placing In operation of the Templin universal metal-working machine9 Most powerful device of 
its kind in the world9 this scientific giant 
permits the study of stresses and strains in 
various forms of aluminum and competing materials 
In their full size9 rather than in the scale models to which the laboratories were formerly 
limited* It is expected that valuable informa­
tion about the properties of aluminum will be f orthcoming*
Research during 1940 was also responsible for important developments in brazing aluminum 
alloy products; in increasing application of anodic treatment finishing processes for alumi­
num; improving the merits of aluminum house paint; continuing to open up fields for the use 
of aluminum in marine applications, and in many further ways painting to expanding markets for 
the metal in the years to come*
In keeping with this general trend of analysis of 
the company*s activities of 1940* it is also interesting to 
note the following portion of its annual report for that 
year* This statement is only a portion of the total report, 
but it does serve to show the general analysis which the 
company was making of its own expansion program of the year*
15lbld.
5&
Briefly quoted In Barron’s for ApriX 7, 1941, the statement
16reads as follows:
The employment for national defense of a 
large percentage of the present aluminum pro­
duction necessarily reduces the amount of 
aluminum available for civilian uses, creating an important situation in civilian markets*
Every effort, however, is being made to 
alleviate this situation* In order to insure 
markets for the greatly increased production for which outlets must be found following the present emergency, the company is main­taining its research, development, and 
advertising activities, and taking all other 
steps permitted by present conditions*
Believing that the best interests of 
the country, as well as those of the Aluminum 
Go*, could be served by lowering prices as improved economies and research permit, three 
reductions, each of one cent per pound, were made during the year 1940 in the basic price of aluminum ingot, bringing the price to 17 
cents per pound* Reductions in the prices of 
fabricated products also were made*
Production in 1940, the highest In the 
company’s history, exceeded by 25$ the pro­
duction of 1939-
Evidently, this sort of information concerning alumi­
num and the progress made by the great American producer, 
Alcoa, was having its effect upon the Allied countries of 
Europe* In an effort to ©how Just what the prospects were, 
as they appeared in England, one only has to check over some 
of the contemporary issues of the Economist* one of England’s 
popular economic journals. This account, however, as given
nAluminum Company’s Plant Expansion,” Barron’s. 
Vol. XXI, (April 7, 1941), p. 20.
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below* pointed not only to the growing American supply of 
aluminum, but also to the fact that the entire situation 
appeared all right to the English people* Remembering that 
this account was written in December, 1940, nearly six 
months after the fall of France* it appears a bit amazing 
that such great confidence could be expressed in the future 
supply of this necessary metal* Only excerpts of this re­
port will be given at this point, but they will serve to show
how the aluminum situation was viewed from the other side of
17the Atlantic Ocean* Some of the statements arei
.**•••*•meanwhile production of both 
bauxite and finished aluminum in other parts of the Empire is rapidly expanding*
In Canada, where the Aluminium Company of Canada, Ltd*, had started a ^7,000,000 
expansion programme shortly before the war whleh included considerable extensions in the reduction capacity of the Arvida and 
Shawinigan Falls works, the potential Cutout of finished aluminium has now been 
raised to well ever 100,000 tons* Further 
extensions with financial support of the British Government are in progress and 
should soon enable the Dominion to supply 
the whole of our huge war requirements*••«
While the Allied territories are now virtually self-sufficient both in bauxite and 
finished aluminium, substantial quantities of American aluminium were acquired by the Min­
istry of Supply from the United States in the first year of the war* Although con­sumption of aluminium in the United States, 
which rose by 97 per cent to 167,600 short
^"Growing Aluminium Supplies,n Economist. 
Vol. CXXXIX, (December 14, 1940), pp. 745-46.
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tons last year, is still growing at a rapid 
rate, that country can still be regarded as 
an efficient source to supplement British supplies should this be necessary* Production 
in the United States in 1939* at 14&*400 tons* was some 20,000 tons smaller than consumption* but last year the Aluminum Company of America not only completed an expansion programme at a 
cost of $26,000,000, but also started another estimated to absorb $30*000*000* Works now nearing completion will raise its potential 
output to 215,000 tons early in 1941* Another, with a capacity of 30,000 tons, is to start in production in the middle of next year*
Adequate supplies for the huge United States re-armament programmes are thus more than assured* On the European continent*too* 
production of aluminium has advanced sub­stantially this year* although figures are unobtainable* The present war* therefore* is proving of decisive influence on the world aluminium supply* Last year world 
production is estimated by the United States Bureau of Mines to have reached 647»400 
metric tons, against 47$,&00 tons a year before and 259,600 tons five years ago* This 
year an output of 750*000 tons seems assured* and further increases are almost certain to 
follow*
Perhaps a better analysis of the entire field of 
world aluminum production in 1940 will serve to show the 
importance of production of the metal in the various countries 
involved in World War II* This analysis is given in the form 
of Table I, which shows the primary aluminum production by 
continents and by countries, both in 1933 and 1940* The com­
parison with 1933 is given simply to show the changes that 
defense and war programs had wrought in the world situation* 
It will be noted that the relative figures for total pro­
duction of aluminum in the world show that between 1933 and 
1940 the output of the metal had been increased about six
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times* Of much more significance to Alcoa and to the entire 
United States is the relative decline in the position of the
TABLE I
PRIMARY ALUMINUM PRODUCTION BY CONTINENTS AND COUNTRIES\
1933 and 1940








142 803 100.0 100.0
Germany ••••••***••* 19 240 13.3 29.9Russia******** ***** 4 55 3.1 6.9France* ************ 14 50 10.1 6.2Italy* ........... 12 40 8.5 4.9United Kingdom***•« 11 35 7.8 4.4Switzerland*••••••* & 28 5-3 3.5Norway*•*•••*«*•*•* 15 15 10.9 1.9
Other Countries*•** 3 8 2.3 0.9
B.
Total Europe * * * * * 
North America
37 471 61.3 58.6
United States***••• 3? 187 27.2 23.3Canada* *••••*•••**• 16 110 11.4 13.7
C.
Total North America 
Asia
55 297 38.6 37.0
Japan* *••*••••••••• e • 35 • * * 4*4
Source: Minerals Yearbooks* U* 3* Bureau of Mines; and Engle
and others* op* clt* * pp* 134-35* Figures on the production of aluminum by countries are rounded off to nearest thousands* 
The table Is for comparative purfjoses only, and specific data 
should be consulted from the above references, If desired*
limited States In aluminum production for the period indi­
cated* Germanyfs output of the metal had increased from 
about 19*000 metric tons in 1933 to about 240f000 metric 
tons in 1940* and her percentage of the v/cr ldf s output of 
aluminum was boosted from only 13*3$ to 29*9$ in that period 
&£ seven years• On the other hand* the production of the 
United States rose from 39*000 metric tons in 1933 to 471*000 
metric tons in 1940* but there was a relative decline in the 
percentage of her world output9 the figures being dropped 
from 27*2$ to 23*3$ during the same seven years* Even the 
total relative output for the continent of North America 
showed a decline from to 37*0$ for the period* although
the European output also showed a slight total decline £n 
terms of percentages* The situation was changed somewhat 
from that of 1933 by the entry of Japan into the field of 
aluminum production* to the extent that the Japanese pro­
duction in 1940 was 4*4$ of total world output of the metal* 
Other figures on the table are of Importance in regard to 
several of the countries* but the ones given above show the 
relative positions of the dominant Allied and Axis countries 
in terms of aluminum production in 1940*
These data show the apparent necessity not only for 
the tremendous expansion of Alcoa facilities* but also for 
the entry into the industry of Reynolds Metals Company during 
the defense period of 1940 and 1941• This story of the first
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real competitor to Alcoa In the field of ingot aluminum 
production is significant in many respects, and will be 
presented in the following section of this chapter*
Brief history of the Reynolds Metals Company and 
H i  sa£OL into Ingot Aluminum Production:
One of the interesting features of the Reynolds Metals 
Company is the fact that its original entry into the field of 
aluminum was merely in the capac£ty-of a consumer of the metal* 
along with other types of metals* The company was incorpora­
ted in the state of Delaware* in the year 1923, and was for 
many years engaged In the production of a variety of finished 
products, such as thermostats, instruments for measuring 
temperature and pressure, foils for packaging, insulation, 
and the like* During the first ten years, the company fol­
lowed a program of expansion through the acquisition of 
additional corporations which were engaged in similar busi­
ness activities* Later on, just on the eve of the outbi'eak 
of World War II, the company became Interested in aluminum, 
first in the field of fabrication and then later in all of 
the various activities needed to make'Reynolds Metals Com­
pany, like Alcoa, a thoroughly integrated company in the 
aluminum industry*
Reynolds Metals Company had been a customer of Alcoa 
for several years, and had dealt in the production of some
6k
aluminum foil, powder and paste* The company had even been 
an Importer of ingot aluminum from France, and had been moot 
successful in all of its business activities* Richard 3amuel 
Reynolds, president of the company, conceived the idea in 
19A0 that the successful waging of the war would depend to a 
large extent upon production of aluminum, because the metal 
was essential in aircraft production* With this idea in mind, 
Mr* Reynolds contacted various officials of the Government, 
and even had an interesting interview with Arthur Vining Davis, 
president of Alcoa* These conversations amounted to almost 
complete failure at first, especially the one with Mr* Davis, 
hut Mr* Reynolds was persistent in his efforts to convince 
the officials In the Government that more aluminum capacity 
was needed at that time* His contacts with Senator Lister 
Hill, of Alabama, bore fruit, even after Mr* Davis had re­
fused to consider the idea of Alcoa expansion up to a billion*
id
pound capacity*
Government financing of the Reynolds program for 
aluminum was forthcoming from the Reconstruction Finance Cor­
poration, and at a later time through the Defense Plant Cor­
poration* The original application to the K* F* G* resulted 
In the granting of a loan of $15,300,000 to the company to
IdI* F* Stone, "Their Monopoly. Right or Wrong," 
Nation. Vol. CLII, (May 24, 1941), p. 603.
65
build a plant for aluminum ingot production* Later loans 
made by the R* F* G* to Reynolds brought the total up to 
$20,000,000* Original plans for construction of facilities 
at Listerhill, Alabama, and at Longview, Washington, were 
made* Both plants were to be ingot production plants, with 
capacities of 40,000,000 and 60,000,000 pounds, respectively, 
each year* At the time, it was planned that the company 
could use electrical energy from Bonneville dam for the Wash-* 
ington plant, although interference on the part of Secretary 
of the Interior Ickes became necessary at one point to assure
19an adequate supply of power to Reynolds Metals Company* It
was not expected that Reynolds could reach full production
until 1942, and, as it turned out, the United States actually
was engaged in World War II before the company reached the
full capacity which it set out to accomplish* The rapidity
with which the expansion of Reynolds Metals Company had taken
place is shown in the following brief summary of their broad20
activities in the period from 1940 to 1942:
In 1940 Reynolds went into bauxite mining 
by the absorption of Bauxite Mining Company* In 
1941 Reynolds Metals acquired Reynolds Alloys Company which operates large aluminum sheet and shape mills built by the Defense Plant Corpora­
tion, and also Reynolds Ore Company which operates 
an alumina plant at Llsterhill, Alabama*
19ibld.
^Engle and others, o p . clt.. pp. 131-32.
66
At the same time a horizontal expansion took place* An extrusion plant was built with Defense Plant Corporation financing which has since operated 
with a capacity of 46 million pounds yearly, pro­
ducing extruded bars, tubing, and shapes* In 1942 
the production of aircraft parts was be^un. On the 
whole* Reynolds now owns or operates some 35 plants located at such points as Louisville, Kentucky;
Chicago, Illinois; Richmond, Virginia, Harrison, New 
Jersey; New fork City; St. louis, Missouri; Listerhill, 
Alabama; and Longview, Washington. Like Alcoa, Rey­
nolds is now an integrated concern from bauxite mining to the fabrication of the most delicate precision in­
struments. It operates on a smaller scale than Alcoa, 
but because of its connections with other metals and 
because of its production of highly elaborated finished products, Reynolds may be said to have a 
wider range of activities than Alcoa.
An examination of recent balance sheets of 
Reynolds shows that its total'assets in 1942 were 
about one-seventh of A l c o a . F i x e d  assets, property, plant and equipment after deducting 
depreciation were valued at $7.6 million in 1936*
By 1942 these assets, including the so-called 
"emergency facilities,” uad increased to $34 million*
In terms of the defense program, it must be admitted that the 
entry of Reynolds Metals Company into the field of aluminum 
created quite a stir in industrial circles. In retrospect, 
it will be futther admitted that the move was one of gr4at 
importance in the building up of wartime supplies of this 
strategic metal.
Testimony by Mr. Reynolds before the Truman Committee 
during the defense period showed plainly what his opinion of 
the Alcoa program had been. In the brief period of only six 
months, the Reynolds Metals Company had constructed one alumi­
num plant and two raeta1-reduction plants, and Mr. Reynolds
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felt that Alcoa could have bettered that record. In his 
testimony, Mr. Reynolds stated further that no lack of alumi— 
q u a  production should be allowed to hold the defense program 
back. He stated that "aluminum Ingots can be increased and
multiplied as fast as aviation, automobiles, and other de~21fense contractors can expand their facilities." It was 
this unbounded faith in the entire aluminum production program 
that kept the expansion program of the Reynolds Metals Company 
la. high gear throughout the defense period and during the war 
itself. In one respect, it was much easier for this company 
to maintain a high degree of faith, since most of its financing 
had been done with public funds* Alcoa*s expansion, as noted 
before, was provided for by a small group of people and by 
the process of "plowing back" their profits into the business* 
Further expansion of Reynolds, beyond the $20,000,000 
in loans previously mentioned, was made possible after the 
United States entered World War II, but this phase of the 
aluminum expansion program will be presented in the next 
chapter* The company had made a successful beginning In the 
aluminum industry by the time of the ending of the defense 
period, and was to emerge as a definite competitor to Alcoa 
in the aluminum industry of the United States* One of the
2^I« F* Stone, op. cit*« p* 603
significant features of the contract of Reynolds Metals 
Company with the Government was the inclusion of an "option 
to purchase” clause, which would permit the company to pur­
chase the Louisville, Kentucky, extrusion plant from the 
Defease Plant Corporation* Reynolds had been operating this
plant for the Government* Their option was a feature which
22was not included in the contracts with Alcoa* Such opera­
tions of the Defense Plant Corporation in the field of finan­
cing the aluminum industry in its expansion program make it 
necessary to review the history of this agency breifly*
Activities of the Defense Plant Corporation:
Originally, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
had been the chief agency for extension of loans in industry 
in the United States* 'Established by an act of Congress in 
1932, the R. F* C. had been active throughout the period of 
the 1930*s in aiding all types of American industry* It was 
only natural that in the beginning of the defense program 
this corporation would lend money to such companies as the 
Reynolds Metals Company* However, It became apparent in 
August, 1940, that a specialized defense agency should be 
set up, and at that time the Defense Plant Corporation was 
established as a subsidiary of tne K. F* C*, mainly to facili­
tate the building of various types of defense pianos*
^Engle and others, Ojj* cit * * p* 134*
The Defense Plant Corporation entered immediately
lato the aluminum industry, and operated mainly as a financial
holding company, controlling all facilities acquired by it,
with the exception of the options to Keynolds and to the Olin 
23Corporation* With adequate financial resources, the cor­
poration extended its investments in the aluminum field until 
about #300 millions had been released* Although its activities 
during the defense period had not extended very far, the 
tremendous expansion of its interests after the United States
entered World War II made the Defense Plant Corporation "by
24far the largest single factor in the industry." Evidently, 
the entire program of its expansion was due to the fact that 
officials in Washington filially began to realize that the 
bottleneck in aluminum could cost the Allied nations the 
victory in World War II* Many suggestions aad been made by 
various interested officials and individuals concerning the 
Governments entry into the aluminum production field, with 
at least one writer urging that the best way to provide alumi­
num was "to begin construction of a chain of government alumi­
num plants that will give us planes now and cheaper pots later*"
^Discussion of the Olin Corporation is given in the 
next chapter, since this company began operations in 1942*
2^Engle and others, op. cit*. p. 135*
2*I. F* btone, oj£)* bit«« p. 603*
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Xn mid-year, 1941, the news from Washington, D. G», 
was that the Government finally had decided to erect eight 
new plants for the production of aluminum. It came as a 
distinct surprise to many Americans, because of the persistent 
efforts on the part of Alcoa officials and even Commissioner 
Edward Stettinius, of the National Defense Advisory Commission, 
to impress upon the country the adequacy of the aluminum sup­
ply* It seems impossible that Mr. Stettinius could have 
issued his famous statement of December 29, 1940, to the
effect that ■Investigations just completed disclosed nd
26
serious shortages•* The events of 1941 proved him to be 
incorrect in his analysis, and further established the necessity 
for greatly expanded production of aluminum.
The years of 1940 and 1941 had begun the great revolu­
tion in the aluminum industry of the United States, and the 
next three years were to see the wartime activity in this 
field exceed even the most hopeful dreams of expansion. With 
the active participation of the United States in World War II 
after December 7, 1941, this country embarked upon its true
26"Why We Are Falling Behind,fl New Republic» Vol. CIV, 
(February 17, 1941, Part Two), p. 233. For additional comments on this same subject of the actions of government officials 
in the aluminum crisis, consult Time. (January 6, 1941), P* 15, 
and Time. (May 26, 1941), P• 21.
wartime program, the history of which will include an account 
oi the success of the vast aluminum industry in its continu­
ation of the program begun as a defense measure* The next 
chapter will be devoted to the history of the aluminum industry 
from December, 1941* to September, 1943*
CHAPTER III
THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II
Entry of the United States into World War II in
December, 1941, gave a great impetus to the aluminum industry
of this country* Following the events which had taken place
during the defense program era, the Industry engaged in still
further efforts to place the United States in a strategic
position to wage a successful war* Germany had been gambling,
along with Japan, upon the possibility of being able to hold
the United States at arm9s length with its air forces, mainly
because of Its vastly superior prewar position in regard to1the primary supply of airplane metals* This gamble on the 
part of the Axis powers was quickly recognized as just a hope 
on their part, because the immediate response of both private 
industry and the Government of the United States gave rise to 
a phenomenal wartime production of the metal*
The vast expansion program of Alcoa, the entry of the 
Reynolds Metals Company, and the Government*s decision to
iRal F* Lee, "America Turns *Pro,f" Barron*s (March 16, 
1942), p. S. This article is typical of the early wartime 
discussions of the problems faced in the light—metals field* 
Lee points to the gamble that Germany and Japan were making, and suggests that the United States might surprise the Axis 
in regard to wartime aluminum production*
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erect; aluminum producing facilities were discussed in the 
previous chapter. The full story of the success of these 
programs was to be told in terms of their wartime activities. 
Early in 1942, at a time when the shock of Pearl Harbor and of 
other events was still fresh in the minds of the American 
public, the vast program of expansion in the aluminum in­
dustry was continuing as rapidly as could have been expected.
The United States was beginning to be looked upon as the
2"Aluminum arsenal of the democracies," with the result that 
the Government's program was of particular interest. The 
entire history of the aluminum industry in wartime is closely 
allied with the various problems as they are listed below:
1. Expansion of plant facilities;
2. Dispersal of the aluminum industry;
3. Creation of potential postwar competition;
4. Development of new alloys and processes;
5* Integration of aluminum processes in one plant;
6. Success of additional private companies in 
aluminum;
7. Extension of the aluminum industry of the South 
and East to meet expanded needs;
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Development or a new aluminum industry in the 
Pacific Morthwest to aid in wartime productions; and
9* Total contributions of the aluminum industry 
in World War XI#
Governmental intervention, of course, was being felt 
not only in the field of aluminum, but also in other fields, 
because the situation in regard to some other raetals was 
critical after our official entry into the war* The whole 
picture of the frantic search for metals was adequately pre­
sented in March, 1942, in an article in Fortune* where the
3facts were presented as follows:
The crisis is barely realized. Few people are aware that one month after Pearl Harbor a 
squad of top U» S. specialists, metallurgists, 
and geologists packed themselves into a plane for South America to set going an all-out metals survey of Latin America. Few more realize that for over two years a small army of U.3. experts, 
state geologists, and engineers has been scouring this country by pack horse and mud-spattered automobile in a similar exploration of the continental 0. 3. With this survey now broad­ening into hemispheric scope the greatest hunt 
for metals in the history of the Western Hemis­
phere is on# It is brute weight of metal that must count in the next eighteen crucial months of this war, and the speed with which the hemis­
phere is made to disgorge new metal supplies may 
well tip the balance# The Axis has indicated its 
realistic grasp of the issue by making a beeline 
for metal resources in every country it has overrun. And the latest, smashing report of 
the U. 3. Bureau of Mines is that the Axis by
^*Eaee For Metals," Fortune. Vol. XXV, (March, 1942), 
pp. #5-36.
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conquest is now almost evenly balanced against 
the Allies in vital metal supplies—-one grim 
fact to underline the length of the contest qhead.*••••**
This is another race against time and against • 
dwindling stockpiles, which are now state secrets 
but in no case big enough to be complacent about.
The reasons for haste must now be clear to even the blind*....the U* S. must get as far toward self- 
sufficiency in metals as it can****.fhls may mean 
radical changes in the economic structure of the 
U. S* mining industry, cutting across patent , barriers, and even the disregarding of economics itself*
The great extent to which this analysis and prophecy
came to be actual fact can be Judged by the activities which
surrounded the aluminum industry itself* Adequate recourse
to 3outh American bauxite ores had aided the industry during
the prewar and the defense periods, but more and more emphasis
was placed during the war on the utilisation of domestic 
ores, even to the extent of developing the lower-graae ores
and the erection of pilot plants for research activities.
The situation in early 1942 in regard to bauxite
ores and their importance to the aluminum picture has been4further stated as follows:
Important as are all the other strategic 
metals, aluminum probably will go into history as the metal of World War II. It is the metal 
of air power. It is the metal in which the Axis stole such a long march on the Allies, 
building up to 4& per cent of v/orld output, that it will take us until the end of 1942 to
4Ibld.. pp. 132-35
76
pull ahead, It la the metal in which pressure 
on production is now greater than in any other,The most startling fact about aluminum to many 
people is that the B. S, imports ovei’ £>0 per cent of its needs in high-grade bauxite ore, 
from which aluminum is made. The bulk of U.S. 
supplies of this vital ore come from British 
Guiana and Surinam, whose huge deposits can 
fill our full import needs (total estimated 
war needs: over three million tons a year)as soon as the U. 3, triples the shipping 
capacity now available, In the interim the 
U, S, is drawing deeply on its domestic bauxite 
reserves, which are precariously small. Known deposits of high-grade bauxites, mostly in 
Arkansas, total some nine million long tons; 
below this, at extra cost for silica removal, 
are usable submarginal reserves of another nine 
million long tons. If all outside supplies were to be cut off these reserves would make us self- sufficient--but at the price of exhausting them in something under six years.
This Is a shaky backdrop for aluminum,,,,.
The broadest, most prolific, and untapped source for alumina is high-alumina c l a y , , S o m e  of the 
world9 a top researchers have been attacking this problem for two decades, because in the long view 
bauxite is limited and clay must eventually become 
the world9s source for aluminum.,,,,The most dan­gerous notion that the U, S. may have is that it has plenty of time, that extreme measures to 
broaden U, 3. production of strategic metals need not be taken quite yet. The initiative, it should 
be noted must come from government, ••• .On their 
side private capital and industry cannot too far 
abrogate their traditional function of taking risks without destroying their reasons for being.
There could have developed a substantial argument in
terms of economic theory as to whether or not the Government
should have been entering the field of production of aluminum,
but It will be readily seen by most economists that in this
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time of emergency private, enterprise simply was not in any
5sort of* position to produce an adequate supply of the metal»
It had been apparent Tor many years that the classic analysis 
of an "invisible hand" had not received much appreciation in
the field of aluminum, and no competition had developed#
Expansion of Plant Facilities:
Expansion of the various companies reached its highest
point in the period from 1942 to 1945• Government-built
plants made the picture of the aluminum industry a more
satisfying one, in terms of production and priees* The
Reynolds Metals Company, which had begun its building program
in 1940 and 1941, continued to expand, mainly with financial
aid from the Government# It is not surprising, then, to find
that in 1943 the reduction capacity of this company had been
increased to approximately 170 million pounds in the Longview
and ListerhiU plants* The Reynolds company had little more
than one-fifth of the capacity which Alcoa could boast in
1943* The extent of its capacity was about eight per cent6
of the total capacity of the United States* However, the 
Reynolds Metals Company could boast of having a unique
^Private enterprise versus government intervention is 
a point which will be discussed in the chapter dealing with 
the economics of the aluminum industry*
^Engle and others, o p . cit** p. 134•
7&
record behind it, in terns or the pioneering in the field
of modern aluminum production techniques* Mr* James A* Lee,
in an article concerning this company, pointed to the many
** firsts* that had been achieved by Reynolds since its entry
into the field of aluminum production* He described the
decision of Reynolds to go Into the field of virgin metal
7production in the following statement:
This decision was quickly put into definite form with the construction of the first aluminum 
plant in the Western Hemisphere and probably in the entire world to start with the bauxite ore, 
process It to alumina, reduce the oxide to metal, and roll sheets, rods, and bars, all in one 
continuous straightline flow of materials over a mile in length* Throughout this long line are 
nmnerous evidences of pioneering spirit*
(1) It is the first aluminum plant in which 
low grade domestic ore was used ex* 
clusively;
(2) This is the first commercial plant to use closed circuit wet grinding of 
bauxite;
(3) The bedding down of bauxite was intro* duced;
(4) Most of the red mud is removed by settling rather than by filtration;
(5) Rectangular Soderberg continuous eleo* trodes are used in the cells; and
(6) Rolling doors are provided for the 
furnaces*
7ja»es A* Lee, nThree Plants in One: Reynolds Metals
dompany Aluminum Plant," Chemical and Metallurgical Engijieer- 
ing* Vol* L, (May, 1943), PP» 145-50*
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Another coatemporary report; on the growth or the Reynolds
Metals Company also is of great interest, mainly because of*
the fact that it pointed to the postwar future of the company
in terms of its competition with Alcoa* From this article£
the following is quoted:
The growth of Reynolds during the war 
changes the picture of the aluminum industry*A competitor with a capacity of one-fifth that of Alcoa9s is not a negligible one, 
especially since Reynolds9 facilities arc of 
the most modern* The Longview plant is on 
tidewater and has very cheap power near at 
hand* In the future it may have access to 
locally produced alumina, either from im­ported bauxite or from local clays* Reynolds9 
Listerhill plant is the only one in the United States where alumina refining, aluminum re­duction, and fabrication are integrated on the 
same site* In the future, the success of Reynolds may depend on its ability to take 
over some of the government-owned plants now 
operated by others and thereby extend its share of total capacity and reduce Alcoa’s 
lead* here again the policy of the govern­ment on the disposal of its holdings may be 
decisive*
The analysis is not complete, however, when only the 
expansion of Reynolds is treated in the discussion of the 
wartime period* The greatest single influence throughout 
the entire period of the war was the Defense Plant Corpora­
tion* This government corporation carried through its 
original plans to build alumina plants and aluminum reduction
^Bngle and others, op* cit*. p. 134
so
plants* The rapid extension of its program of building
aided the war effort greatly* The Defense Plant Corporation
made a total investment of approximately half a billion
dollars in the aluminum industry during the defense and war
periods* The corporation eventually owned alumina plants to
the value of nearly $100 million; nine aluminum reduction
plants worth nearly $175 million; rolling mills valued at
more than $100 million; and an extrusion and fabricating
9plant which cost more than $30 million* Additional facili­
ties bfought the sum total of investments of Defense Plant 
Corporation to the staggering sum of more than $633 million* 
Some of the actions of this governmental agency were severely 
criticized* Its decision to purchase 1,300,000,000 pounds of 
aluminum from the Aluminum Company of Canada, at a price of 
15 cents per pound, was criticized by many people* It must 
be admitted that this action was caused by the dire necessities 
of war, and some of the criticism was not justified* An ad­
vance payment of million was made by the Defense Plant
Corporation* This money allegedly was used to construct a
dam on the Saguenay River, thus giving Canadian producers an 
advantage in the postwar era through their low power costs. In
j 10defense of this move, the following statement Is presented:
Such criticism overlooks the fact that the 




toe realization that they must gird themselves 
for war. Aluminum was needed in vast but un­der inable quantities* Frantic efforts were made 
to increase capacity at home and in Canada*
Economic considerations both immediate and long rim were ignored* The important consequence is 
that we have insured an adequate supply of alumi- nuffl, to secure victory* Offsetting facts are 
that we have subsidised a potential competitor 
in Canada , and have built a number of poorly 
located, high cost plants at home* We have also 
established some new efficient and well located 
plants* Only the test of time can reveal the 
net benefits or losses flowing from policies 
forged of necessity in the fire of war prepara­tion*
Government activity throughout the war in the aluminum 
program may best be shown by presentation of facts concerning 
the Defense Plant Corporation*s interest both in aluminum and 
in magnesium, which is the chief competitor of aluminum among 
the light metals* Mr* Hans A* Klagsbrunn, of the Defense 
Plant Corporation, published one of the most comprehensive 
reviews of the aluminum and magnesium industries of this 
country that appeared at the close of hostilities with Germany, 
During the war, of course, it had been a matter of close cen­
sorship, and figures on such production could not have been 11published* But with the end of war with Germany, conditions 
were changed considerably, and various articles began to
^■For a typical example of wartime writing on the 
aluminum industry, see F* C* Frary, "Aluminum in War," Chemical 
and R n g j N e w s * Vol* XXI, (December 10, 1943)» P P * 2018—19* 
For obvious reasons, it was much later than 1943 before it was 
possible to draw a complete picture of the aluminum industry.
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appear, even before the cessation of war with Japan*
Mr* Klagsbrunn's article appeared in the July, 1945, issue 
of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry* This magazine was 
one of the first periodicals to present an adequate summary 
of events during the war years* The article was accompanied 
by a number of significant tables concerning various phases 
of the aluminum and magnesium industries during the war* 
Significant among the opening remarks of Mr* Klagsbrunn is 
the following statement:
bhen it became apparent that tremendous in- 
creases were necessary, Defense Plant Corporation, 
at the request of War Production Board, con- strueted two alumina plants, nine aluminum re­
duction plants, and thirteen magnesium metal 
plants* These additions gave a total designed capacity of 2236 million pounds of aluminum 
(about seven times the 1939 Alcoa peak) and 536 million of magnesium (about eighty-seven 
times the Dow high of 1939)* Actual production, however, showed a larger capacity for all of 
the aluminum plants and for nine of the mag­nesium* Even without full use, supplies came 
so rapidly that cutbacks were ordered for 
aluminum by December, 1943» and for magnesium 
in May, 1944* During December, 1944, aluminum had been cut back to only 43*5% of capacity, magnesium to 16%* The problem of adequate 
supply of these metals had, within a space of four years, been completely overcome*
This description of American aluminum and magnesium
production is one of the most amazing stories of industrial
production ever known in the United States* From a story of
^Hans A* Klagsbrunn, "Wartime Aluminum and Magnesium Productions" Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, Vol* XXXVII, 
{July, 1945) , pp.' W - T 7 .
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•toe little" and almost; "too late,1* the development In the 
aluminum industry had p m  grossed so well that even before 
the opening of the second front in Europe it was possible to 
begin these cutbacks which Mr* Klagsbrunn mentions* The 
Defense Plant Corporation had made investments in both the 
aluminum and the magnesium industries to the extent of about 
$1*059*957*000, more than half of which had gone into alumi­
num production. In a more detailed breakdown, it is shown 
that $263*643*000 was spent for alumina and aluminum plants; 
# 363*575*000 for aluminum fabricating plants; and $41*435,000 
for miscellaneous plants* including the sintering plants, 
power, etc* This made a total of $670*65$,000 that was spent
13by Defense Plant Corporation on aluminum* The rapid ex­
pansion of facilities which had been made possible for the 
industry by this outlay of money caused the United States 
to be in a strategic position to turn the entire course of 
the war in Europe* The enormous production of warplanes and 
equipment for the armed forces made an Allied victory possible.
Although the preceding discussions show the extent to 
which the entire aluminum production program had been a huge 
success, particularly after governmental intervention, there 
is one additional feature of the wartime activities that 
improves the whole picture. It is the story of the Olin
13Ibid.. p. 608
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Corporation, which was mentioned earlier in this study* It 
is of significance to the complete discussion of aluminum 
in war, mainly because it is typical of the interest of the 
government in the development of aluminum from alunite, 
rather than from the traditional ore, bauxite* In reality, 
it is a part of expansion in the entire industry, because 
it opened up a wide field for research and experimentation 
with the lower-grade ores for use in the postwar world*
One of the earlier reports on the activities of the 
Olin Corporation in the field of aluminum production was
14given by Professors Engle, Gregory and Mosse, as follows:
Little is known about the most recent entry 
in the aluminum field, the Olin Corporation*
Owners of Western Cartridge Company, a closely held middle west corporation, the Olin family 
undertook, in 1942, to build and operate for the Defense Plant Corporation an aluminum plant at 
Tacoma, Washington, with capacity to produce 
some 40 million pounds of pig aluminum annually*
The company has been granted an option to pur-* 
chase this plant, which is believed to be the 
only option to buy an aluminum reduction plant thus far issued by the D* P. C
Recognizing the necessity for an independent 
supply of alumina the Olin interests purchased control of Kalunite, Incorporated, at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, a company which had been formed to promote a process for extracting alumina from 
alunite* With $4,954,063 of Defense Plant Cor- 
poration funds a plant was constructed near Salt 
Lake City with capacity to produce 72,000,000 
pounds of alumina annually* Completed late in 1943 the plant is expected to be in production 
early in 1944*
^►Engle and others, op* cit** pp* 134^*35*
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No information is available on the intentions of the Olin Company to take up their option on 
the Tacoma plant and to become permanent competi­
tors of Alcoa and Reynolds* Neither are facts to 
be found on the capital strength of the company*
The excellent plant at Tacoma located close to 
tidewater is turning out aluminum of very high quality using alumina from southeastern plants*
This organisation may become a strong nucleus for another effective factor in the aluminum industry*
Actually, the last statement on the part of the 
authors mentioned above did not evolve as they had indicated 
it might, because the Olin Corporation did not remain in the 
field of aluminum production, at least at the Tacoma plant* 
This plant, according to Klagsbrunn, had cost a total of 
#6,297,000 by December 11, 1944, end had two pot lines for 
the reduction of alumina to the virgin metal* Designed for 
an annual capacity of 41*6 million pounds, the plant in. 
actual operation bettered that mark, with an annual equi­
valent, based on its best month of production, of 43,392,000 
pounds* This was not sustained production, however, and 
actual figures for production of the plant in 1942, 1943, 
and 1944, were approximately 5 million, 37 million, and 
37 million pounds, respectively, for those three years* 
Initial operations had begun in September, 1942, and full 
scale operation was effected in March, 1943* Costs, as given 
by Klagsbrunn, amounted to 15*3& cents per pound of ingot 
aluminum produced, which made the Tacoma plant one of the 
highest cost facilities which were built dufing the wartime
£6
emergency• Perhaps the higher costs of this plant might 
hare contributed to the decision of Qlin Industries, Inc*, 
to close the plant in 1945*
On December 11, 1944, the Qlin Corporation had merged 
with the Western Cartridge Company, with the result that the 
new company had been named Olin Industries, Inc* Its alumi­
num plant at Tacoma, and an ordnance plant in St* Louis, had 
been closed in 1945, but the company had retained Kalunite,
Inc*, of Salt Lake City, as a subsidiary* The Olin Company
15has ceased to be an important factor in the aluminum industry* 
Even the alumina producing facilities of Kalunite, Inc*, had 
proved to be quite disappointing, although they had paved the 
way for greater research in alumina production from alunite* 
Initial operation of the Salt Lake City plant had begun in 
July, 1944, but the total production of alumina had reached 
only 1,069,000 pounds in the last half of 1944* By that time, 
the plant had not been adequately tested, owing mainly to 
difficulties with equipment* The production of only slightly 
more than one million pounds of alumina, in a plant designed
^Complete details on the Olin Corporation and its successor, Olin Industries, Inc*, are still lacking, although 
the story as given is fairly complete, as far as it can be ascertained* These data have been assembled from Klagsbrunn, 
op* cit*. pp. 610-11; Moody*s Industrials* 1946, p. 2755; 
and Standard Corporation Records. June* 1946* p. 3444*
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for a capacity of 72 million pounds, proved to be extremely 
disappointing on many grounds.
At the same time that it extended financial aid to 
Kalunite, Inc*, for the Salt Lake City plant, the Defense 
Plant Corporation, in an attempt to augment aluminum facili­
ties, built three additional small plants to develop processes 
using materials other than bauxite ores. These three plants, 
like the one built by Kalunlte, Inc., (which was owned by Qlin 
Corporation), were constimeted by private operators, as 
follows: Columbia Metals Company, Salem, Oregon; Monolith
Portland Midwest Company, Laramie, Wyoming; and the Ancor 
Corporation, Harleyville, South Carolina* All of these three 
plants were mainly in the nature of experimental actions for 
developing alumina from clays, which are in reality low grade
17aluminum ores.
Dispersal of tne Aluminum Industry:
Wartime dispersal of the aluminum industry of the 
United States has been a subject for much comment by various 
writers who have noted the suddenness with which this scatter­
ing of all types of plants was accomplished. Most writers 
have merely commented on the vast dispersion which has taken 
place, without analyzing the entire situation to any great
^Klagsbrunn, o^. cit., p. 612. 
^ I b i d .. p. 611.
extent* However, upon close examination, it will be found 
that the expedient; things were done to assure hasty pro*** 
dnotion of aluminum with which to fight the war* Prewar 
descriptions of the industry, even after Reynolds Metals 
Company entered the field of alumina and aluminum reduction, 
were limited to a relatively small number of plants of both 
types* The privately-owned companies producing alumina were 
Alcoa and the Reynolds Metals Company, with a total of three 
plants engaged in the reduction of alumina* Two of these 
plants for alumina reduction, one at East St. Louis, Illinois, 
and the other at Mobile, Alabama, were owned and operated by 
Alcoa* The other plant, at Listerhill, Alabama, was owned 
and operated by Reynolds* That company had been financed in 
Its initial stages by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
and later received financial assistance from the Defense 
Plant Corporation* These three alumina plants were the total 
alamina facilities early in 1942* But this picture was to 
be changed considerably, both in terms of dispersion and 
quantity of alumina production, by the entry of the Defense 
Plant Corporation into the building of additional alumina 
facilities*
The Government had embarked upon the program of 
alumina production as early as August, 1941* A contract with 
Alcoa for the construction of an alumina plant at Hurricane
#9
Arkansas* was executed at that time* This plant* with 
an annual rated capacity of 1*555*000,000 pounds of alumina* 
was situated six miles from the Saline county bauxite mines
in Arkansas. It was an attempt to locate the alumina re­
duction plant close to the source of the raw ores. Its 
initial production was planned for a lower figure than that 
given above* but the later agreements reached between Alcoa 
and the Defense Plant Corporation boosted the capacity. 3till 
a second plant was planned and erected at Baton Rouge* Louisi­
ana* with the expressed purpose of using Arkansas and South 
American ores* provided conditions permitted the importation 
of the latter raw materials. The entire program which sur­
rounded the building of the two extra alumina plants had been 
set forth by the War Production Board and its predecessors.
Alcoa was to operate the two government-owned alumina plants.
Completion of these plants gave the dispersion of the alumina 
plants* their rated annual capacities, their ownership and 
operation, and the sources of their bauxite ores, as shown 
on the following page.
Analysis of Table II will show that the Defense Plant 
Corporation* through its ownership of the Hurricane Creek and 
Baton Rouge plants* was the largest single owner of alumina 
reduction capacity. Total capacity of these two plants was 
2 *555*000*000 pounds of alumina annually, or 52.2$ of the 
capacity of the entire industry. Alcoa plants ranked second
90
ia importance in alumina production, with a total capacity 
of 2,140,000,OCX) pounds annually, The Reynolds Metals Com­
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Source: Klagabrunn, op. clt ♦, p. 611*
Alcoa, with Its plants at East St# Louis, Illinois, and Mobile, 
Alabama, had a total of 43 • 7^ of the annual capacity for 
alumina production, while Reynolds1 total was 4»1^, from its 
Listerhill, Alabama, plant. In the two plants owned by the 
Defense Plant Corporation, and In Alcoa*s two plants, it was
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arranged during the war to Install lime—soda-sin ter pro-*
cessing facilities, the purposes behind this move were to
decrease losses of alumina in the Bayer process, to conserve
the limited resources of bauxite ores, and to utilize the18lower grade ores*
The dispersion among the alumina plants was more than 
matched by the wartime dispersal of the various aluminum in­
got facilities under both private and government ownership. 
Dealing briefly with the privately owned facilities for the 
reduction of the virgin metal from alumina, Alcoa had a total 
of five plants, scattered over the United States as follows: 
Alcoa, Tennessee; Badin, North Carolina; Massena, New fork; 
Niagara Falls, New fork; and Vancouver, Washington. All 
five of these plants had been in aluminum reduction business 
in 1939, with the exception of the Vancouver plant, which 
had produced nearly 10 million pounds of aluminum in 1940, 
after which its production had steadily increased each year 
until the 1943 cutbacks. The same may be said for the other 
four plants in regard to their wartime production of ingot 
aluminum. Production in all of them steadily increased in 
the years 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943* The Reynolds Metals 
Company had two aluminum reduction plants, those located at 
Listerhill, Alabama, and Longview, Washington. Production
Ibid.. pp. 611-13.
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of ingot, aluminum did not begin in these two plants until 
1941, but it was greatly expanded throughout the next three 
years, and reached maximum figures in 1944* Even without 
the Tast expansion of the government-built ingot aluminum 
plants, this phase of the activities of the industry was 
well dispersed from coast to coast* This dispersion was 
effected mainly on the basis of adequate power supplies, 
which is a necessary adjunct to ingot aluminum reduction*
The previous picture of the privately owned ingot 
aluminum production facilities is complicated by the addi­
tion of the nine government-built plants*^ The wide dispersal 
of the industry achieved by this move on the part of the 
government is one of the unique features of the history of 
alumixnsa during the war* Of these nine plants, eight were 
operated during the war.by Alcoa, and the Olin Corporation 
operated the ninth* The Alcoa-operated plants were widely 
scattered over the entire country, as follows: Burlington,
Mew Jersey; Jones Mills, Arkansas; Maspeth, Mew fork;
Massena, Mew fork; Riverbank, California; Spokane, Washing­
ton; Torrance, California; and Troutdale, Oregon* The plant 
operated by Olin Corporation was, as we have seen, in Tacoma, 
Washington* Briefly, the total dispersion of the ingot 
aluminum plants, both privately owned and government owned, 
shows that a total of 16 such plants were operative in the 
United States during the war. Of this number, four were in
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Mew Iork, four were in Washington, two were in California, 
and the remaining six were widely scattered, one each being 
in the states of Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Ala­
bama, Oregon, and New Jersey* This dispersion has been 
criticised as being uneconomic in many ways, but it has been 
upheld because of the expediency of fighting and winning 
a war.
The eight aluminum ingot plants constructed by the 
Defense Plant Corporation and operated by Alcoa during the 
war added greatly to the supply of ingot aluminum, and may be 
credited with full share in winning the war for the Allied 
powers. A total of 3$ pot lines for aluminum reduction had 
been established by the construction of these facilities, and 
Alcoa had control of 36 of them, the remaining two were 
operated by Olin Corporation at its Tacoma, Washington, plant* 
As in the case of the privately owned plants, the nine plants 
owned by the Defense Plant Corporation increased total pro­
duction for all aluminum facilities. Six of the plants had 
been In operation in 1942, and the remaining three were placed 
into operation in 1943. Total ingot aluminum production for 
the year 1943, including both privately owned plants and 
government owned plants, was 1,640,075,000 pounds, which was 
more than sufficient to satisfy the war effort. The follow­
ing table shows the wartime production of the sixteen in ,ot 
aluminum reduction plants, for the years 1942, 1943, and 1944•
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Xt is part;i cularly significant to note the great superiority 
of same of the producing plants over the others* The reason
TABLE III
ALUMINUM INGOT PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATED BY GOVERNMENT 
OWNED PLANTS AND PRIVATELY OWNED PLANTS, 1942-1944
Location
Burlington, N. J* Alcoa 
Jones Mills, Ark* 9 Maspeth, N. Y*




Torrance, Calif* Alcoa 
Troutdale, Wash* 9

























Massena, N* Y*Niagara Falls,N*Y* 
Vancouver, Wash* 










310,776 347,932 272,91996,247 106,606 65,049152,069 160,453 143,49236,670 40,669 AO,564
161,369 172,609 164,65462,975 96,456 100,40652.040 .  62,221 6.3.1.876
696,146 969,746 850,982
1,042,193 1,640,075 1,552,696
Souree: Adapted from Xlagsbrunn, o£. clt* » pp. 610-11*
for these differences is explained on the basis of the original 
designed capacity of the various plants, the original costs
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Involvedt and the number or pot lines which each plant con­
tained. The government built plants in 1943 produced 
350,329*000 pounds of virgin metal, almost as much as the 
939*746,000 pounds which were produced by the privately owned 
plants. This record is unusual for the government owned 
plants to attain, in view of the fact that the plants at 
Riverbank and Torrance, California, never did attain maximum 
capacity. One pot line at Riverbank and two at Torrance were 
never put into operation.
Peak production for all of the government owned plants 
was reached in December, 1943* with a total of 104*500,000 
pounds of ingot aluminum for that month* At the end of that 
month, the first cutbacks were made at two of the Defense 
Plant Corporation plants, and in three plants operated by 
Alcoa. These cutbacks were definite signs that the vast pro­
gram for aluminum production to meet the war emergencies had 
served the purpose. The whole problem of dispersal of the 
industry to meet the immediate wartime needs of the country 
in regard to adequate amounts of the metal was solved success­
fully. The postwar problem of the greatest economic usage of 
these facilities was still to be faced* Obviously, wartime 
dispersal of the aluminum Industry had been made mainly on the 
basis of adequate power supplies* Postwar considerations would 
give attention to other problems pf nearness to markers, trans­
portation difficulties and adequate raw materials*
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&£ Potential Postwar Competition:
Much or the previous discussion has shown the lack 
of competition in the aluminum industry prior to 1940* 
Activities ox both Reynolds Metals Company and the national 
Government in bringing about some competition in the era of 
preparedness was shown in Chapter II* But the all-out efforts 
of the United States during the actual wartime period were 
responsible for the real crystallization of the element of 
competition in the industry* The vast program of expansion 
which was carried out under the sponsorship and financial 
assistance of the Defense Plant Corporation resulted in the 
creation of a national aluminum industry ownership that 
rivalled, as we have seen, all of the efforts of Alcoa through 
the years of the twentieth century* Expansion of the Defense 
Plant Corporation into several lines of aluminum industry 
activity intensified the prospects for competition*
The extent to which this competition was a potential 
threat to Alcoa1s power in the industry may be illustrated by 
the reiteration of the statement that the Defense Plant Cor­
poration built two alumina plants, nine aluminum reduction 
plants, two rolling mills, and an extrusion and fabricating 
plant. These activities placed this governmental agency in 
the entire field of the aluminum industry, with the exception 
of the mining of bauxite or other ores* It was apparent that 
the governmental agency was interested in giving aid only in
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those fields of the industry which were inadequate to meet 
the wartime demands for the metal* The actual intention on 
the part of the Government to stay in the aluminum production 
business was never made an important issue* It was generally 
understood that the plants being erected would either’ be 
turned over to private industry at the end of the war, or be 
abandoned or, as a safety measure, be placed in a stand-by 
status as a precaution against being unprepared in the event 
of another war* However, the idea of turning the plants 
over to private industry was the question which was uppermost 
in the minds of those connected with the aluminum industry, 
because it was not known during the war whether by this means 
the Government would seek to cripple Alcoa*
Obviously* many people had felt kindly toward the 
Government when aid was extended to Reynolds* Olin and others 
for various plants in the aluminum industry* Then, after the 
Defense Plant Corporation had built the two alumina plants 
and burned them over to Alcoa for operation, there was a wave 
of skepticism about the Governments intentions. This feel­
ing of anxiety was intensified when it became known that 
Alcoa, in addition to operating the two alumina plants, would 
be given the opportunity to operate eight of the nine ingot 
aluminum reduction plants* However, these moves on the part 
of the Government may be explained by the fact that Alcoa 
seemed the only company prepared to operate these facilities*
Since the Government made no commitments to Alcoa, such as 
the "option to purchase" which had been given to Reynolds and 
the Olin Corporation, it could not have been felt at that 
time that Alcoa would take the greatest share of the post­
war aluminum capacity developed by the federal Government.
In fact, several later moves on the part of Alcoa and the 
Government showed that competition was a more likely prospect 
for the postwar aluminum industry than was the extension of 
Alcoa9s monopoly with the direct aid of the Government* Sub­
sequent leases of government-owned plants both to Reynolds 
Metals Company and to Henry J* Kaiser facilitated the postwar 
competition which had been hoped for by many people* These 
latter problems of leases, together with the turning of patent 
rights over to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to be 
made available to all producers of aluminum in the United 
3tates, will be discussed in the next chapter*
Development of Hew Alloys and Processes:
Experimentation with new alloys and new processes for 
handling both the ores and the virgin metal has long been an 
outstanding, feature of the aluminum Industry. The wartime 
period saw a great extension of these types of experimenta­
tion, with the result that many new and significant dis­
coveries were made* While the technical end of the new 
developments will not be considered here, the growth of the
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industry through these new alloys and processes is of great 
economic importance* These new alloys have made the extension 
of aluminum markets more feasible, and have, added to the use­
fulness of the metal in many industrial applications which 
were previously impossible* Both Alcoa and Reynolds developed 
outstanding alloys, which have been put into industrial use* 
Both companies have been constantly experimenting with the 
metal in a variety of ways* Further refinements of the Bayer 
process of alumina reduction have been accomplished, particu­
larly with the use of the soda-lime-sinter process* This 
process utilises or saves much more of the alumina content of 
the various ores. One of the important postwar commentaries 
on the development of alloys and aluminum processes appeared
in Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering for February, 1946, 
19as follows:
Mot all developments in aluminum have had to do with the (Bayer) process, since many con­
cerned new alloys, finishes and applications*The past year marked the commercial introduction of new clad alloys which combine high yield strength with good resistance to corrosion*
Alcoa’s new high strength 753 alloy and Reynolds 
R303 alloy, both newcomers, have found wide acceptance; they are the strongest aluminum 
alloys of their type ever used* Alloy 633, which made its debut during the war, is noted 
for its ability to take a bright, clean anodic coating* Significant progress was made during
^"Wartime progress in Alumina and Aluminum," Chemical 
and Metallurgical Engineerin£* Vol. LXII, (February, 1946),
p. 1JT.
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the last year in the fields of welding, brazing, 
and resin bonding, all of which will have their impact on the fabrication of postwar aluminum products.
Developments in the field of aluminum 
finishes continued at a rapid pace. Electrolytic 
processes have been further perfected and peace­time customers of aluminum will find the metal 
finished in practically every color of the rain­bow.
Commercial electroplating of aluminum is now available for many types of products. Nickel, copper, silver, chromium and gold plating can be 
applied now to aluminum using a zinc immersion procedure.
A great deal of significance has been attached to
this wartime development of aluminum alloys, mainly on the
basis of their prospective uses in the postwar era. In
regard to the new Alcoa alloy, 75S, the following has been 
20
said:
New high-strength alloys have been reported 
in the aluminum field. Alloy 75S contains zinc, copper, manganese, magnesium, and chromium. Its Increased strength over older alloys is said to have saved 400 pounds in an airplane. The con­
struction of a New fork skyscraper from this and other aluminum alloys is proposed by the Aluminum 
Company of America.
Other industrial applications of this same new alloy, plus
the Reynolds alloy, $303, have been mentioned in various21
articles, the following of which is typical:
Aluminum alloys are again being extensively 
used by the transportation Industry in trains,
2Qthe Americana Annual. 1947, p. 441*
23»Ibid.. p. 24. See also "New Alloys, Techniques 
Expand Markets for Aluminum Afbtor d'ar,” Iron Age, Vol. CLVII,
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trucks, and buses, and in the marine field. The 
use of aluminum in ship superstructures is a promising development. The building industry has 
been a large user of aluminum, and now develop­ments are continuing this trend. The introduction of aluminum roofing sheet, particularly for use 
oa farm buildings, sheds, and the like, has opened a very large market which should keep the rolling 
mills busy for some time. Other important appli­cations in building and home construction are aluminum spandrels, coping, window frames, 
and sills, building hardware, and venetiah blinds, 
structural uses of aluminum are increasing, -and a railroad bridge span with aluminum-plate girders 10 feet in depth and 100 feet long has been in­
stalled near Massena, New York.
All of these important uses of aluminum alloys will make the 
wartime investments in research and experimentation worth­
while in terms of additional consumer usages of the metal.
Integration of Aluminum Processes in One Plant:
Previous reference has been made to one of the greatest 
achievements in the aluminum industry of the war, that of inte­
gration of all of the processes of aluminum production into 
one plant, as achieved by the Reynolds Metals Company, at 
Listerhill, Alabama. While perhaps not on a par with the 
great expansion of the entire industry in terms of Its impor­
tance, this integration of the essential processes of alumina 
reduction, aluminum ingot reduction, and rolling mill fabrication,
(January 10, 1946), pp. 143-44; T,75S, Alcoa1 s New high Strength Aluminum Alloy,” Metals and Alloys. Vol. XX, (October, 1944), 
pp. 922-25; and Fritzlen andMondolfo, "R301, Reynolds New High Strength Aluminum Alloy,” Metals and Alloys. Vol. XX, 
(October, 1944), pp. 926-33.
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skows that it is possible, without widespread dispersal of 
these functions, to carry out a program of aluminum produc­
tion on an economic scale* Although each of these processes 
was carried out at the Listerhill plant on a smaller scale 
than was possible at other locations where larger plants had 
been erected, the integration did serve to impress upon the 
leaders in the aluminum industry the necessity for reduced 
postwar costs* One of the significant features of this in­
tegration was its saving of costs of transportation, both 
for the alumina after it had been reduced and for the ingot 
aluminum after it was ready for fabrication*
E>ach of the steps in this integrated plant is 
presented in detailed fashion in the May, 1943« issue of 
Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering * together with a
flow sheet which shows graphically how each stage is carried22
out in the mile-long industrial plant* The entire project 
was unique from the standpoint of industrial engineering, 
plant management, and continuous-flow operations* The 
nearest approach to the Reynolds technique of aluminum pro­
duction in the war was the establishment of the new alumina%
plant at Hurricane Creek, Arkansas, and the placing of the 
aluminum reduction plant near by at Jones Mills, Arkansas,
22"From Bauxite to Aluminum Sheet; Pictured Flow Sheet," Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering, Vol. L, 
(May, 1943), PP- 154-57.
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the bauxite, alumina, and virgin metal all could be produced 
in Arkansas within a radius of* a few miles, but this inte­
gration was not comparable to that of* Reynolds at Listerhill* 
The interest in this type of* integration was .further manifested
by Reynolds in its lease of the Hurricane Greek and Jones Mills23facilities after the war*
3uccess &f Additional Private Companies in Aluminums
Although the major wartime developments in the alumi­
n a  industry were achieved by those large companies which have 
been mentioned quite frequently thus far, there were some 
smaller companies which were able to gain some degree of 
recognition for their contributions in the field during the 
war* Mainly with the aid of government funds, these small 
companies, like Reynolds and Alcoa, devoted their special 
efforts to those phases of the industry which they could 
handle best* In particular, the Olin Corporation should 
be given credit both for its operation of the Tacoma, Wash­
ington, aluminum reduction plant, and for its purchase of 
Kalunite, Inc* The latter company, as we have seen, operated 
the alumina reduction plant it Salt Lake City, Utah, although
^3*Wartime Progress in Alumina and Aluminum," Chemical 
and Metallurgical Ln^ineerinig*. Vol* LIII, (February, 1946} , p. 157. A  further discussion of this postwar leasing program 
will be found in the next chapter*
1G4
its success in reducing alumina from alunite did not reach 
the full expectations which had been held for it.
Other smaller companies, which attained some degree 
of success in the aluminum field, were Ancor Corporation, 
the Columbia Metals Company, and the Monolith Portland Mid­
west Company. The Ancor Corporation and the Columbia Metals 
Company both were aided by the Defense Plant Corporation in 
the establishment of plants for the reduction of alumina from 
clays. Ancor established a plant at Harleyville, South Caro­
lina, at a cost of $2,642,OCX), and Columbia established a 
plant at Salem, Oregon, costing $4,066,500. The Monolith 
Portland Midwest Company erected a plant at Laramie, Wyoming, 
at a cost of $3,965,000. This latter plant was dedicated to 
the reduction of alumina from anorthosite, which is a type of 
igneous rock found in the Rocky Mountain region and more 
abundantly in the "Laurentian* belt in Canada, from the Great 
Lakes to Labrador. A fifth small company to be mentioned in 
connection with these experiments with low grade aluminum 
ores is Aluminum, Inc., which had been scheduled to operate 
a plant at Marysville, Btah. This plant was of the same 
nature as the Kalunite, Inc., project, and was supposed to 
produce alumina from alunite. However, this project, which
would have cost the Defense Plant Corporation a total of
2J+$775,000, was abandoned.
^Various discussions of the facts presented here' 
are found In Engle and others, op. cit.t pp* 26, 60, and 136.
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These smaller plants, designed to be experimental
plants in the field of alumina reduction, were designated
in the aluminum industry as pilot plants during the war*
They were Important in the wartime years because of the
necessity of finding practical methods of reduction of alumina
from lower grade ores* Their lasting significance has been25shown in the following statement:
Justification for such expenditures lies in the danger that high-grade ores will be exhausted 
and the nation's aluminum industry will be entirely 
dependent on foreign sources of supply should the 
war drag on for several years. Much the same Justification exists for the development of a 
practical process for the quantity production of 
alumina from clays and other raw materials avail­
able in the United States, as for the building of 
a synthetic rubber industry. So long as aircraft remain the indispensable armament they are today 
and so long as aircraft must be made of aluminum, 
the United States should spare no effort to 
provide a domestic source of alumina. Even though alumina-from-clay plants may not be able 
to compete with alumina-frora-bauxite plants after 
the war, they could be held in reserve as part of the permanent arsenal of the nation, as stand­
by plants to be operated only in time of national peril. Should they, on the other hand, prove to be competitive with bauxite refineries their future contribution to the aluminum industry of 
the United States would be great.
Government aid was extended through the Defense 
Plant Corporation to a wide variety of companies engaged in 
different fabricating activities during the war. Classifi­
cation of these companies into various divisions of fabricating
2?Ibid.. p. 61.
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activities was made by the Truman Committee, in the Third 
Annual Report* This report is condensed and tabulated by 
Professors Engle, Gregory and Masse, and appears as nAppen­
dix 7" of their book* A great number of companies were aided 
by the Defense Plant Corporation, in the following divisions 
of the fabricating business* extrusion plants; rolled rod 
and bar plants; tubing plants; aluminum forging plants; 
aluminum sand castings (excluding cylinder heads); aluminum
die eastings; permanent mold castings; and cast cylinder 26
heads* Some of the outstanding companies in the fabrication 
field to receive Defense Plant Corporation financial assistance 
were: Alcoa; Reynolds; Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation;
Revere Copper and Brass Company; Aluminum Forging Company,
Inc*; Delco—Remy; Buick Motors; Chevrolet; and Ford Motor 
Co^>any* All of these companies contributed much to the war 
effort in their fabrication of the various types of aluminum 
products mentioned above* Most of these companies, it will 
be noted, do not fall into the smaller companies group, but 
in terms of their efforts at fabrication of aluminum during 
the war, they were definitely in that classification as far 
as the Defense Plant Corporation loans were concerned* Only 
such companies as Alcoa and Reynolds received loans above the 
$20,000,000 level for fabricating facilities during the war.
^ I b i d ** Appendix 7# PP* 442-53*
One other company should he mentioned as being of 
potential importance in the field of aluminum, although 
specific information is lacking about it in many respects*
It is the Independent Aluminum Corporation, which today 
controls a one—half interest in a new patented process for 
the thermic manufacture of aluminum* This company is given 
little prominence in the book by Professor Engle and his 
associates, although Appendix 9 of the volume is entirely 
devoted to an exposition of the new process for aluminum 
reduction* This appendix gives extracts from a memorandum 
which had been supplied by Mr* Jacques Fondal, who is the 
president of the Independent Aluminum Corporation* The memo­
randum shows the new thermic process to be of value in the 
reduction of aluminum directly from bauxite or lower grade 
ores* The surprising thing about this process is that it 
was patented in France in 193B» by Hirsch Loevenstein, and 
was then patented in the United States in 1940* According 
to Mr* Fondal, the new process was covered by United States 
Letters Patent ho* 2,19B,673, which was issued on April 30, 
1940* Later information obtained by the writer from the 
United States Patent Office indicated that the patent was 
vested by the Alien Property Custodian January IB, 1943* 
under Vesting Order 666* The assignment records also indicate 
that prior to the vesting of this patent an interest was trans­
ferred to the Independent Aluminum Corporation (61 Broadway,
XOB
Sew York)* Mr* loevenstein, the inventor, also transferred 
an interest to Israel Jacob Foundaminsky, of Paris, France* 
Description of the technical chemical processes in­
volved in the thermic manufacture of aluminum by this method 
is extremely difficult* The general principle involved Is 
the complete reduction of the virgin metal from the raw ore 
in one continuous chemical action* Through the use of iron 
or silicon, in the first step, and sine, in the second step, 
pure aluminum is produced in a furnace similar to those 
which are used in the refining of zinc. According to 
Mr. Fondal1s article, the new process is completely revolu­
tionary, both in terms of treatment of aluminum ores and of 
secondary aluminum. In both instances, it is said that the 
process results in the production of a purer type of metal. 
Summing up the entire article, Mr. Fondal gives the follow­
ing statement concerning the economic advantages of the 
27process:
The advantages of this new process based 
upon thermic principles lie in the possible use 
of raw materials other than bauxite, in economy 
in the use of electric energy, labor, equipment 
and maintenance.
Present aluminum manufacture requires.*..* 
the preliminary production of pure alumina in plants specially built for that purpose and from 
bauxite having a low silicon content. On the
27Ibld.. p. 457
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other hand, aluminum-containing ores of* all 
description and without exception (bauxite, 
kaolin, clay, etc*) may be used in the new thermic process of this invention*
A plant Tor producing aluminum under present practices, to be economically sound, 
must produce at least 6,000 tons of the alumi­
num annually* In our process, on the other 
hand, production depends merely on th© number and size of the furnaces* For this reason, a 
plant producing even a few hundred tons per 
year would be economically practical*
As a consequence of the above enumerated 
advantages, it is conservatively estimated that 
aluminum may be produced by our thermic process at a cost of 30 to 40^ lower than the present cost* In addition, our process permits the 
production of silico-aluminum and sinc-aluminum alloys of any desired proportions at a cost 
far below that possible under present practices*The application of our process to the recovery 
of aluminum scrap, resulting in an aluminum of even greater purity than th© original and at a 
considerable savings in cost, should also be kept in mind* Naturally, the great reduction 
in the net price of aluminum made possible by our process should open vast new markets for 
these metals*
This innovation, if it is as described above, may 
even yet become a major step in the advancement of aluminum 
production* Its delayed development may have been caused by 
one or more of several causes. The inability of Loevenstein 
and Fondal to convince government officials or industrialists 
of the practical nature of the invention may have been one 
reason for its lack of success so far. Both of these men 
were in Washington, and are reported to have spent weary
months in vain attempts to convince government official® of 
the value of the invention in 1943• Cutbacks in the aluminum
industry in ths latter part of* 1943 may have been a reason 
for the lack of Interest shown by both Government and. in­
dustry* Other possible reasons for the failure to exploit 
the patent commercially may have been politics, the power 
of monopoly* or the institutional setup of the industry* 
hack of specific information precludes the possibility of 
stating a definite answer to the problemf although such an 
answer would be valuable to the study*
Economic literature of the twentieth century is filled 
with instances of holding out new patented processes because 
of their effects upon the institutional structure of Indus-* 
trial organisations* Xt is at present a matter of conjecture 
as to whether the thermic process encountered tills difficulty* 
If such a far-reaching calamity as World War XJ did not result 
in the fullest exploitations of such a patent, then several 
ideas may be advanced as reasons for the lack of interest*
The process might have been proved to be impractical from a 
chemical or technical standpoint, although it was reported 
that the process had been tested in a pilot plant in France*
On the other hand, the process might have Involved some 
economic implications which were too great for its adoption.
If old plants would have to be abandoned, power sites left 
unused, labor laid off, and the entire cost structure of the 
industry revolutionised, then the older manufacturers of 
aluminum by the time—tested processes would not have been
Interested in the changeover* However, it still seems most 
surprising that the Government, being interested in such 
methods of using lower grade ores during the war, did not 
at least set up some sort of pilot plant to aid the Inde­
pendent Aluminum Gorporation in exploiting Lo even stein* s 
thermie process*
It is not to be denied that the smaller companies, 
through their varied efforts, did much to bring the war to a 
rapid dose* Their efforts were financed chiefly through 
the Defense Plant Corporation* Expense apparently was no 
object, as far as the Government was concerned* Winning the 
war was the prime motive, obviously, although it may be hinted 
that in some respects the breaking down of the Alcoa monopoly 
in aluminum ingot reduction might have been one of the factors 
which were involved in the entire program* The postwar as­
pects of toe industry were to be affected to a great extent 
not only by some of the smaller companies, but also by the 
government plants*
Extension of the Aluminum Industry in the South and 
East to Meet Expanded Needs of World War
Tn addition to the other economic considerations 
which were given to the aluminum industry during World War
jLt will be seen that the extension of the facilities for 
the production of the metal in both the Southern and. Eastern
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states Is of groat Importance to the whole analysis* Pre­
vious mention has been made of the expansion which occurred 
throughout the industry, and of the erection of various new 
plants for wartime production by the national government* 
dispersal of the aluminum industry was a noted characteristic 
of wartime activities, and the entry of additional companies, 
both for experimentation and for fabrication of ingot aluzni*- 
Qua, caused the whole situation to be changed immensely* In­
tegration of aluminum processes in one plant was an important 
step forward for the entire manufacturing process, as it was 
accomplished by the Reynolds Metals Company*
All of the foregoing activities were to be found in 
the s)um1 ̂ im industry of the South and East during the war*
Even before the entry of the United States into the conflict, 
a great deal of expansion had been accomplished for the 
South era aluminum industry* One of the examples of this type 
of expansion was the building of the Mobile, Alabama, plant 
by Alcoa as part of its own vast program of expanding its 
facilities* But this expansion on the part of Alcoa was not 
all that occurred* Buring the defense period, Reynolds Metals 
Company had begun its aluminum production program at Listerhill, 
Alabama, with the famous integrated plant development being 
its greatest contribution to aluminum technology* In the 
Eastern states, particularly in Hew fork, extension of the
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aluaiQoa Industry was accompli shed during the defense program, 
but the wartime activities eclipsed the previous expansion of 
Alcoa in that area*
Pressure of the defense and wartime program of ex­
pansion during the years from 1940 to 1943 brought about one 
cf the most rapid increases in Southern and Eastern facilities 
yet known in the Industry* As a result of such a program, 
mew facilities were erected at various points in Mew York,
Mew Jersey, Arkansas, Alabama and Louisiana* From the prewar 
single alumina plant at East St* Louis, Illinois, this phase 
of altminum production was extended during this modern era to 
Include the additional four alumina plants, all of which were 
located in the Southern states* Alcoa had built the Mobile 
plant, Reynolds the Listerhill plant, and the Defense Plant 
Corporation built the government-owned alumina plants at 
Hurricane Creek, Arkansas, and Baton Rouge, Louisiana* With 
the single exception of the plant built at Salt Lake City,
Utah, by Kalunite, Inc., for experimentation with alunite, 
all of these important defense and wartime plants were erected 
in the areas of the South where access to raw materials, 
principally bauxite ores, would be readily available* The 
Alcoa plant at Mobile maed ores from Arkansas and Surinam.
The Reynolds plant at Listerhill used lower grade Alabama ores, 
and some from Arkansas. The two plants erected by the Defense 
Plant Corporation at Hurricane Creek and Baton Rouge used vast
amounts of Arkansas ores, but the latter also received ores 
f r »  Surinam*
Although no alumina plants were erected in the Eastern 
states, several aluminum ingot reduction plants were expanded 
and others established in New York and New Jersey, as well as 
in North Carolina and Arkansas* Facilities Tor reduction of* 
the virgin metal were expanded at Alcoa, Tennessee; Badin, 
North Carolina; and at Niagara Falls and Massena, New York, 
by Alcoa* Reynolds expanded the facilities for reduction at 
its Listerhill, Alabama, plant* New plants erected by the 
Defense Plant Corporation in Eastern and Southern states, and 
operated by Alcoa, were located in Maspeth and Massena, New 
York; Burlington, New Jersey; and Jones Mills, Arkansas* This 
vast program of expansion in the South and East was rivalled 
only by the dispersal of a great portion of the aluminum re­
duction industry to the Pacific Northwest, where adequate 
power facilities were immediately available* Power for re­
duction of the pure aluminum from alumina in the South and 
East came mainly from the Tennessee Valley Authority and from 
Niagara Falls power developments, while in the Pacific North­
west it was obtained from the Bonneville Power Administration, 
in charge of Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams*
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D STelo paent of a How Aluminum Industry in the Pacific 
Horthwest to Aid in Wartime Production;
Although the Western states region, and particularly 
the Pacific Northwest, had received some attention from both 
Alcoa and Reynolds prior to the entry of the United States 
into World War IX, the real Impetus to aluminum development 
in that area came after this country was actually engaged 
in the conflict* This impetus came largely from the Govern­
ment, because it was through the Defense Plant Corporation 
that some of the best aluminum reduction plants of the country 
were located in that region* Each of the new plants was an
ingot aluminum plant, which processed alumina produced in one
of the five plants mentioned in the previous section* The 
states of Washington, Oregon and California were selected as 
the locations of these new aluminum reduction plants* Enor­
mous capacity was built up at such places as Vancouver, Long­
view, Spokane, and Tacoma, Washington;iTroutdale, Oregon; and 
Riverbank and Torrance, California* The plant at Vancouver 
was owned by Alcoa, and the plant at Longview was owned by 
Reynolds* The other plants in the Western region were owned
by the Defense Plant Corporation* In reality, for the period
of the war Alcoa operated all of these government-owned plants, 
with the exception of the Tacoma plant, operated by the Olin 
Corporation*
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The availability of enormous amounts of* hydroelectric 
power was responsible for the concentration of the aluminum 
industry in such a large degree in the Pacific Northwest, 
ill of the recent writers who have dealt with this new dis­
persion of the aluminum industry in that region have empha­
sised the use of the famous Bonneville—Coulee system for 
electrical energy. It is not to be doubted that other 
factors militated against such selections of locations of 
plants, but the power problem in terms of production of the 
ingot aluminum was probably the most important. Not a single 
alumina plant was located in the West, unless the unsatis­
factory Salt Lake City plant, along with the pilot plants for 
dealing with clays and anorthosite are considered. These 
latter plants did not provide the alumina for the functioning 
of the Pacific Northwest plants during the war, because their 
supplies of alnmina would not have been sufficient even to 
supply one of the new plants. It was necessary to transport 
the fliimina from the five alumina plants in the East and 
South, ‘nils operation caused the production costs of the 
virgin metal in the Pacific Northwest to rise. Even early In 
the ‘war it was pointed out that the mal— location of the 
alumina plants created important postwar problems for the 
industry in the Western States. It was suggested by many 
writers that if the aluminum industry were to survive in that 
region it would be necessary to establish at least one
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alumina plant there* At the present time this latter 
suggestion has not been carried out, though the aluminum 
plants there continue to function on the basis of impor­
tation of alumina from the East and South* The develop­
ments in the Pacific Northwest will be considered at length 
in the next chapter* In conclusion of this chapter, we turn 
briefly to an analysis of the total contributions of the 
aluminum industry of the United States to the emergency of 
World War II* To state precisely the exact contribution of 
the aluminum industry to the war effort is not our purpose, 
but a brief resume of the accomplishments will show what was 
t a €  in wartime, and what might be expected in the postwar 
period*
Summary of the Contribution of the Aluminum Industry 
of the United States in World War II:
A resume of the wartime contributions of the aluminum 
industry should take into consideration the vast increase in 
the productive capacity for alumina, which is necessary for 
the reduction of the virgin metal* Before the war, the entire 
aluaiaa capacity of the industry In the United States was 
about 700 million pounds per year* Defense and wartime ex­
pansion of this phase of the aluminum industry built up an 
annual alumina capacity of almost 5 billion pounds, as shown 
by the various figures on the Hurricane Creek, Baton Rouge,
lid
Mobile, East St. Louist and Listerhill reduction plants.
Fran a prewar number of only one plant at East St. Louis,
the four additional plants had been set up to furnish 
alumina to the vastly increased number of ingot aluminum
plants. This increase in alumina production had been made
possible by the increased mining operations of domestic
bauxite ores in Arkansas and Alabama, as well as of the
lesser ores in several states. Foreign bauxite ores from
Surinam in South America had contributed to this alumina
production, also. The smaller experimental plants at Salt
Lake City, Salem, Laramie, and Harleyville must be included
to make the analysis complete.
Additional plants for the reduction of alumina to 
virgin metal were set up during the defense and wartime years. 
Expansion of this phase of the aluminum industry was as 
notable as the Increase in alumina production capacity. Pre­
war average production of the various plants engaged in ingot 
aluminum production reached only 257 million pounds during 
the years from 1935 to 1939* This production came from five 
prewar plants owned by Alcoa, but such a supply was utterly 
inadequate to serve the needs of the defense and war programs 
of the United States and her allies. By the end of the war, 
this total of only five plants had been supplemented by the 
addition of eleven more aluminum reduction plants, widely 
scattered over the United States and owned by other Inte­
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rests* Gf these eleven new plants, the Defense Plant 
Corporation owned nine, and the Reynolds Metals Company 
owned two* During the war years, the government-owned 
plants were operated by Alcoa (eight plants) and the Olin 
Corporation (one plant)* Wartime production of the virgin 
metal jumped from the prewar average of 257 million pounds 
to a capacity in all of these plants of 2*3 billion pounds 
by the end of 1943> although this capacity never had to be 
utilised to its maximum extent. Figures for alumina pro­
duction in 1943 have been stated previously as being 
3*936,522,000 pounds for that year. The figure for ingot 
aluminum production for 1943* which was 1,640,075*000 
pounds, bears out a previous statement that it takes appro­
ximately two pounds of alumina to produce one pound of 
aluminum* It also shows the extent of unused capacity in 
the sixteen aluminum reduction plants right in the middle 
of World War II, at a time when cutbacks in ingot aluminum 
production were ordered in December, 1943* To repeat that 
this expansion in the aluminum reduction facilities was 
phenomenal is to say the very least about this phase of the 
entire aluminum industry*
Increased fabrication facilities made It possible to 
process the ingot aluminum into the various shapes necessary 
for wartime industrial uses. The fabrication plants con­
tributed greatly to the building of the vast armada of
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Allied airplanes that; swept the skies of the entire world* 
Other types of wartime industries received increased
quantities of the metal, to facilitate manufacturing of a
variety of products necessary for the prosecution of the
war* Improved techniques of various kinds were introduced
during the war, such as the integrated facility established
by Reynolds at Listerhill, Alabama* where alumina, aluminum
ingot, and rolled aluminum were all produced in the same
plant* New alloys were developed, several of which were
high strength alloys beneficial in war and in peacetime
uses of aluminum* New processes were evolved to aid the
Bayer process of alumina reduction, among them the soda-
lime—sinter process that made possible the greater savings
of alumina from the various ores* A newer, and more
revolutionary, process was described by the Independent
Aluminum Corporation, but thermic manufacture of aluminum
from ores in one continuous operation was not developed,
although the original patent in the United States had been
secured as early as April, 1940•
Excess productive capacity was the greatest problem
that faced the aluminum industry at the close of World War
II. This problem, along with other postwar aspects of the
industry, will be the subject matter of the following
chapter* Aluminum in war created enormous problems, which
were solved In various ways both by tho Industry itself and 
by the Government* Aluminum in peace constitutes just as
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important a subject. It is a problem that both the industry 
and the Government must solve, if maximum benefits are to be 
derived by consumers of aluminum throughout the world.
CHAPTER IV
POSTWAR ASPECTS OF THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY 
OF THE UNITED STATES
Surplus productive capacity, government ownership 
of important facilities and. wide dispersion of the great 
aluminum industry of the United States wore the chief 
characteristics of the aluminum situation after World War XI 
was concluded in 1945* These problems gave rise to other 
considerations in the immediate postwar period, and the 
entire aluminum industry of this country was rapidly and 
radically changed from the prewar status* Discussions in 
this chapter will revolve around several of the. postwar 
aspects of the aluminum industry, as follows:
1. Problems of surplus productive capacity}
2* Problems of disposal of government-built alumi­
num facilities, including alumina plants, aluminum reduction 
plants, and fabricating facilities;
3. Analysis of government policies in regard to 
plant disposal and the creation of competition in the post­
war aluminum industry;
4* Partial settlement of the problems of plant 
disposal, and the entry of other companies Into the aluminum 
industry of the United States; and
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5* Postwar problems of competitive enterprise in 
the aluminum Industry, as they evolved from the sale of 
government facilities to Reynolds and to the Kaiser inter­
ests, instead of Alcoa*
All of the above problems have a direct bearing upon 
the aluminum industry of the United States as it exists today* 
The partial settlement of these problems has resulted in an 
entirely new aluminum industry of such a nature as to make it 
incapable of comparison with the prewar ownership and control 
as exercised by Alcoa* The primary aluminum industry, the 
production of both alumina and ingot aluminum, underwent such 
a radical change in the immediate postwar period that the 
monopoly of Alcoa in this respect was broken completely*
Alcoa, in prewar years, had possessed a highly integrated 
aluminum industry* The ownership and operation of its own 
mines, reduction plants, ships, and other facilities had made 
Alcoa synonymous with power and outright independence in the 
aluminum industry* The company had produced and sold all 
aluminum that it had the capacity to make, but no great in­
creases had been made in the real capacity of the various 
plants until the defense and war programs forced the company 
to expand its facilities* The same processes for reduction 
of fllnalmim had been more or less standard with the. company 
for a period of fifty years, and had not been subject to 
patents for three decades* But no other company had dared to
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compete with Alcoa for a variety of reasons* These reasons 
have been stated previously as being the advantage of an 
early start, the control over essential patents, the control 
of the vast majority of all rich bauxite resources of the 
United States, the ownership and operation of the company1s 
own waterpower plants to furnish electric energy for aluminum 
reduction, the protection of a favorable tariff on imported 
aluminum, and friendly international relations with the pro­
ducers of aluminum in Canada and Europe* The maintenance of 
a high and rigid price of aluminum ingot through the decades 
of the 1920* s and 1930* s kept the price from falling below 
20 cents per pound, until after 1939* Various writers have 
shown that the price of 20 cents charged for ingot aluminum 
by Alcoa was almost twice the cost of production, and that 
the new profit which accrued to the company in the sales of
all its varied products over a period of years was nearly1
20 per cent on the invested capital*
All of these facts pointed to the need for competition 
in the alumimsn industry over a period of many years, but 
until the end of the war and the disposal of the government- 
built aluminum facilities such a hope was in vain* It is 
true, as we have stated in the previous chapter, that the
^"Aluminum Reborn," Fortune* Voi• XXXIII, (May, 194&)» 
pp* 103 ff*
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basis lor competition was laid In the defense and wartime 
eras, when the Reynolds Metals Company and the Government 
entered the aluminum Industry* But the facts that have been 
pointed out show that the control exercised by Alcoa during
the war Itself was extended over a wide domain, to include
\
the government-owned plants themselves* At War’s end the 
industry bore little relationship at ail to the prewar alumi­
num pattern* The productive capacity had been increased by 
seven times, and in the field of fabrication the increase had 
been about forty-five times in some stages* An article in 
Fortune magasine for May, 1946, pointed to the significant
difference between the prewar and postwar aluminum industries2in the following manner;
That (prewar) industry, however interesting 
historically, no longer exists* It has been 
absorbed into an entirely new industry, to which 
iu bears only an ancestral relationship: thealuHrfmnn industry of 1946*****the industry is 
vastly changed in its contours, its control, 
its geography, its technology, its economics of supply, cost and price, its potential markers, and its Interesting possibilities for creative 
competition* Rot the least part of the aluminum 
revolution was a 1945 Circuit Court decision 
(final for lack of a Supreme Court quorum) hold­ing Alcoa a monopoly in ingot production as long as it controlled over 90 per cent of the market*
The Attorney General had finally succeeded in establishing, beyond appeal, that a monopoly is a monopoly— even under the Sherraan Act*
2Ibid** pp* 103-04
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During the war itself, Alcoa*s domination 
of the industry was undiluted* Besides nearly 
trebling its own facilities in a ^300-million construction program, the company built and 
operated nearly *>300 million worth of govern­ment capacity* As the sole prewar aluminum 
producer— with a monopoly on technical, en­gineering, and management brains in the 
business— Alcoa was, of course, the logical choice to hhndle the urgent government 
program* Its assignment included eight of the 
nine government smelting plants and nime of the 
government fabricating plants— all completely 
integrated into the company*s own far-flung 
system* At warfs end Alcoa was in control of 
more than nine-tenths of U. 3. capacity for alumina and primary metal, 66 per cent for 
sheet and plate, 90 per cent for extruded 
shapes* But at this point the Defense Plant 
Corporation stepped in to claim its own— on a somewhat tenuous technicality in the Alcoa 
leases— and over half the industry went on the war-surplus market.
These evidences of control on the part of Alcoa con­
stituted basic reasons for disposal of the government-owned 
aluminum facilities to producers which might be able to 
make competition effective in the industry* It was definitely 
felt that such a move on the part of the Government would be 
made, but before such a step could be t$Jken, it was necessary 
to determine the extent of the real surplus capacity which 
had been built up during World War II*
Problems of Surplus Productive Capacity:
Surplus productive capacity in the aluminum industry 
was built up to a great extent during the war# The exact 
extent to wliich any facility could be determined as being 
real surplus was not known at that time, but ak least one
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comprehensive postwar market survey had. been made, with
results that need explanation. This survey, conducted by
Professor Engle and his associates at the University of
Washington during 1942 and 1943* indicated the existence
of excess productive capacity in the aluminum industry, even
3with aluminum selling at 15 cents per pound. The figure
of 15 cents per pound had been attained in the industry early
in the war, and remained at that level throughout the period
of hostilities* The market survey indicated that greater
quantities of aluminum would be taken off the market at
prices below 15 cents per pound, but the significant expla—
nation of this situation given by Professor Engle is as 
4follows2
Total capacity for the United States is 2,300 million pounds of virgin aluminum annually,far in excess of any immediate postwar demand
now in sight* The most optimistic forecast 
Indeed does not envision a market for much over half the present capacity until five years 
after the war, and not then unless the price is 
cut to 10 cents per pound* Drastic curtailment, 
therefore, seems inevitable*
The curtailment of production envisioned by most 
observers during the war years simply amounted to the abandon­
ment of the high cost plants which had been erected during
the war period* It was well pointed out that several of the
^Engle and others, op* cit*. Chapters XII and XIX
*Tbld.. p. 403.
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alumintai plants were badly situated and were high cost 
producers* The most obvious method of dealing with such a 
situation would be to curtail production of such plants as 
those in Massena and Maspeth, New York, and Burlington, New 
Mersey* These three plants, all owned by the Defense Plant 
Corporation, and operated by Alcoa, could not be expected to 
be maintained in the production field if the price of alumi­
num continued at 15 cents per pound, according to Professor 
Engle and his associates* The high cost of electrical 
energy, plus the necessity for building new power facilities, 
was given as a reason for the stoppage of operations and the 
abandonment of the three Eastern aluminum plants, in spite of 
the access to raw materials and the nearness to potential 
postwar markets.
The same reasons were pointed out by observers for 
the discontinuance of aluminum facilities at Jones Mills, 
Arkansas* Despite the excellent location of this new war­
time plant, in terms of nearness to bauxite, it was pointed 
out that high cost of electric power would be a deterrent 
feature* Another factor for consideration was the necessity 
for saving the rapidly diminishing supplies of good bauxite 
ores in the state of Arkansas* One of the interesting con­
clusions reached in regard to the Jones Mills plant was the 
blanket statement that "Certainly it appears very doubtful 
that any private operator familiar with the aluminum industry
would be willing to buy it for operation at tb© present 
l o c a t i o n T h i s  plant was considered to be a marginal plant 
If aluminum prices remained at the level of 15 cents per pound# 
The forecasting made by the observers at the University of 
Washington apparently was not taken seriously by others in­
terested in the aluminum industry, because the Jones Mills
plant was leased by the Reynolds Metals Company early in 61946#
Other outstanding examples of wartime estimates of 
surplus capacity may be cited in regard to the California 
plants, as well as the facilities in the state of Washington# 
Professor Engle and his associates indicated that the elimin­
ation of the three Eastern plants, together with the Arkansas 
plant, might be accompanied by the abandonment of the aluminum 
reduction plant at Riverbank, California# Such a move, it 
was pointed out, would reduce the aluminum reduction capacity 
of the country down to 1,629 million pounds, which would still 
be far in excess of any foreseeable postwar demand for the 
metal at a price of 15 cents# It was further stated that 
the Torrance, California, plant would be eliminated if alumi­
num prices dropped to a level of 13 cents, because at that
5Ibld.. P- 410.
^Later discussions will show the extern to vMich 
Reynolds Metals Company took over existia--; government-owned 
facilities#
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price the plant would b© unable to compete with the reduction
plants of the Pacific Northwest* In regard to the Torrance,
7plant, the following statement was made:
The elimination of this plant would reduce 
national capacity to less than l,f>00 million pounds, still far above the estimated maximum demand for virgin aluminum of slightly over one 
billion pounds at 13 cents, five years after the war* bine© Pacific Northwest plants can deliver virgin pig aluminum to California for 
less than it can be produced in the California 
plants the latter appear doomed to the status of stand-by plants, if they are not completely dismantled*
It was further indicated that the aluminum reduction 
plants in the Pacific Northwest would be competitive with a 
postwar price of 13 cents for aluminum, but it appeared 
doubtful from the survey that they could be profitably opera­
ted at a lower level of 10 cents per pound* Three government 
plants were concerned in this statement. The plants at 
Tacoma and Spokane, Washington, and at Troutdale, Oregon, 
were considered to be potentially outstanding bargains for 
a postwar competitor to Alcoa, provided the market situation 
were favorable to such a new entry into the field. The entry 
of the Xaiser interests into the field of aluminum production, 
as we shall see, aided in the disposal of these government- 
built aluminum facilities in the Pacific Northwest*
Predictions concerning future activities sometimes 
appear to be wrong in the field of economics* In the treatment
^Engle and others, op. cIt *, p. 410*
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of the industry during the war, forecasts of disposal of the 
government built facilities ran a bit contrary to later de­
velopments* It is interesting to note how the estimates of 
Professor Engle and his associates differed from the immediate 
postwar disposition of alumina plants* The alumina plants 
constructed by the Government during the war at Hurricane 
Creekt Arkansas, and at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, had added 
enormous alumina reduction capacity in the industry* It was 
conceded by the above-mentioned observers that the two Alcoa 
plants at East St* Louis and Mobile would continue in opera­
tion, and that the Reynolds plant at Listerhill would be 
sufficient to meet the needs of the new competitor’s aluminum 
reduction plant at the same location* But it was stated that 
the Hurricane Creek and the Baton Rouge plants constituted 
quite different problems* The analysis of the problems con­
fronting the Arkansas and Louisiana alumina producers was 
a s follows:
There are two remaining alumina plants, 
both owned by the Defense Plant Corporation, one located at Hurricane Greek, Arkansas, 
with a yearly capacity of 1,555 million pounds, and the other at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with 
annual capacity of one billion pounds* The 
Hurricane Creek plant will undoubtedly be rendered obsolete by reason of the need to conserve remaining Arkansas bauxite and because 
it is too far inland to justify economical 
operations with imported bauxite. The plant
Ibid.. pp. 413-14.
1>2
might be retained by the government as a stand­by plant, for utilisation only in an emergency 
great enough to justify the further use of 
bauxite reserves in Arkansas*
The Baton Rouge plant, while well located 
with respect to tidewater, transportation appears, 
nevertheless, to be excess baggage in postwar 
alumina production* A better location for this plant would have been the new center of aluminum production, in the Pacific Northwest**•.Strategic military requirements must have determined the location of the Baton Rouge plant, but it appears now that the difficulties of getting bauxite 
through the Canal and to a West Coast point 
were exaggerated in the minds of policy makers.
The criteria for locating Industrial plants for modern warfare should be the soundest economic 
basis for both war and peace, with protective military devices to safeguard plants located 
at oritical points*
The Baton Rouge plant, because of its un­
economic location, will probably, have to be 
dismantled. Otherwise, it might be operated only at a fraction of its capacity to t ill out 
the demand from industries, other than aluminum, in the postwar period, or to supplement the 
Alcoa and Reynolds plants should an unexpected demand arise......
In conclusion, over-all postwar capacity 
of aluminum is apparently excessive to the extent 
of about 2,750 million pounds annually. The location of plants is such that successful opera­
tions after the war seems doubtful for either of the D. P. C. plants. On the other hand, now alumina capacity of approximately a billion 
pounds annually will have to be added for the 
aluminum refining industry of the Pacific Northwest.
It would appear that such an analysis of postwar 
prospects for the Baton Rouge and Hurricane Greek plants 
was slightly in error, particularly if the immediate post­
war picture Is reviewed. Both of these plants are operating
In 1947* Reynolds Metals Company operates the Hurricane 
Greek establishment, and the Permanent© Metals Corporation*
{ a subsidiary of Kaiser* Inc*)* operates the plant in Baton
>Rouge* This is only the short-run picture* however, and 
analysis is possible at the present time only on the basis 
of their operation for, a little more than a year by these 
two competitors* It is known that neither plant is operating 
at full capacity in 1947» but both Reynolds and Permanents 
apparently are planning big things for the future* In the 
long run, the analysis which was made during the war might 
possibly prove to be correct, in spite of the immediate post­
war operation of both plants in their "uneconomic locations*n 
The period intervening between the end of the war and the 
middle of 1947 is not a sufficient time in which to judge 
the full effects of operation of the two plants* It is the 
transition period of which Professor Engle spoke, and both 
Reynolds and Kaiser are operating the plants on the basis of 
the huge backlogs of ddmand for altminum products that was 
built up in the United dtates during the past five years* The 
extent to which both the Hurricane Greek and the Baton Rouge 
plants will be operated in the future will depend upon numerous 
factors in the long run* such as the expansion and contraction 
of the uses of aluminum* the use of substitutes, the price 
situation* the availability of bauxite or lower grade ores*
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advances In aluminum technology, and the possibility of 
expansion and contraction or American aluminum exports into 
the world markets*
Aluminum rolling mill capacity, like aluminum and 
alwina capacity, was greatly expanded during the war, and 
a surplus in this phase of the industry was noted early in 
1944*  The total capacity of aluminum rolling mills in that 
year was about 1,600 million pounds, most of which was re­
quired in the aircraft industry* During the war it was 
estimated that about 30 percent of the pig aluminum produced 
in the United States was used by the aircraft Indus try, and 
that most of the metal was used in the form of sheet alumi­
nums for sheathing airplanes* In regard to the amount of
excess capacity in the rolling mills in the postwar era, the
9following statement is significant:
In the years before the war the average consumption of aluminum rolling mills was only about 35 per cent* What the demand will be after the war is difficult to forecast, but it 
will undoubtedly fall substantially below the 
war ratio of 50 to 60 percent. A very liberal assumption is that 40 per cent of the postwar 
production of virgin aluminum will be required 
for sheet* Thus if total demand for aluminum reaches 1,500 million pounds, the production of virgin aluminum will be about 900 million 
pounds* On this basis it may be estimated that postwar demand for sheet will be 360 million 
pounds, and the excess sheet capacity will be
9IhjUU, pp. 414-15
1*250 million pounds* In other words, the 
rolling mill capacity of the nation is over 
4 times the probable postwar requirements*
These dats concerning alumina, aluminum, and rolling 
mill capacities prove that excess productive capacity was 
envisioned by the experts in all of these three stages of the 
aluminum industry in the postwar era* It must be admitted 
that in the period intervening between the end of the war and 
the time this study was made the estimates of excess capacities 
proved correct in many instances* All of the predictions of 
the experts did not come true at once* however, as we have noted 
particularly in the case of the alumina plants* Disposal of 
the plants erected by the Government presented a special prob­
lem* which had to be solved both by industry and government 
officials in a variety of ways*
Problems of Disposal of Goverament-BuiIt Aluminum Facilities £
A brief analysis of the aluminum industry given by
Alderfer and Michi in 1942 presented a view which was widely
accepted as being typical of the pessimism prevalent in this
country* Few people In the early years of the defense program
suspected that the aluminum Industry would be expanded to the
great extent that was necessary in order to win the war, and♦
most of the observers of the industry would have agreed with
Alderfer and Michl when they made the statement which la 10
quoted below:
Current developments in the industry seem to indicate that this field, heretofore domi­
nated by one company, will be opened to compe­
tition* Some competitors already have a foothold, and if national defense demand for 
the metal continues to expand, others may be encouraged to enter, especially in view of the 
hydroelectric power available in the West and the not-too-friendly attitude of the government 
toward the leading company* However, we cannot be too optimistic about the future growth of competition because the Aluminum Company of America is likewise expanding capacity and re­ducing prices to meet the present emergency, 
and after the emergency has passed, this company may have an effective monopoly despite the existence of several comparatively small 
competitors*
Officials of the government had cooperated with 
private enterprise to the extent of building up a huge alumi­
num industry during the war, however, and the result was that 
by 1943 many writers were speaking of the cutbacks in the 
aluminum production and the consequent necessity of solving 
the problem of disposal of surplus capacity after the war 
ended* A wide variety of proposals were made at different 
times, but all of them hoped for some degree of competition 
in the postwar aluminum industry* Generally speaking, the 
various types of proposals for postwar handling of the
B* Alderfer and H* E. Michl, Economics of 
American Industry* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc*},
pV 165 •
surplus plant facilities grouped themselves under at least 
six different plans, as follows:
1* Dismantling of the aluminum plants by the 
Government, to whom they belonged under the Defense Plant 
G orporation 5
2* Retention of the plants as a permanent addition 
to the national defense network, to be used as stand-by 
plants for operation in times of actual war;
>• Disposition of the plants through sale to the 
highest bidder in the industrial field!
4* Leasing of the various plants to responsible 
and reliable operators in the postwar era;
5* Retention and operation of the various plants 
in competition with private business enterprise; and
6* Employment of a combination of the above solutions 
in an effort to work out a permanent policy in the aluminum 
industry satisfactory to the Government and to the American 
people*
It was felt from the very beginning that the Govern­
ment would never solve the problem by using the method noted 
as number five above. No intention on the part of the Govern­
ment to engage in postwar competition with private industry 
in the aluminum field had ever been voiced by any official 
in any responsible position. Quite tne contrary was the case, 
because most officials whovorked on the problems connected
with the aluminum industry felt that the Government would
have many reasons for moving out of the industry as soon as 
the war was ended* At least one official, Secretary of
Commerce Jesse Jones, openly voiced the opinion that he "had
11no idea of Government operation of any of these plants.n
Such a program would have been inimical to the best interests
of the Government and the aluminum industry, because it would
have been another step in the socialization of industry in
this country. Since the Government did not intend to use
the proposal to operate the plants itself the other plans
were given much consideration before actual disposal of the
plants was' affected. Actually* a combination of plans was
used* since most industrial concerns interested in the aluiai-
num industry favored a leas e-purchase plan, which would give
the purchasing companies a chance to determine whether or not
entry into the aluminum industry would be profitable to them*
This type of plan had been pointed out by Professor Engle and12
his associates when they stated:
In view of the risks and uncertainties of entering such a field,; however, the government 
may find it necessary to provide very liberal 
terms for the sale of alund.num plants to private interests. It may be advisable to offer these 
plants on a lease-purchase plan, the value of
Jones Pavors Leasing U. 3.-Owned Plants*" The 
Wall Street Journal. (December 3, 1943)> P* 2*
Engle and others, opa clt«* p# 417•
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the properties to be determined after 10 or more years of operation, the purchaser meantime 
dividing net profits after taxes with the 
government as annual payments to be credited 
against the purchase price*** • •Whether or not 
the existing companies in the industry would be 
adversely affected cannot b© predicted* If the 
new plants can be operated successfully, however, the government would ultimately receive a higher 
price than would likely be bid in advance* On 
the other hand, the buyer would be enabled to face competition without an excessive burden of overhead costs*
Disposal of all three types of plants*— alumina, alusdb
nuza, and fabricating facilities— faced this problem, and it
was for this reason that certain writers felt that very few
of the Defense Plant Corporation activities were scheduled
for postwar operation* Mr* J. R, Hight, in an article in
Iron Age as late as June 23, 1945* stated this conviction in 
13these words:
Aluminum reduction plant disposal, in the 
opinion of informed government officials here (Washington, i). C.}, will probably result in the postwar operation of not more than two or three 
of the major government-owned reduction units.
The over-expanded productive capacity of 
the industry, plus the present anti-monopoly position of the Federal Government will combine 
to limit the interest of Alcoa, Reynolds, and 
other possible producers in leasing or pur­
chasing DPC plants*
Mot even the most optimistic of industry 
or government officials feel that there is 
reasonable hope of operating war-expanded
Hight, "Few D P C  Aluminum Plants Scheduled 
for Postwar Operation," Iron Age« Vol. GLV, (June 23, 1945)*
pp* 105-06*
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facilities at near 100 per cent of capacity in the near future, but the general feeling ex­
pressed here is that the overall aluminum consumption figure would be improved if an 
additional aluminum producer, or possibly two additional companies were to enter the field*
Patent problems, ©specially in regard to the reduction 
of alumina from the lower grade ores, constituted a handicap 
in the immediate postwar disposal of the various plants* A 
description of these problems as they were handled by Surplus 
Property Administrator W • Stuart Symington will follow. Coupled 
with the other problems of disposal already mentioned, th© 
question of patents made the task extremely difficult until 
early in 1946* Altogether, the Government and the private 
industrial concerns which had hopes of engaging in aluminum 
production faced, at the end of the war, the problems of 
(1) an entrenched Alcoa, which had expanded rapidly during 
the war; (2) extensive aluminum capacities in alumina, 
aluminum, and fabrication stages; (3) high cost and marginal 
firms in the expanded industry, especially with the possi­
bility of aluminum prices either being held down to 1$ cents 
per pound, or even going to a lower level under competition; 
u >  lack of immediate funds on the part of would-b© aluminum 
producers, with the necessity for governmental lease-purchase 
plans to tide the new entries over the first few years after 
the war; and patent problems, which primarily concerned 
the alumina reduction plants* These problems loomed large 
at first, but in view of tue governmental policy as aired In
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Congressional circles, the solutions to them were worked out 
much better than many people had hoped they would be.
Analysis of Government Policies in Regard to Plant Disposal 
and the Creation of Postwar Competition in Aluminums
One of the most significant features of the wartime 
expansion of the aluminum industry was the administration 
policy of expanding the facilities to meet the emergency 
needs, and the avowed declaration On the part of government 
officials that competition would be an objective in the post­
war world* Congress itself had gdne on record as being 
definitely dedicated to the discouragement of ” monopolistic 
practices™ in the aluminum industry, and as favoring a long 
ran program to "foster the development of new independent
enterprise19 as the solid rock upon which to build the postwar
14structure of competition. More than this, the Congress had 
passed the Surplus Property Act, which required that the 
Surplus Board make known to Congress its specific policies 
in regard to the disposal of surplus plants and facilities* 
The report required by Congress from the Surplus Board was 
necessary for all properties in which the Government had in­
vested more than £5f000,000, the aluminum industry was
^"Aluminum Reborn,” Fortune. (May, 1946), op» pit.« 
p* 103 ff.
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affected in all of the three stages beyond the mining of
15bauxite or other ores for aluminum production*
The actual policy of the administration in regard to
the aluminoa industry was not officially known until Septem**
ber 26, 1945, when a report was submitted to Congress* This
report, submitted by Surplus Property Administrator W* Stuart
Symington on that date^ stated unequivocally that competitors
of Alcoa would have the very first choice in obtaining govern-16ment—owned surplus aluminum plants and equipment* 'While It 
is Impossible to present the full context of this report here, 
a brief resume of the proposed solutions given by Mr* Symington 
will prove helpful to an understanding of administration policy, 
not only for aluminum but also for other light metals* Presi­
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt, before his death, had Inspired 
the inauguration of provisions in contracts with Alcoa that 
the company would not be allowed “purchase options" on plants 
operated by it during the war* The report of the Surplus 
Property Administrator carried the attack on Alcoa several 
steps further by rejecting several of the company*s proposal® 
in regard to the surplus aluminum plants*
^J * R. Eight, JSJm* j&Jknil* i PP • 105—06 •
Alcoa Competition First in Aluminum Plant Disposal," 
Iron Age* Vol* CLVI, (October 4* 1945), pp* 116-19*
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Alcoa had staged its willingness in 1945 to lease or 
purchase the alumina plant at Hurricane Greek, Arkansas* Pur­
chase of the alumina plant at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, had 
also been suggested, because the company wanted to remove 
the plant to the Pacific Northwest, as part of its proposal 
to set up a fully integrated aluminum industry , in that region.
R eduction plants at Jones Mills, Arkansas, Trout dale, Oregon, 
and Massena, New York, also would have been bought by Alcoa, 
according to the report. All of these moves on the part of 
Alcoa were made not out of necessity, but as a means of 
eliminating the Government entirely from the aluminum industry. 
Alcoa apparently did not need the government-built facilities 
for postwar production of alroainum, but the company saw the 
opportunity, according to the report, of ridding itself of a 
most serious competitor in the form of governmental enterprise, 
which might be able to produce the metal at extremely low costs 
because of its peculiar advantages in tax-free operations, low 
power costs from government—owned electrical energy facilities 
such as TV A and Bonneville, and low bauxite costs from the 
government stockpiles 6f the ore.
Other companies had exhibited Interest in the postwar 
disposal of the aluminum facilities, the most important among 
them being Reynolds Metals Gompany, the American Smelting and 
Refining Company, Kaiser Company, Inc., the Columbia Metals 
Company, the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, and Olin
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Industrie©* Inc• Host of those companies were concerned 
either with the alumina plants or the aluminum reduction 
plants, and had not given much attention to the larger fabri­
cating plants* Reynolds Metals Company had been interested 
in taking over all of the facilities which Alcoa mentioned, 
botk for alumina and aluminum production* The broad program 
which was envisioned by the Kaiser Company, Inc., was of 
particular import especially since the Government had been 
anxious to get another producer into the aluminum field. The 
other companies wanted specific plants, and would not have 
become important in the industry as integrated companies. Olin 
Industries, Inc., had expressed a desire for aluminum reduction 
facilities, but this company removed itself entirely from 
aluminum production during the year of 1945* The fear of 
being unable to obtain adequate bauxite supplies on a com­
petitive basis probably was the chief reason for the company’s 
departure from the aluminum industry*
•*
All of the companies, with the exception of Alcoa, 
indicated before the end of the war that they would be 
Interested in a type of lease-purchase arrangement with 
the government in regard to the alumina plants and the alumi­
num reduction facilities. One of the chief factors for con­
sideration of all the companies was the governmental assurance 
that an a1wlna supply would be available on a competitive 
price level comparable to that ^hich Alcoa enjoyed. Minimi­
zation of various risks of loss through liberal rental terms
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was also stressed* Some of* the companies indicated a 
preference for governmental handling of stockpiles in such a 
way that the companies could sell directly to the government 
until commercial markets opened up after the war*
Although the Government did not take cognizance of 
all of the different desires of these companies, one fact 
concerning disposal was made most apparent* Alcoa1s many 
proposals were rejected by the Government* The report 
declared that these proposals were turned down because the 
acceptance of themnwould have increased Alcoa’s monopoly in 
the primary metal* In acquiring three of the four best re­
duction plants and controlling the Hurricane Creek alumina 
plant, Alcoa would take government plants off the market
and discourage employment opportunities which is the primary
17concept of the Surplus Property Act itself.”
Additional important points presented in the reportia
of Mr* Symington were as follows:
Alcoa would be given the opportunity to 
take over certain facilities, subject to approval of the Department of Justice, but 
only on terms of lease or sale that would 
preclude competitive advantage;
The government will maintain in standby 
condition plants needed for the national 
defense;
^?Iron Age. (December 4, 1945) op- cjt*. pp. 11&-19. 
iaibid.
Plants and equipment not otherwise needed 
will be exported to members of the United Nations subject to approval of the State, War and Navy D epartments;
These priorities may be disregarded, the report points out, where research can be fostered by selling, lending or donating equipment that 
otherwise has no industrial use, provided the 
fruits of such research become public property;
Where key plants are involved, the report 
states, it is essential that they be disposed 
of to bidders who have the organization, ex­
perience and financial resources affording best 
prospects for continuing operations and maximum 
production in the industry* Preference will be accordingly given*
In addition to these general provisions which were 
set forth in the report, certain specific policies in regard 
to the disposal of individual plants were also stated* These 
specific plans for each of the major plants show the special 
intent of the Government to eliminate the monopolistic power 
of Alcoa, particularly in the field of primary aluminum*
19These provisions for the individual plants were as follows:
The Hurricane Creek aluminum plant will be offered to an Alcoa competitor under terms that guarantee sale of alumina on a competitive basis;
The Baton Rouge plant will go to an Alcoa 
competitor but, if none can be found who is willing to operate it at the present location, 
consideration will be given to removing it 
entirely or in part to the Pacific Northwest 
for sale to a competitor* Finally, if the foregoing conditions cannot be complied with, 
the plant will be offered to Alcoa for removal to the Northwest subject of Department of 
Justice approval*
19Ibld.
Reduction plants at Jones Mills, Trautdale, 
Spokane and Tacoma will be offered to Alcoa com— 
petiters* Undisposed—of plants will be retained 
in standby condition until the aluminum market permits economical operation*
The M&ssena plant will be offered to Alcoa subject to Department of Justice approval, on 
terms conferring no competitive advantage* It will be retained by the government pending 
determination of possible disposal to others when low—cost power supply becomes available*
The Maspeth, Burlington, Los Angeles and 
Riverbank reduction plants, if unacceptable to 
any bidders, will either be held in standby 
condition or disposed of according to the recommended priorities, the report says*
Scrambled facilities in private plants will be disposed of by giving plant owners first 
choice* Those in excess will be disposed of according to the priority pattern*
Lime-soda-sinter facilities which are adjuncts 
to Alcoa-owned plants locatdd at Mobile, Ala*, and 
E* St* Louis, 111*, will be offered to Alcoa sub­ject to Department of Justice approval*
In disposals of fabricating plants, the re­
port states, holders of valid options or rights of first purchase will have first choice in exer­cising their rights* Operators of government reduction plants will be granted first choice on plants subject to prior rights of others in order to enable them to integrate more favorably* 
Third choices will go according to the priority 
pattern*
Rental terms and sales prices, the report 
points out, will be fixed with due regard to earning ability of the plant and not necessarily 
with regard to original cost or replacement 
value* On alumina and reduction plants, leasing 
terms may be offered, if necessary, as favorable 
as those received by Alcoa under its original 
lease*
All of the above plans for the disposal of surplus 
aluminum facilities were designed to aid competitors of 
Alcoa* It was suggested in the report that the terms for 
leasing of the aluminum properties might contain provisions 
for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to stand losses 
for an initial period of operation by these competitors. 
Profits* if any* accruing to the new companies operating 
the facilities would be divided, with $5% going to the 
government and 15£» to the operators* The additional pro­
visions suggested were that the Reconstruction Finance Cor­
poration might (1) review and approve the price at which 
virgin aluminum was to be sold; (2) review the top salaries 
offered in the new companies; and (3) look over the extra­
ordinary expenses of the new operators* It was felt that 
this type of control exercised by a governmental agency 
much as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would place 
the new operating companies in the position of having to 
assume reasonable risks of working capital. It would be 
possible under such an arrangement for the government to 
withdraw its assumption of other risks after some reasonable 
period of time had elapsed.
Two additional general provisions of this report 
by Mr* Symington assume a great deal of importance to th© 
historian of the industry. Success of the new aluminum pro­
ducers was a goal toward which the government report was
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striving* The success of* competitors of Alcoa could be
20further assured through the following provisions:
The government stockpile of bauxite at 
Hurricane Creek will be available to the plant 
operator* In addition* the board will ask the 
help of the appropriate federal agencies in 
exploring uhe possibilities of securing foreign 
ore by means of international agreements*
Engineering investigations will be made to determine changes necessary to place plants in the most advantageous position to compete, and the government will finance such changes where 
costs appear to be recoverable.
Many of the provisions of the report were most 
acceptable to the various government officials and to the 
members of Congress who had direct interest in the aluminum 
industry. It was generally felt that most of the actions 
taken would be justified on the basis that disposal of the 
aluminum facilities was preferable to the dismantling of 
the plants built up during the wartime emergency. Leasing 
plans appeared to be the best solution to the general prob­
lems* because most of the potential private competitors 
favored such governmental policies* and government officials 
were interested in preventing losses or excessive maintenance 
costs while the plants remained idle. Outright subsidy 
payments of any type were generally opposed, however, and 
government policymakers were in harmony with this opposition* 
Rent-free leasing arrangements were opposed, also, because 
it was felt that they constituted a type of subsidy* Pro­
ponents of such rent-free leasing of plants were quick to
20Ibid.
point out that wartime producers had the same benefit, be­
cause of the fact that their investments for war built
facilities would be completely amortized by the end of the 
21war*
It is not surprising to find that Alcoa officials 
were in opposition to the administration policy in the dis­
posal of surplus aluminum plants* This opposition was 
expressed in a statement made on October 17, 1945> by 
Mr. I. ¥. Wilson, vice-president of Alcoa* Mr. Wilson, in 
his statement to the Joint Senate Committee on Aluminum, 
challenged the government* s so-called subsidy program which 
had been advocated by Mr. Symington. Stating that the pro­
gram was * wholly unnecessary," Mr. Wilson went on to say that 
his company* s position was "incorrectly stated and charged
that the program is an invitation to reckless, extravagant
22and calculated mismanagement*" He characterized the program 
proposed by the Surplus Property Administrator as being a 
"cradle to the grave program which, once started, can never
23be terminated*" The whole program, as described by 
Mr. Wilson, consisted of many inimical policies, among them
R* Might, op* cit.. pp. 105-06*
Alcoa Charges S P A*s Program for Plant Disposal 
Seeks to Destroy It," Iron Age. Vol CLVI, (October 25, 1945), 
p. 105*
23ikM-
belzig such items as the .following: (1) government guarantee
against losses; (2j purchase options based on the record of 
earnings under subsidized leases; (3) government procurement 
of bauxite or other ores; (4) subsidized manufacture of alumi­
num for sale at prices equal to or lower than Alcoa1s cost of 
manufacture| (3) reduced power rates on government-owned 
power to operators of government plants; and (6) government 
stockpiling of aluminum ingot purchased from operators of the 
government plants. A final blast at the administration policy
of aluminum plant disposal was taken by Mr. Wilson when he
24made the following statement:
We are compelled to conclude that the ulti­
mate objective of the plan is the destruction 
of Alcoap by subsidising competition in the industry that it created or its dissolution by 
government-induced court decree, or governmental entry into private business in the form of 
federal operation of government-owned aluminum plants.
Mr. Symington’s reply to the above conclusions of Mr. Wilson 
was a disavowal of any intention on the part of the Adminis­
tration to atomize Alcoa, although it was more or less 
apparent that the dominating position of the company would 
be destroyed if effective competition would be arranged 
through governmental disposal of the plants to other operators. 
Congressional action was taken on October 18, 3-945* to extend 
for thirty days the whole problem of aluminum pl:int disposal*
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Senator 0* Mahoney had taken the lead in sponsoring the plan 
to frees© the disposal of the government-owned facilities 
until the whole question could be studied again by the vari­
ous military, small business, and postwar planning committees 
which were interested in the entire question of plant dis­
posal through governmental agencies*
A great deal of discussion was carried on in the 
remaining months of 1945 concerning the disposal of surplus 
aluminum plants, but very little was accomplished until 
early in 1946* In January of 1946 the settlement of patent 
rights was made between Alcoa and the Government, with the 
result that disposal of the government-owned plants was made 
possible* Details of the patent settlement and the actual 
disposal of the various aluminum facilities will be given in 
the next section*
Partial Settlement of the Problems of Patent Control 
and Â irarSman Plant Disposal;
Previous discussions have hinted that the disposal 
of government-built aluminum facilities hinged upon the 
question of Alcoa7s control of essential patents in the 
production of alumina* Many companies feared the eventual 
squeese which Alcoa might put upon them in regard to the 
purchases of alumina or ingot aluminum, and did not even 
respond readily to the governmental attempts to attract new
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competitors into the field. Immediately following the 
victory over Japan in September, 1945$ the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation had sent out telegraphic messages to a 
total of 224 eompanies— leaders in the metal and metalworking 
industries— to determine the extent of the interest of these 
companies in aluminum production facilities* Only two com­
panies responded favorably to the messages, but even these 
two made ** jittery leasing offers that involved, along with
other propping, a government guarantee to buy all the alumi-
25num produced that couldnft be sold elsewhere.” The offers 
were made by the Reynolds Metals Company and the Columbia 
Metals Company* Other Interested companies, such as American 
Smelting and Refining Company, the Kennecott Copper Corpora­
tion, and the Anaconda Copper Mining Company, made brief 
investigations, but did not think entrance into the aluminum 
field under the conditions existing at that time to be a
wise move* The key to the whole situation is stated by26
Fortune (May, 1946), as follows:
This reluctance was Induced not so much by 
faintness of heart for a fair competitive fight as by Alcoafs control of most of the available 
high-grade bauxite deposits in the U* 5* and of 
critical patents on the processing of lower- 
grade bauxites in the government1s alumina plants* Without a source of alumina independent 
of Alcoa, nobody who felt any concern about his 
own independence was likely to barge into the 
aluminum business* Alcoa had been fairly good for a long time, but the company was a past 
master of the price squeeze*
26Ibid
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This situation made It appear early in 1946 that the
governmental program Tor disposing of about #700 million
worth of surplus aluminum facilities was at a standstill.
Matters appeared even worse to many observers who felt that
the domination of Alcoa before and during the war was being
perpetuated in the postwar era. But the situation came
rapidly to a sudden conclusion in early January, after an
explosive outburst by Mr. Symington and retaliatory moves
on the part of Alcoa officials. Mr. Symington’s part in the
initial stages of the controversy has been described in the
27following manner:
Then, on January 6, former Surplus Property Administrator W. Stuart Symington fired the shot 
heard round the aluminum world. Symington accused the Aluminum Co. of using its patents to obstruct disposal of government-owned aluminum plants, and of an attempt nto distract the members of Congress and the public from the fact that Alcoa was seek­
ing to obtain the more desirable government plants 
and thus to increase and solidify its own monopo­
listic position." He also suggested that Alcoa officials were bargaining with the patents for settlement or dismissal of the antitrust suit.
"The time has come,” declared Symington, wto say frankly to Congress that it may well be that no 
disposal of any of the plants to competitors will be possible unless Alcoa changes its attitude, or unless the courts, acting under the Sherman 
Act, reorganize Alcoa so that its monopolistic 
power is broken.w
The next four days following Mr. Symington’s pugnacious 
tirade against Alcoa have been characterized by Fortune
27ibid i
magazine as a period that shook aluminum into a 5Jraucous new
Industry** That period— -from January 6 to 10, 1946— will
remain as one of the greatest and most significant periods
in the entire history of the aluminum industry of the United
States* One magnificent gesture on the part of Alcoa changed
the whole outlook in regard to surplus plant disposal and
eoatpehihiom in the aluminum industry of the peacetime world*
This gesture, simple as it was, merely consisted of Alcoa’s
presentation to the United States Government, license-free
for life, the patents for the reduction of aluminum from
low—grade bauxite* It was much more far-reaching than it
appears on the surface, however* The patents themselves
covered three important phases of the process of alumina
reduction, as follows: (1) the use of the lime-soda-sinter
process in combination with the Bayer process; (2) continuous
digestion: and (3) the use of starch as a settling and filter- 
28
lag aid* The use of all of these patents was essential to 
the proper operation of the Hurricane Creek alumina plant, 
because all of the features had been built into the plant 
when it was constructed during the war*
It had been felt for many months that no aluminum 
plant facilities would be sold until Hurricane Creek property 
was disposed of, because of the necessity of adequate alumina
James A* Lee, op * cit* * p* 157*
supplies at a cost competitive with. Alcoa alumina, which was 
produced .from high-grade ores resulted in a saving estimated 
at between ten and twelve dollars a ton, and it was this 
saving that would make the future cost of alumina competitive* 
It was this feature of the patents that had caused the impor­
tant Alcoa officials— Arthur V. Davis, I* W* Wilson, and Leon 
Hickman— to make a hurried trip to Washington, D* C., in 
order to bargain with governmental officials* Loss of the 
patents would mean a loss of income to Alcoa, and it was felt 
by the Alcoa officials that some type of bargaining was 
necessary*
The whole story of these conferences between Alcoa 
officials and representatives of the Surplus Property Ad­
ministration, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the 
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, and congressional 
committees constitutes a unique chapter In Alcoa-Governraent 
relations* The determination of the various government 
officials to break the Alcoa stranglehold was seen in the 
answers given to three propositions which Alcoa officials
advanced during the conferences* The account of this clash
29is stated briefly as followsi
The Alcoa people were there to bargain*
They were interested particularly in getting out from under the Circuit Court decision, which 
had suspended sentence until the effect of
^"Aluminum Reborn,” Fortune. (May, 1946), op* cit., 
pp. 103 M.
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surplua-plant disposal could be determined.
After complaining about the "pugnacious" quality of the Symington blast, therefore, they 
advanced Proposition No* 1: If they made areasonable deal on the patents, would the anti­
trust case against Alcoa be closed? No, said Attorney General Tom Clark* Proposition No* 2 
followed; If they made a good patent settle­ment, would Alcoa b© given equal rights to buy 
or lease the government plants along with 
everybody else? No, said S* P* A* Administrator 
Symington* Proposition No* 3s would they be permitted to finance their own expansion with 
their own risk; it would be up to the court and the Justice Department to decide whether the 
expansion gave Alcoa a monopoly-sized share of the market*
These repeated rebuffs to Alcoa officials constituted 
a real setback to the hopes of the company. It appeared un­
believable to Alcoa that it would not even be able to finance 
its own expansion without governmental surveillance* But 
governmental officials were adamant* They refused to be 
moved by Alcoa*s arguments. Mr. Symington went so far as to 
state that a lease with Reynolds should be consummated, 
regardless of Alcoa's patent holdings* He even cited the fact 
that a patent is nothing but a right to sue, and that if Alcoa 
wanted another lawsuit on its hands it could bring proceedings 
against th© agencies that gave the lease to Reynolds* Other 
government officials agreed with Mr* Symington, leaving the 
Alcoa officials in a predicament. The meeting of Januafy g 
was adjourned with th© situation at an impasse, but the Alcoa 
officials promised to make an offer the next day®
15$
On January 9* 1946, Alcoa made an offer to grant the 
use of patents to competing companies on the basis of free 
licensing of the patents for the Hurricane Creek plant up to 
25$ of capacity (400 million pounds of alumina), plus a 
royalty of one dollar per ton on all alumina produced above 
that figure* This offer met with objections from some govern­
ment officials, and the deal was not settled* On the same 
afternoon, however, Alcoa officials, after a long conference 
with Mr* Symington, gave in to the suggestion that the patents 
should be granted entirely free* Thus, the final settlement 
was one which gave prestige to Alcoa for its "public-spirited 
cooperation” and to Mr. Symington for his diligent efforts at 
•busting a trust.” Testimonial letters were arranged, a press 
conference was called to give the news to cynical Washington 
newpaper men, and Mr. Symington took the trouble to take back 
all the things that lie had said about Alcoa* In the words of
Fortune magazine, "the only question was whose tongue was in 
50
whose cheek*”
In spite of any temporary misgivings which observers 
might have had concerning the events as outlined above, it 
must be readily admitted that the granting of the alumina 
patents to the United States Government aided greatly in the 
disposal of the surplus aluminum plants. The officials in
3°Ibld.
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'the Surplus Property Administration had predicted that when 
the Hurricane Creek plant problem had been settled it would 
be much easier to dispose of the aluminum plants* This is 
exactly what happened* A general clamor for the government** 
owned plants was begun by representatives of several companies* 
Reynolds Metals Company, still unsatisfied with its vast 
holdings built up during the defense and wartime periods, 
was anxious to get the properties which would aid in the 
further integration of its far-flung organisation. The Kaiser 
Interests, the American Smelting and Refining Company, and 
even Alcoa itself were particularly interested in some of the 
major facilities, "tumbling all over one another in a race to
31get at the choicest government properties."
Hurricane Creek facilities for reduction of alumina 
were leased immediately by Reynolds Metals Company, which 
obtained the right to use the government stockpile of 
bauxite located at that plant. According to the terms of the 
lease, Reynolds received the property on a lease-purchase 
plan, the lease itself being for the period of five years* 
Reynolds agreed to sell alumina to all Industrial enter­
prises at cost plus six per cent, with the stipulation that 
the maximum price would be $40 a ton. This was considered 
to be a fair price for the alumina, since the wartime price 
had been as high as $50 per ton. It was felt that the lower
31Ibld
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figure would permit more industrial operators to be demanders 
of alumina, and the ingot aluminum which was produced from the 
alumina* Reynolds also leased the Jones Mills reduction 
plant which was near the Hurricane Creek facilities* These 
two outstanding plants— Hurricane Creek and Jones Mills—  
were sufficient to make the Reynolds Metals Company the 
first fully integrated competitor which Alcoa had had to 
face in its long history in aluminum production in the United 
States* The plants made it possible for Reynolds to produce 
all of the alumina needed for its reduction plants, and to 
produce all the virgin metal needed for its fabricating 
facilities* The prospect for real competition in the alumi­
num industry was at hand, and the further developments within 
the next few weeks were sufficient to make the situation 
even brighter to the American public*
Further disposal of Defense Plant Corporation aluminum 
plants had resulted in the addition of the ^aiser interests 
by the end of March, 1946* The Kaiser company entered the 
field as a producer of ingot aluminum and sheet aluminum in 
the Pacific Northwest. A five-year lease was granted to 
Kalser-Cargo, Inc±, on the aluminum reduction plant at Spokane, 
Washington* This plant was valued at $22,000,000* The Kaiser— 
Frazer Corporation leased the sheet rolling mill, also located 
at Spokane andvrlueci at ^4^*000,000* This initial entry of 
Kaiser into the industry was further expanded at a later date
to Include the alumina plant at Baton Rougef Louisiana , and 
the aluminum reduction plant at Tacoma, Washington. It had 
been rumored in the automobile industry that the Kaiser 
interests were interested in aluminum, because difficulties 
in obtaining steel had left the Kaiser-Fraxer Corporation in 
a bad predicament in the production of the new* Frazer and 
Kaiser automobiles* This problem of procuring steel was 
elesared up, however, and the Kaiser-Fraxer Corporation was 
not forced to use sheet aluminum for the bodies of their cars* 
The Fermanente Metals Corporation, a subsidiary of Kaiser 
interests, took over the operation of the aluminum facilities 
from the original leasing companies, and at the present time 
this company operates the plants at Baton Rouge, Tacoma, and 
Spokane*
The Reynolds Metals Company extended its operations 
in the field of aluminum rolling mills through the leasing 
of the Chicago sheet mill which had been built by the 
Defense Plant Corporation. The Chicago plant was valued 
at £44,000,000. In addition, the Reynolds company leased 
an extrusion plant at Grand Rapids, Michigan, and bought 
a sheet, rod and bar mill at Listerhill, Alabama. The latter 
plant had been operated by Reynolds during the war, and was 
valued at £20,000,000, but the sales price to Reynolds was 
£7,000,000.
All of these moves on the part of Reynolds and the 
Kaiser interests served to place the aluminum Industry of
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the United States on an entirely new basis* In the amazingly
short space of only a few weeks, the entire industry was
placed on a competitive basis, in such a manner as to evoke
the consent that "never before had a one—company industry
been cracked open so fast, so wide, and so handsome for 32
competition * * The results over the period of the next
year in the aluminum industry were amazing* The structure 
of the industry from April 1, 1946, to April 1, 1947* showed 
a decided trend toward the making of a great triumvirate of 
aluminum competitors* The following table will show the 
breakdown of aluminum production facilities in the United 
States* Percentages for the “Big Three11 in the aluminum
TABLE IV
ALUMINUM PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES




Alcoa 43*7 50*6 46 *4
Reynolds 35.9 29.4 29.9
kaiser 20*4 20*0 16.5
Source: The Permanent© News* (May, 1947), p. 16 O'
industry, for alumina, aluminum reduction, and sheet aluminum 
production are given for April 1, 1947• The breakdown is
32Ibid.
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unique in one respect., at least* It shows that Alcoa* in the 
postwar year of 194?, has a majority of plant facilities In 
only one field of aluminum production* that of Ingot alumi­
num reduction* where the percentage gives that company 50*6$ 
of the production capacity* Alcoa continues as the leading 
producer in a U  three lines of activity* of course* but its 
dominance is by no means as complete as It was in prewar 
years or even during the wartime era* By way of contrast* 
it is interesting to recall that in 1939 the picture of the 
aluminum industry* as shown by Alderfer and Mlchl* listed
Alcoa as the producer of 10Q$ of bauxite for aluminum, alumina*
33and of virgin aluminum* The people of the United States 
may marvel at the breakdown of the aluminum monopoly* but it 
should be recalled that toe task was accomplished only as a 
result of purposeful actions on the, part of governmental 
officials and private producers after this country had begum 
its defense program* The elimination of Alcoa*s dominance 
was not an overnight proposition* It proceeded from the 
first decisions to refuse options to purchase to the company 
in connection with the new facilities which it helped to 
build and which it operated during the war* The task was 
completed in the refusal of officials of the various govern­
mental agencies to sell the surplus plants to Alcoa after
^Alderfer and Mlchl* op * cit *» p* 103*
the war had ended, and by the process of obtaining the 
patents from Alcoa for use by competing companies•
Postwar Problems of Competitive Knternrise in the Aluminum 
Industry of the United States;
In concluding this chapter on the postwar aspects 
of the aluminum industry, it is interesting to note the 
most recent article entitled "Lots of Aluminum," in Business 
Week for May 31, 1947* The significance of increased capacity 
and of competition in the aluminum industry is well illus­
trated in the statement that it is necessary to "chalk up*
aluminum as the first major metal to enter a buyer* s market"
34after World War IX was ended* The reasons given are obvious,
35as shown in the following statement:
For two years primary aluminum producers and rolling mills have been operating at full speed* 
Pent-up wartime demand, substitution of aluminum for other metals in even tighter supply, gave suppliers all the business they could nandle*****
Now the pipelines are filled up* Current buying is on the basis of current consumption* The 
result;
Reynolds Metals Co* is "temporarily suspend­ing" production at the Longview (Wash*) aluminum plant, which has a capacity of 60 million lb* of 
ingot a year* Smallest of Reynolds* ingot plants and the company*s highest-cost producer, it will 
be bebuilt to improve efficiency and productivity* 
Operations may be resumed in about a year*
34»Lots of Aluminum, " Business Week* Number 926, 
(May 31, 1947), P* 17*
3hbid.
Aluminum Go* of* America has curtailed production at its Alcoa (Tenn.) rolling mills*
Kaiser Go*, the nation’s third aluminum 
producer, found time to slow down a couple of 
departments in its Trentvtfood {Wash*} rolling mill for year-end inventory purposes* Full 
production is scheduled after the Memorial Day holiday*
Reynolds also has decided it doesn’t want the government-built rod and bar mill near 
Newark, Ohio. It has signed a letter of intent to lease the plant from W A A. Not it finds its KcCook (111*) plant can meet the demand* Rey­
nolds also has cut back on rolled products*
Sheet is the one type of aluminum now in 
easy supply* Output of extrusions is close to 
meeting demand* Castings are still short*
One of the chief reasons for the surplus of sheet
aluminum in 1947 has been the reduced demand for aluminum
for housing and building construction* Both siding and
roofing of aluminum sheet had been in big demand, but the
rapid building up of stocks of this type of fabricated
aluminum products has acted as a deterrent to further
expansion in that field*
No immediate reductions in primary aluminum prices
is envisioned in this latest article by Business Week*
although it is pointed out that secondary aluminum prices
had shown a tendency to turn down in the first half of 1947*
The steady price of 15 cents per pound for ingot aluminum
^Ibid* * p* 9
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had been maintained since 1941 » and it appears doubtful 
that under present circumstances the price will be decreased 
as rapidly as some industrial users might hope# Demand for 
aluminum has held up much better than wartime predictions 
indicated that it might, with the result that more optimism 
is being shown in the industry* The long-run viewpoint is 
that a stable market will evolve from the present situation* 
and that the demand for aluminum will show continued steadi­
ness and growth through the coming years* Several items are 
mentioned specifically to snow the causes for optimism, as
37follows:
1* Continuing demand for foundry items;
2* The expanded market for aluminum foil as a packaging material;
3* The large growth in use of aluminum wire as a substitute for copper;
4# The increased call for aluminum pigment 
for paints; and
5* As a clincher, the fact that .ilcoa is spending #30,000,000 on a new rolling mill at Davenport, Iowa* Alcoa hopes to start opera** 
tions there before the end of the year*
It is not to be doubted that the immediate postwar
aspects of the aluminum industry point to a brighter future
of the industry both in terms of its usefulness to the economic
system and in terms of competitive enterprise* Government
37J&Uk-, p-
plans bore fruit in the establishment of a degree of com-* 
petition that appears to have the possibilities of permanence 
In the field of aluminum production* The changes of the last 
seven years have resulted in significant changes in the 
economics of the industry, which will be the subject matter 
of the final chapter of this study•
CHAPTER V
POSTWAR ECONOMICS OF THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY
The aluminum Industry of the United States affords an 
excellent opportunity for one to analyze some Important data 
in the light of economic theory and practice* The postwar 
economics of this industry is so different in many ways from 
the prewar conditions that many new problems have arisen*
The enormous growth of the industry over such a short period, 
plus the entry of potential long-run competitors to Alcoa 
changed the institutional and technological structure of the 
entire industry*
The economic problems to receive special attention 
in this ehapter constitute an array of seven, all of which 
are connected with the economics of the aluminum industry*
The postwar economics of aluminum will be treated in terms 
of these seven problems, as follows:
1* Competition of producers and fabricators;
2* Production problems after the war;
3* Postwar cost problems in the aluminum industry;
4* Postwar aluminum markets;
5* Labor and labor relations in the aluminum industry 
6* Problems of monopolistic competition; and 
7* Problems of international competition and cartels
in the postwar aluminum industry*
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Analysis of the post-war aluminum industry in terms 
of the above problems constitutes an attempt to show the 
Industry as it exists in 1947* In some cases, particularly 
with reference to the determination of the degree of effective 
competition existing in the industry in the postwar era, the 
answers cannot be entirely definitive* In order to analyse 
production problems one must be concerned with such phases 
of the industry as bauxite resource depletion; alumina and 
aluminum processes, both old and new; fabrication and finish** 
lag problems; the decline in production as a result of the 
eutSiag off of the i*artime demands for aluminum Ingot 
products; and the differences in production problems of 
older plants and the newer government-built aluminum facili­
ties* Important postwar cost problems used for explanation 
are those connected with the various aluminum ores, aluminum 
reduction, shipping and transportation, and the fabrication 
or railing mill costs* Aluminum markets will be analyzed 
on the basis of demand and supply data, which are connected 
with the expansion and contraction of aluminum markets in 
the fields of transportation, industry, and finished consumer 
goods* Marketing centers in the aluminum industry are used 
in explaining the economics problems which have to do with 
the distributive end of the aluminum industry* Problems of 
labor and labor relations are helpful, particularly In the 
light of the labor troubles existent in the industry during
the war* The postwar features surrounding the presence of 
great numbers of additional trained personnel in the in­
dustry are useful in throwing light on a new labor problem* 
Monopolistic competition in aluminum has always been 
a fertile field for analysis, particularly in terms of dif­
ferentiation of products, substitution, and competitive 
materials which take the place of aluminum in industrial 
usage* Added to the prewar features of the monopolistic 
competition in the industry is the wartime development of 
additional producers in the field of aluminum production, 
making the postwar analysis revolve around the conditions 
of oligopoly* Three producers in the field of primary 
aluminum production after the war change the picture from 
a 100* monopoly to a competitive one* No extended analysis 
is contemplated in the field of the international cartel® 
in aluminum, primarily because of the fact that it has been 
repeatedly stated that Alcoa was never a member of the 
cartel movement* However, the possibilities of international 
competition, especially with Canadian aluminum, will be 
discussed* The tariff situation, since it now is positive 
protection for domestic producers against Canadian competi­
tion in United States markets, will be given some considera­
tion in the latter part of the chapter*
Competition of Producers and Fabricators:
Prewar lack of effective competition in the aluminum 
industry of the United States, especially in the field of 
primary aluminum production, was perhaps its most noted 
characteristic• Figures which have been cited before in­
dicated that in the field of aluminum ores, alumina, and 
ingot aluminum reduction, the position of Alcoa was one of 
quite complete monopoly* Only in the case of fabricating 
facilities was it possible before the war to discover any 
degree of competition, but even that was limited by the 
necessity of fabricators to purchase Alcoa ingot aluminum 
for fabrication* The 100/9 monopoly in the three primary 
stages of aluminum production resulted in Alcoa control of 
the aluminum industry of the United States, with the result 
that no other producer dared to enter the field* Wartime 
changes effected by the governmental agencies and private 
industry created the opening wedge for competition in the 
industry, and the postwar disposal of surplus plants set up 
the Reynolds Hetals Company and the Kaiser interests as 
competitors*
It must be stated at this point, however, that the 
real degree of effective or classical competition in the 
aluminum industry of the United States in 1947 cannot be 
measured with exact scientific accuracy* A variety of 
reasons may be given for tnis lack of definitive evidence,
but the most important ones ares (1) the fact that the 
surplus plants leased by the government to Reynolds and to 
falser were leased for a period of five years, beginning in 
1946, and they have been in operation for only a relatively 
short period of time under postwar conditions; (2) the 
oonditions of demand, which were such at the end of World 
War IX that a great backlog of demand for a variety of alumi­
num goods had sprung up, enabling new producers to sell 
their goods mostly in a seller*s market; (3) the possibility 
that the leasing companies may, at the end of five years, 
find it advisable not to exercise the option to purchase the 
plants, especially if they are faced with a declining demand 
for aloainua and an unsatisfactory price situation; and 
(4) the continued operating existence of the uneconomical 
plants, such as the ones at Baton Rouge, Hurricane Creek, and 
Tacoma, at least under present conditions as they exist in 1947* 
It is obviously a matter of conjecture as to the 
degree of genuine competition existing in an industry where 
the competing firms are operating on different bases# The 
situation in the aluminum industry in 1947, with Alcoa opera­
ting on the basis of private industry assuming its own risks, 
both present and future, is quite comiJlicated* The leases 
held by both Reynolds and Kaiser were designed to provide 
a modicum of competition, chiefly by limiting profits and 
prices which were possible under the leases granted* For
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6xanple} it has been stated before that Reynolds book over
the Hurricane Greek plant with the stipulation that he could
sell alumina at cost plus six per cent* provided that the
price could not be more than a maximum of $40 per ton of
alumina* The granting of the patent rights by Alcoa to the
Government had been given as a reason for keeping alumina
prices down that low* as against the wartime price of $50
per ton* The patent rights granted license free made it
possible for Reynolds to produce alumina from ten to twelve
dollars a ton cheaper* as we have seen* Such conditions as
these make it evident that competition* free and unrestrained*
does not exist in the aluminum industry of the United States
in 1947* This conclusion is in opposition to the following
1statement* which appeared in Fortune magazine in May* 1946:
Under monopoly conditions in an industry*
It Is more or less worth while to reduce costs-— with the aim of either lower prices and greater 
sales* or simply of increased profits on the old volume of business* Under competitive conditions 
it is often a matter of life and death* The 
latter is quite desperately the case of the 1946 aimtnuB industry* No longer can the industry 
develop its markets in a leisurely way and expand its capacity just enough to meet the demands it 
can clearly see ahead* No longer can it play 
merry tunes with prices all up and down the scale for aluminum— even with demands pent up by the
^"Aluminum Reborn*" Fortune * (May* 1946), q p » cit * * 
pp* 103 ff *
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war— occupies merely a corner of the enormous war—expanded capacity. The present price of 
vifgin aluminum ingot is 15 cents a pound 
(14 cents for pig) and it had better not go any higher if the industry wants to sell more 
aluminum*
The chief reason for disagreement with the above 
statement is the fact that toe writer does not feel the 
degree of satisfaction concerning effective competition 
that is exhibited in the line which states that ”the latter 
is quite desperately the case of the 1946 aluminum industry.” 
Although the disposal of government facilities did result 
in the placement of means of competition into the hands of 
two large competitors of Alcoa, the time is too short to 
say that competition is at hand in the aluminum industry 
of the present era* The statement even in the year 1947 
would be subject to careful scrutiny, because the very 
nature of the government lease-purchase agreements with 
Reynolds and Kaiser interests indicates the possibility of 
their retirement from the field if conditions become worse 
than they anticipate*
The writer is more inclined to accept the viewpoint 
expressed by the War Assets Administration in the most 
recent report to Congress concerning aluminum plants and 
facilities* Conservatism is shown in the statements con­
cerning tne possible competition arising out of the govern­
ment plans for disposal to competitors of Alcoa* It becomes 
apparent that the officials of the War Assets Administration
do oot JTeel that, completely effective competition exists
2in the aluminum industry of 1947* The report states:
The distribution of productive capacity 
in surplus plants to now independent producers 
represents a major step toward the establishment 
of a competitive aluminum industry* particularly 
in the very important lower stages of manufac­
ture. Mere possession of such productive capacity 
will not, of itself, give rise to competition» Other Prerequisites must be met before genuine eeatpetition can be achieved. (Italics mine.)
One of these is keeping the newly acquired 
facilities in substantial production, for it is output and the ability to sell that output that 
will ultimately be a deciding factor. Another 
factor is the extent to which existing noninte­
grated fabricators and the purchasers or lessees of Government-owned fabricating plants will have 
available for their operations adequate supplies 
of Ingot, sheet and other forms of aluminum, whether from the present integrated producers 
or from other sources. The smaller firms and independent fabricators who presently look to 
the ingot and fabricated aluminum producers as 
their prime source of supply will be able to withstand competition from the large firms only 
if they are able to obtain supplies at a sufficiently low price. In the fabricating 
field it is possible that under some conditions 
competition may be diminished, rather than 
promoted. This circumstance, as well as the general market outlook for aluminum and its 
products, will affect the efforts of WAA to 
broaden the base of disposals so as to bring additional Independent operators for the 
remaining surplus plants into the field*
It is of extreme importance in making any analysis
of present-day competition in the aluminum industry to
2Aluminum Plants and Facilities, First Supplementary 
Report of tBg W£? Afl’SSTg 35ffliTftgtr tidft to the Congress, 
(February 12, 1947)> PP* 4-5*
remember the exact statue of the disposal program for the
government-built plants* The latest report available in
this connection is the War Assets Administration summary
3of disposals, excerpts of which are given below:
.....the wartime investment of the Government 
In the aluminum industry was $716.1 million, of which $34*2 million represented loans to private 
enterprise by the &FG, and #661;. 9 million went 
into DPC and Wavy plants and scrambled facilities 
cost #66$»4 million, of which the bulk, or $629*4 million, were plants costing $5 million or more 
eafh.»***•
As of November 30, 1946, #651*6 millions in 
Government plants and facilities had been de­
clared surplus, and #367*3 millions disposed of 
(including one plant withdrawn from surplus), 
leaving approximately #276.1 millions in aluminum plants still awaiting disposal. These disposals 
comprise chiefly leases, the leased plants cost­
ing #295 million. Plants costing #79*6 million 
have been sold for a total of #26.5 million. In addition, sales and transfers (includes transfer to Veterans Administration of Navy plant with­
drawn from surplus) of equipment in Government- 
owned plants were made amounting to #11.7 million. 
Thus, plants representing over half of the original Government dollar investment in the aluminum 
industry have been disposed of to date.
.....The total number of Government-owned 
plants was 56 (Including the lime-soda-sinter facilities adjacent to Alcoa-owned plants, which are treated as complete plants) of which 35 cost 
more than $5 million. Of the 56 Government 
plants, 53 were originally declared surplus and 
one later withdrawn by Navy Department; 14 have 
been sold and 14 leased. Of the 26 disposed 
plants, 16 will continue operation in the alumi­
num industry.
> p p * >-4*
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The basic or key plants in the program are those Tor production of alumina from bauxite, 
valued at $65*7 million, and foi1 the reduction 
of alumina plants at Hurricane Creek, Ark *, and Baton Bouge, La* , are fundamental to the program*
Both plants are now in operation under letters of 
intent, and leases are being drawn* Four of the nine reduction plants have been disposed of, and 
negotiations for one of the others are under way*
The disposal of the fabricating plants which 
comprise the balance of the Government investment 
is less advanced, since it not only depends to 
some extent upon the prior disposal of the basic 
plants, but may involve problems of conversion* However, 20 out of 3$ such plants have been 
disposed of, representing all types of fabrication*
Ideas in the above statement are further clarified by
the report in the declaration that *surplus aluminum plants,
and segments of plants, originally costing the Government %2$2
million, remain to be disposed of*****In many cases, disposals
have covered land and buildings only, and disposition of the.
plant equipment will be made at some future time through the
4WAA Office of General Disposal*"
The conclusion reached in the War Assets Administration 
report of February 12, 1947, is pertinent to an understanding 
of the competitive features of the aluminum industry at the 
present time* Leonomie theory will be of importance in this 
statement of the general idea, and further analysis of the 
other problems of production, costs, and markets, will aid 
1A the final conclusions which will be drawn In this chapter*
P* 5
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The successes attained in the program of disposal are out-
5lined in the report as follows!
The accomplishments of the past year in 
the disposal of aluminum plants and facilities 
represent substantial progress toward the 
attainment of most of the major economic objec­
tives of the program presented to Congress in the report of the Surplus Property Board, of 
September 21, 1945* The distribution of productive capacity in surplus plants to new 
independent producers represents a major step toward the establishment of a competitive 
aluminum industry, but production in these 
plants and the marketing of their output will eventually determine this issue*
The plants remaining to be disposed of 
are chiefly those in the fabricating group*
Future prospects for these plants will depend upon the extent to which the present large 
demand for aluminum is sustained* The War Assets Administration will, within the frame­
work of the policy and program set forth in 
the first report to Congress, continue to follow a course of endeavoring to establish competition in the aluminum industry and to achieve the pertinent objectives of the 
ourplus Property Act*
If the postwar policy of disposal of the Governmental 
aluminum facilities continues to work out as planned, and if 
the companies whose entry into the industry has been so widely 
heralded are able to stay in the field beyond the periods of 
the leases, it will be a successful step in the inauguration 
of competition in aluminum* In concluding this section on 
postwar competition, however, it will be well to remember
^lbid.. pp. 38-39.
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the following statement; which appeared during the war in a
6study on corporate concentration and public policy2
The economic characteristics of the alumi­num industry show, on the one hand, that monopoly 
is not a necessary condition and, on the other hand, that classical competition is not feasible, Present demand conditions would support between 
five and ten large firms at optimum size and 
optimum scale in the refining, reduction, and power stages. In mining and in the finishing 
stages a large number of independents would 
be economically justified* The observed merits o f integration and the advantages of large-scale production suggest that five to ten integrated 
firms of medium size would create a technically 
efficient industry*
The industry has not progressed to this ideal, and 
probably will not reach such optimum potentialities within 
the next few years, but the conditions of oligopoly existent 
in the aluminum field today offer more hope for the future 
in this respect* It is a far cry from the monopolistic 
nature of the prewar industry, and is a harbinger of more 
competitive economics in the aluminum industry of the future*
Production Problems After the Wart
Several problems in the field of aluminum production 
assume major importance for consideration in the industry in 
the postwar period* Bauxite resource depletion is one problem
xH* L* Purdy, M. L« Lindahl, and W* A. Garter, Corpor­
ate Goneentration and Public Policy. (New York: Prentice-HaTl,
Inc *, 1942 J, p . 218 .
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that has claimed the attention of various experts during the 
past few years* ’the presence of possible new methods of pro­
ducing aluminum through the newly invented processes has 
called for deeper consideration of the postwar technological 
phases of the industry* Mew fabrication and finishing tech­
niques have added to the marketing potentialities of the 
metal* Declines in aluminum production in the period after 
cessation of hostilities, with their consequent declines in 
quantities of aluminum available for the postwar market, 
gave rise to economic problems of significance* Various 
differences in production problems of the older aluminum 
plants as contrasted with the newer wartime facilities have 
caused a wide variety of comments on this phase of the 
Industry since the end of World War II*
Depletion of bauxite resources of the United.States 
has been feared in both governmental and private industrial 
circles for a number of years. This fear was noted in the 
early discussions concerning the postwar aluminum industry, 
and it is of importance to consider just what is meant by 
most writers when they refer to such bauxite resource de­
pletion* Several writers, among whom we may mention Profes­
sor Engle and his associates, have stated that the rapid 
use of our high-grade bauxite ores during the war might 
place the United 3tates in the position of a have not nation, 
and might make this country dependent qpon outside or foreign
131
help 1** case of another war* This argument, is carried to 
its logical conclusion in Chapter XVIII of their book* which 
is descriptive of *a program for allocation of world bauxite
7reserves*0 Pointing to the necessity of arranging for 
international agreements concerning bauxite resources, the 
writers refer specifically to implementing one of the pro­
visions of the Atlantic Charter* which contains the following3statement in Article IV:
They (the United States and Great Britain) will endeavor, with due respect for their exist­ing obligations* to further the enjoyment by 
all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, 
o£ access* on equal terms* to trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity*
little doubt exists that this country would be 
interested in some sort of international agreements which 
would assure adequate supplies of bauxite in the future* 
Repletion of resources in Arkansas has occurred during the 
years since 1940* with the result that the industry must rely 
upon imported bauxite ores from Surinam to supplement the 
domestic output in the postwar period* Use of lower-grade 
ores which are to be found in this country would be possible 
in the event of another world conflict, but might delay the 
successful rearmament of the United States to a great extent* 
International control, assuring adequate allocation of the
6Ibld.. p. 3«9.
182
bauxite resources to various consuming nations, had been
suggested, even before the end of the war. Two types of
international settlement of the bauxite problem were suggested,
each of which was quite different from the other* The first
plan called for reliance upon the general machinery of the
international government of the United Hat ions to set up a
free world market with effective competition. This system
would permit the highest bidder in the free world market to
obtain supplies of bauxite. However, in spite of its element
of laisses~faire economics, it was not felt that it would be
successful in actual postwar practice. In other words, ”a
free market, therefore, might easily result in a few rich
nations, individuals, or corporations, getting control of the
9lionfs share of the world*s choicest bauxite resources•”
The second type of international control which was 
advocated had to do with the establishment of a permanent 
international bauxite allocation board or commission with 
adequate power to enforce its decisions. This power of en-~ 
forcemeat would be granted by the United Nations, with appeals 
possible to a type of international court. Elaborate pro­
visions for this entire program were outlined by the experts 
at the University of Washington, but no efforts to implement 
these plans for actual practice have been forthcoming in
9Xbld«. p. 390.
Halted Nations circles up to the present time. Perhaps such
suggestions lor international control of raw materials have
been too far advanced for acceptance by the United Nations
under present day conditions# If such a program were adopted
the likelihood of another war might be postponed indefinitely,
*
but one must admit that it is merely a matter of conjecture
in 1947* Such schemes of international cooperation in
economic matters too often become involved with political
issues to become practical realities, although they may still
be desired by a great many nations. If such a plan for
bauxite could actually be worked out, then international
cooperation in many other raw materials problems might be
easier# The conclusions reached by the group in Washington
prove to be of interest, particularly the following state- 10meats
The allocation of bauxite reserves to 
consuming nations on the basis of equalizing the duration of reserves for each country should not only be considered desirable but should be looked upon as entirely feasible*#.. 
Admittedly any program set up for a long period would have to be kept flexible* An arbitrary 
allocation of reserves to uses, however care­
fully thought out in advance, would be certain 
to need modification from time to tirae*.#*In conclusion, the authors feel that some such 
program as that envisaged##**is an indespensable prerequisite, not only to a permanent aluminum 
Industry in the United States, but to a peace­ful world# A program must be developed which will not only allow us to preserve and expand
pp. 401-04
our aircraft industry but will also permit the fulfillment of the rights of other nations.Through our President we have gone on record 
with Britain for free access to the raw materials 
and markets of the world as a keystone for inter­
national peace policy* It' is only as every natural resource is brought under scrutiny and 
control such as indicated above that the promise of the Atlantic Charter can be fulfilled. Bauxite* 
as one of the basic materials In the postwar world* might well be the first to be tackled*
To the extent that such a plan for bauxite resources 
indulges in the positive program of suggesting what ought to 
be done in the field, it becomes **artrt in the realm of economic 
considerations• Descriptive analysis of the entire problem 
of resource depletion was made on a scientific basis, and must 
be accepted as indicative of "science* in the field of economics 
The issue here, as in other instances of the conflict between 
art and science in economics, resolves itself Into a consider­
ation of the net result to be accomplished in pointing out 
what might be achieved through such a positive program. The 
writer feels that if the cause of world peace can be served 
by turning artist at this point, then it is well to suggest 
what ought to be done in regard to bauxite, as well as other 
essential mineral raw materials* Cooperation among the nations 
of the world is desirable in this respect, and should be en­
couraged by all economists and statesmen.
Technological progress In the aluminum industry from 
1940 to 1947, coupled with the changing institutional pattern 
of the industry, has called for a different economic evaluation
l&S
of production problems than was possible in prewar years * The 
changes in technology have been mentioned in this study be— 
fore* mainly in terms of the new processes that have been 
employed * or tested in pilot plants* One of the greatest of 
the wartime improvements on the Bayer process of alumina re­
duction was the soda—lime—sinter process that made x>ossible 
the greater utilisation of low grade ores* Other processes 
for reduction of aluminum from alunite or from various types 
of clays were employed in the pilot plants at Salt Lake City* 
Laramie* Salem* and Harleyville* Even the new process for 
thermic manufacture of aluminum* as yet untried in the United 
States* may change the production problems of the industry 
to an extent am yet unpredictable* The newer wartime alloys* 
with greater strength and durability than any of the prewar 
varieties* add to the production potentialities of.the indus­
try in terms of satisfying an expanding market* All of these 
developments, in the light of economic theory* are to be 
considered as being instrumental in changing the technology 
of the industry to provide for both extensive and intensive 
use of raw materials in the aluminum industry and to provide 
for better types of aluminum products for the consuming public. 
This changing technology in the aluminum industry has given 
a wider variety of products in the postwar period, and the 
hopes for future utilization of the processes appear bright*
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New fabrication and finishing techniques in the 
production of aluminum goods have enhanced the position of 
the metal in many industrial uses* Markets for aluminum 
products have been expanded in the housing field, where sheet 
aluminum has been used in prefabricated houses, both for 
aiding and for roofing* Aluminum foil for wall insulation, 
to reduce heat loss and to lessen fire hazard and vermin 
infestation, finds a ready market in the postwar world* A 
great variety of reconversion activities after the war re­
sulted in the extension of potential markets, as shown inUthe following statement:
Reconversion of the aluminum industry to meet the demands of the peace time world is 
progressing swiftly* The huge mills that turned 
out block and a half long sections of aluminum sheet during the war for fighter planes and 
bombers are now rolling aluminum sheet destined 
for farm roofs, truck bodies, and a hundred other peacetime products* The foil mills that rolled aluminum foil which played so vital a 
role combatting enemy radar, now roll foil for the packaging of cigarettes, candy bars, and chewing gum* The giant hammers which forged 
aluminum propellor blades, are now turning out pistons for automotive engines and other peacetime products*•***An attractive market 
for aluminum at the present time is the build­ing industry**•*.Another promising field for 
aluminum finishes*.•*.Important progress has 
likewise been made in electro-plating alumi­
num. ... .Manufacturers of aluminum cooking utensils promise several innovations in post 
war aluminum pots and pans.....Transportation
^"Aluminum Industry Makes heady for feace Demands,* 
p.tiirer*s Record, Vol. CIV, (April, 1946), pp* 44^46*
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continues to be one of the principal users of aluminum with bright prospects for increased consumption in all fields*
The list of applications of these newly fabricated and 
.finished aluminum products is tremendously long* The fact that 
fabrication is one phase of the Indus try with a relatively 
large number of producers makes the outlook for the future 
more promising. Fabricators in the past history of the 
aluminum industry had to depend on Alcoa for their ingot 
aluminum, but with Reynolds and Kaiser interests in com­
petition in the field of primary aluminum production, the 
field of fabrication should have a greater supply of the 
metal for peacetime civilian needs, and should have an even 
wider market than it has enjoyed in the past for its products* 
It was to be expected that aluminum production would 
be curtailed to some extent immediately after the cessation 
of hostilities in World War II, mainly because the postwar 
prospects for sales of aluminum products could not compare 
with the wartime needs for the metal In the aircraft and 
other types of industries* The original cutbacks came as 
early as 1943, and the immediate postwar period has seen 
further declines In production of certain types of aluminum 
products, such as sheet aluminum* Present* operation of many 
of the plants is conducted on a basis of less—than-capacity 
production, but this condition has been brought about by 
several factors* The presence of a large amount of secondary
l$$
aXminuii salvaged from a variety of wartime applications,
has affected the market for ingot aluminum to some extentf 
and has made the production of virgin metal unnecessary in
the large amounts that were produced during the war, when no 
secondary metal was available« The backlog of civilian de­
mand was not as large as the wartime demand of the various 
industries which employed the use of aluminum, and this 
situation has meant a decline from wartime volume of pro­
duction, at least until the market situation clears up* Post­
war markets, in contrast with wartime conditions, actually 
needed to be extended through salesmanship and advertising, 
and these activities have taken some time and effort on the 
part of alumlnnm producers*
The markets for aluminum products are being rapidly 
expanded at the present time, and it is reasonable to expect 
greater production of the metal in the years to come* Wider 
applications of the metal in a greater variety of industrial, 
coronercial and consumer activities will make this possible* 
Most observers of the aluminum industry feel, however, that 
the peacetime production of the various phases of the industry 
will not reach the wartime level, at least for several years* 
It may be possible in the long run, provided the potential 
markets are thoroughly exploited, both in the domestic and 
international spheres*
Differences between the production problems of the 
newer wartime plants and those of the older, established
1&9
facilities have been Indicated* Emphasis has been 
placed on the differences arising out of such changed con­
ditions as location of plants, transportation problems, and 
cost problems brought about by the improved and new pro­
cesses and technological structure of the industry* The 
geography of the industry, as it expanded into new and widely- 
dispersed sections of the United States, has given rise to 
various comparisons of the newer plants for primary pro­
duction of aluminum* Location of new alumina plants at 
Hurricane Creek and Baton Rouge, for example, caused their 
production problems to be different from those of the older
plants at Last 3t.Louis, Mobile, and even Listerhill* The 
plant at Hurricane Creek was adjacent to the bauxite areas 
of Arkansas, while the plant at Baton Rouge was not as close 
to ocean transportation facilities as the plant at Mobile, 
but was better situated than the East 3t* Louis facility to 
receive foreign ores* The Baton Rouge plant made use of the 
bauxite froa Surinam, which came by ore ship to New Orleans
and was then transshipped by rail up the Mississippi River
Valley to its final destination* Lack of dock facilities at 
Baton Rouge prevented ships from proceeding directly to the
alumina plant there* The various transportation problems
involved represented a change from the institutional structure
of the industry, and in some cases the newer plants were
recognized as the better plants, except for the Baton Rouge
plant, which still is referred to as being uneconomical,
although its continued operation by the Kaiser interests is 
expect ed*
Some of the newer aluminum reduction plants were 
beneficiaries of the extended governmental power development 
program, and were able to get lower power rates for the 
electrolytic process of reduction of the virgin metal* The 
plants in the Pacific Northwest have been pointed out as be­
ing more economical than some of the older facilities, be­
cause they received hydroelectric power from the Bonneville 
Power Administration, which channeled power from Bonneville 
and Grand Coulee dams into the aluminum industry in that 
region* Plants at Tacoma, Spokane, Longview, and Vancouver 
were more advantageously located with respect to power than 
the Eastern plants, or even those in California* Total costs 
of the various regions per pound of aluminum produced were 
shown by Professor hngle and his associates to be as follows:
Pacific Northwest (private plants).•..**10.63^
Pacific Northwest (DPC plants)•••••••••*10.7##
New York State -..•.........*...--*.....10.97^Alcoa, Tennessee ••••»•*••*••«**»•*•••*.11*57$Listerliiil, Alabama •*»••••••«•••••**«•*12*15$
Torrance, California *•••••***•*••.*.***12*63$
These figures are indicative of the fact that the 
newer facilities built by the Government and private industry 
incorporated some of the modern technology that the older 
plants did not possess* More than this, however, was the
12Engle and others, op. cit*. p. 229*
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combination of* factors of raw material, power, and trans­
portation facilities In such a ’way that lower costs result­
ed in some of the newer plants. It will be noted that the 
Torrance, California, plant, regardless of its newness, 
could be operated only under wartime conditions which covered 
its uneconomical operations. It was one of the very first 
plants to be put out of opex^ation when ample aupplies of the 
metal were made available, and it has never been placed back 
in operation* The long run analysis of the newer facilities 
will have to be made at some future date, because operations 
in qll of the plants have been curtailed to some degree up 
to the present time in the postwar period.
Postwar Cost Problems in the Aluminum Industry:
Extended statistical analysis of costs in the aluminum 
industry is not contemplated here, but a careful consideration 
of cost problems is necessary for an interpretation of the 
postwar economics of aluminum. These problems of costs, in 
their general nature, are somewhat different from the prewar 
considerations, and it is in this respect that they will be 
discussed. The important problems are those connected with 
the costs of aluminum ores, aluminum reduction, shipping and 
transportation, and fabrication or rolling mill activities. 
Wartime studies In all of these specific fields of aluminum 
production were conducted at the University of Washington, by
192
Professor Engle and his associates, and their conclusions are 
to be fowl in Chapters X and XI of their book* These studies, 
however, were limited in scope, for a variety of reasons which 
were mentioned by the authors* Excerpts from their conclusions 
are valuable for consideration here, because they show the 
difficulty facing the analyst in the field of aluminum* borne
13of their most pertinent statements are as follows:
despite the unsettling effect upon accounting procedures and summary statements of war-wrought 
industrial change within plants, such as new con­struction and the gradual occupation of completed 
portions uf plants, changes in sources of supplies and the accompanying alteration in transportation; 
accommodations of o|>erations to new government rules and to trade union practices; breaking in of new 
workers; shortages of materials and supplies; changing prices and qualities of materials— despite these 
dynamic factors, the aluminum industry today is 
accounting for production In familiar categories 
and in some instances in terms of budgets and standard costs* The authors found complete costs systems In 
privately operated plants throughout the country*
Access to records, however, was not possible, hence alternative methods had to be followed*
heither are adequate published data available 
on separate operations in the industry* Contrary to 
the policy of producers of other basic commodities, more particularly, iron and copper, which publish cost data on internal operating processes, the 
principal aluminum producers have followed the plan 
of retaining such information for strictly company use.*.*.•For the aluminum industry, annual financial 
statements have appeared in the published financial 
journals for a number of years* Data, however, have been restricted to the usual condensed balance sheet 
**ui brief profit and loss items with such explanatory 
notes as were deemed necessary to clear questions of
Ibid.. pp. 206-0>
accounting procedures** * *.*Sporadic analysis of alumina and pig aluminum costs have been made from 
the very earliest history of the industry by various 
writers in professional journals* Mostly theoretical 
or blueprint analyses, none of these studies purport to bear the hallmark of authoritative cost accounting, which naturally could come from the industry alone.
Various brief analysis of cost conditions in the 
aluminum industry have been published since the end of the 
war, and they are helpful in the understanding of the general 
problem* It has been generally recognized that the wartime 
conditions in the industry were such that many high-cost 
factors were Involved, but hope has been expressed that some 
of the high—cost factors of production would be reduced in 
peacetime operations* The Defense Plant Corporation plants 
erected during the war are the nucleus of effective com­
petition In the present day aluminum industry, and a com­
parative analysis of their costs is significant* A brief
statement of the cost situation involved was given in Fortune14magazine (May, 1946} as follows:
The major cost items in aluminum smelting are: alumina, electric power, labor, and carbon electrodes* Alumina and electric power together make up approxi­mately 60 per cent of the mill cost of pig aluminum, 
and are also the most variable cost factors between 
one point and another* The whitish-gray powder, alumina, is produced In separate plants by the standard 
Bayer process, using bauxite, soda ash, lime, and fuel 
as its chief raw materials* Actually, transportation 
is the principal element in the cost of alumina* Bauxite, at the mine in Surinam, Arkansas, or wherever,
14"Aluminum Reborn,” Fortune* (May, 1946} op * cit*» 
pp* 103 ft*
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Is dirt-cheap, but it has to be hauled to the alumina plant; so, or course, do the other raw materials#Then the alumina must be transported to the reduction 
plant, which in the case of the northwest aluminum 
plants during the war, was several thousand miles away* 
The cost of alumina in the V/est Coast plants was over 
5 cents per pound of ingot# This contrasts with 
Alcoa*s prewar (1937) cost of 3*2 cents, which is be­lieved to be about the same today#
Electric power, the second major factor in aluminum reduction, is required in enormous quantities, in order to tear the aluminum loos© from the oxygen in alumina.•*.....The aluminum industry, largest single 
user of electrical energy in the U. b., consumed an 
estimated 22 billion kilowatt-hours at the 1943 peak* Cheap power— which usually means hydroelectric power—  
is an essential for economical aluminum smelting* In practically every case, the uneconomical DPC plants have been made so by excessive power costs..****
The only wartime power costs approximately 
competitive with those in Alcoa’s private plants were attained by the three northwest DPC plants and the 
Reynolds Smelter at Longview. These plants— buying from the Bonneville Power Administration— produced at an average electricity cost of 2 cents per pound of 
aluminum* The other seven plants in the industry paid 
from 3*2 to 7-1 cents* To be sure, the government built several of its plants with the full knowledge that power costs would make them uneconomical for 
postwar operation*
These statements reflect the general economic con­
ditions of costs within the aluminum industry, and form a 
basis for consideration of a few points of economic theory* 
Costs to the aluminum industry are unique In one respect, as
seen in the statement that nthe fortunate thing about aluminum13costs is that they are subject to change withoxit notice*"
This statement appears startling on the surface, and probably
15Ibid
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should not be taken literally without some sort of explana­
tion* An example of the line of reasoning productive of such16a statement is the further explanation which stated:
One important change, of course, is represented 
by the terms of the Hurricane Greek lease, which 
assures new competitors a price of no more than $1*0 
a ton for alumina* This knocks off 1 cent a pound from the wartime? cost of aluminum* If Reynolds can do as well at Hurricane Greek as Alcoa— which pro­
duced at a cost of during the war— the savingwill be even more. The construction of one or more alumina plants in the Northwest— using bauxite from 
the Dutch East Indies or native aluminous clays—  would mean another 1-ceixt saving on freight costs 
to the northwest ingot plants* Alcoa has already 
announced plans for an alumina plant in Washington to supply its Vancouver pot lines, and both Reynolds and Kaiser are toying with similar ideas*
Plans as outlined above for Alcoa, Reynolds, and
Kaiser have not materialized up to the present time, but
savings in costs may be the impetus that moves these companies
in the future to establish such alumina plants in the Pacific
Northwest* Complete integration of the aluminum industry of
that region would indicate that an alumina plant, or perhaps
more than one, is necessary to supply the ingot aluminum
reduction facilities that have been operating there since the
war. If costs can be reduced to the extent indicated, then
postwar competition may force this move, particularly when
such competition becomes more effective in the long run*
Cost conditions in the aluminum industry can change
16Ibid
rapidly, as shown by the preceding statements, but iaother 
point or economic theory should be emphasized at this point* 
Ttie typical cost conditions round in the aluminum industry, 
according to most writers in the field, are those of de­
creasing costs, at least to an extent equal to that found 
in other types of manufacturing enterprises* This feature 
of decreasing costs is chiefly a result of the fact that the 
aluminum industry is characterized by relatively large over­
head costs* This does not mean that the industry is topheavy 
with overhead costs, however, as illustrated by the following 
examples of direct and overhead costs by regions:
Region Direct Costs Overhead Costs
(Percentage of total costs)
Pacific Sorthwest (private plants) $2*4 17*6
Pacific Morthwest (DPC plants) 32*7 17*3
Torrance, California #5*2 14•&
Hew York (old plants) 63*2 14*6
Alcoa, Tennessee 66*0 14*0
Listerhill, Alabama 66*3 13*7
(Source: ingle and others, op* cit., p* 230*)
Increases in production of aluminum under the conditons 
represented here would cause the per unit cost of aluminum to 
be reduced, according to most observers* At the time of the 
great wartime expansion of the aluminum industry, testimony 
given by Mr* Reynolds concerning the production of the metal 
by his company Indicated the possibilities of lowering the 
costs through a greater volume of production# Although the 
subsequent events in the history of the industry did not
produce the result envisioned by Mr. Reynolds, his state­
ments in 1941 still are of great interest in our postwar
economic considerations. As recorded in Time (May 26, 1941)
17the significant quotation is as follows:
Richard Samuel Reynolds........told a SenateCommittee that he will produce aluminum for 12 cents 
maybe 10 cents— when his Alabama and West Coast plants get in production. At 10 cents a pound, the ho. 1 light metal of World War II would cost only half what it did last year  ........
Increases in capacity, reinforced by compe­tition, may some day make even 10 cents per pound 
for aluminum look expensive.
This ideal price situation for aluminum did not be­
come a reality during World War II, but the postwar scene 
is such that it is within the realm of possibility in the 
years to come* ho adequate explanation is forthcoming as 
to the reason why aluminum did not go below 15 cents per 
pound during the war, other than the fact that many high 
cost plants were operating in the country during those years 
If postwar economic conditions in the industry in terms of 
competition among three producers of primary aluminum result 
in vast production programs in the lower cost plants, the 
propheey of Mr. Reynolds may become a reality. The rate 
of profits accruing to Alcoa as it carried through three 
successive reductions of aluminum early in the defense 
period did not decline, and there is no reason to feel that
17"Maybe 10 Cents; Maybe Less," Time. Vol. XXXVII, 
(May 26, 1941), P* 91.
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prodiKSticui in great volume in the postwar world would make
Id
the situation any different* Both Alcoa and Reynolds made
substantial profits during the war with costs of production
at a high level and the price of aluminum at 15 cents per
pound* Reynolds Metals Company is reported to have lost
money in the production of ingot aluminum, but apparently
more than made up for such losses in other lines, as shown
19by the following statements
In spite of Its losses on ingot production, 
Reynolds, too, did all right for itself during 
toe war* In the six years, 1940 through 1945, the company* s net earnings after taxes were nearly 
$1& million, and its earned surplus grew from 
$3 million to #21 million* But Reynolds is in 
nothing like Alcoa9s financial clover. The company still owes $34 million on its RFC loans, while 
Alcoa has a #155 million earned surplus against a debt of $&5 million. In fact, Alcoa financed its #300 million war expansion with a net increase of only $50 million in debt.
It should be noted that Alcoa itself conducted profit­
able operations during the war, because "the company9 s net20
for 1940-1945 was $199 million." If such profits can be 
attained by these companies during a wartime period, when 
prices of labor, materials and transportation are higher than 
in normal times, and when the price of aluminum is at the
-g
"Aluminum and the i&iergencyFortune. Vol. XXIII, 
(May, 1941) * P» 1^4 b*
19"Aluminum Reborn," Fort tine. (toy, 1946), op. cit., 
pp* 103 ff.20Ibid*
15—cent level, it is reasonable to assume that the peace­
time prospects for lower costs and lower prices are good 
and potentially realisable*
Postwar Aluminum Markets:
Aluminum markets traditionally have been extremely 
dependent upon the price situation of the metal, probably 
to a greater extent than some of the other metals* This 
fact has been clearly demonstrated by several writers, and 
It becomes of paramount Importance in discussing the eco­
nomics of the industry to show the potential postwar aluminum 
markets available to all of the producers* One of the most 
significant statements concerning this relationship of
alumlmmi markets and aluminum prices Is the following para-
21
graph from Fortune. (May, 1946):
Price is a weightier factor in aluminum than 
in any of the older, established metals. While aluminum has properties that make it the best 
metal available for certain applications (such as automobile pistons and deoxidizing agent for 
steel production), in most cases it competes with such materials as steel, wood, plastics, magnesium, 
and copper solely on a price basis. At any given time there are millions of pounds of potential 
aluminum consumption hanging in the balance between the comparative prices of aluminum and some other 
material, ready to jump one way or the other as the 3pread increases or diminishes* Other con­siderations, of course-such as economics in main­
tenance and the values contributed by aluminum's
21Ibid
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light weight— are taken into these computations*
but in the long run, price is the deciding factor.
A number of wartime events contributed to the ex­
tension of market potentialities of aluminum. Xhe 25^ 
reduction in the price of aluminum after the state of the 
defense program (from 20 cents to 15 cents per pound) open­
ed up new marketing fields, and if the price goes any lower 
a greater expansion of the markets can be expected. Con­
ditions of demand were not the same during the war as they 
characteristically are in peacetime, however, and allowances 
must be made for the changed nature of the postwar marketing 
situations* Xt was possible during the early stages of the 
war to utilise full productive capacities of the various 
plants to satisfy the demands of a single market— the United 
States Government. It is easy to imagine that the demand for 
aluminum for airplanes and other war material probably would 
have been as great even at a slightly higher price than 15 
cents* Winning the war was the prime consideration during 
those years, and necessity rather than costs set the pro­
duction pattern. Production of adequate amounts of aluminum 
to satisfy the immediate wartime needs resulted in cutbacks 
In the industry, and the transition to normal peacetime 
pursuits was begun.
Elasticity of demand for aluminum becomes one of the 
chief aspects of the postwar aluminum markets. It is the 
determining factor In the extension of the market for the
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metal} and assumes great importance both In the realm of
theory and practice. Economic theory approaches marketing
situations from two standpoints: first, changes in demand
arising out of conditions that result in greater amounts of
commodities being taken off the market at the same or higher
prices, and, second, elasticity of demand, which reflects
the extent to which the quantities taken will vary with
22changes la the prices of coimnodities. Changes in demand, 
of course, can be either increases or decreases of demand, 
according to existing economic conditions surrounding the 
market. If, as in the case of aluminum during the war, in­
creasing amounts of the metal are absorbed into the market 
regardless of the relative stability of the price at 15 
cents per pound, a definite shift in the demand curve has 
taken place, budden increases in the need for a commodity 
like aluminum can remit in such increases in demand, and 
greater production will be needed to satisfy the market*
Such changes can occur in any type of industry, especially in 
times of war, extreme prosperity, or institutional and techno­
logical changes in an economic society. Periods of depression, 
on the other hand, may result in decreases in demand for such 
products, and the markets will suffer.
22
Changes in demand and elasticity of demand are given 
adequate treatment in various textbooks on principles of 
economics. The discussion here is given in an effort to show 
the importance of these economic theories to the aluminum industry in the study of postwar economics of the metal.
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Mormal peacetime pursuits in an economic system, 
however * usually will not result in such rapid changes in 
demand* Kxcept in those Instances where a product can 
invade an entirely new market (as aluminum did in the 
automobile and the aircraft industries), the short-run 
analysis will run more in terms of elasticity of demand 
than in terms of rapid changes in demand for any given 
industrial product. Plans may be made by the aluminum 
producers to exploit the marketing potentialities of the 
metal in new fields, such as streamlined trains, truck 
bodies, boxcars, refrigerator cars, skyscrapers, bridges, 
or a multitude of other uses, with the result that more 
metal will be used in these different ways* The typical 
result of such entry may be dependent upon reductions in 
price, however, and will reflect the elasticity of demand 
for aluminum by industrial consumers* If the Industrial 
users are convinced of the necessity of using more aluminum 
at the same price, the result is a change in demand* But if 
the increased use of aluminum is dependent upon price re­
duction, the producers must Investigate the slope of their 
demand curve for aluminum in order to determine whether or 
not such decreases will be profitable in the long run*
It is reasonable to assume that the demand curve for 
aluminum is elastic, the elasticity being greater than unity* 
Such an assumption may be based upon a prewar analysis of
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dtaa&d for tho metal as given by Mr* James Wechsler* Tbs
eonelusion reached by Mr. Wechsler was that the demand curve
for aluaiaua was highly elastic* He had based his statement
upon a previous conclusion by Robert J* Anderson, a technical
expert in the aluminum industry, who had indicated that a
five—cent decline in the prices of aluminum would result in
23a five-fold expansion of the demand for the metal* More 
recent studies in the field of aluminum consumption have 
indicated that there might have been an error in this prewar 
statement, but there is little doubt that the general con­
clusion concerning the elasticity of the demand curve for 
aluminum is correct* The demand curve for aluminum may not 
approach the horizontal position which is indicated in the 
statement by Mr* Anderson, but it is safe to say that the 
market for aIraninum will absorb increasingly larger quantities 
at lower prices than were charged for the metal in the prewar 
years* The failure by Alcoa to investigate the slope of its 
prewar demand curve for aluminum became apparent, because the 
company was dedicated in those years to a policy of high and 
rigid prices and low volume of production* This fact has
23James Wechsler, "United States vs. Alcoa," Hation* 
Tel* CXLVII, (October 8-15, 1938), pp. 346-47.
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been adequately shown by prewar studies, such as those con­
ducted by the Department of Justice* The following statement
24substantiates the conclusion:
•*****the Department of Justice has produced an immense amount of evidence, some extracted 
from the company *s own books, in an‘attempt to 
prove that Alcoa and twenty one other affiliated and subsidiary companies have amounted to a 
monopoly of the U. S. aluminum business effective 
enough to maintain prices and profits inordinately high and volume unnecessarily low*
More specific conclusions concerning the elasticity
of the demand curve for aluminum have been reached in the
wartime studies made at the University of Washington* These
studies indicate a high degree of elasticity of demand for
the metal* The results of the industrial survey conducted
by Professor Engle and his associates during the war pointed
to a great demand for aluminum and the products of aluminum,
and prlc e was indicated to be a deciding factor in much
demand* Two approaches were pointed out as defining the
market limits for aluminum——technological factors and costs*
The statement is made that the first rule of the aluminum
2-5market is* "ask the technician*” If aluminum satisfies
the technical requirements of lightness, strength, dura­
bility, or other physical and chemical qualities, the
Aluminum and the Emergency,ft Eortune, Vol* XXIII, 
(May, 1941)* P* 67*
2^Engle and others, op. cit*, p. 249*
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problem then becomes one of costs and prices of the metal* 
Competitive materials have been mentioned In the study, with 
steel, magnesium, copper, and plastics in the role of chief 
economic competitors to aluminum, both in technical and cost 
aspects. Ho single product, whether it be steel, aluminum 
or any other octal, can enjoy complete monopoly in a market 
If there are reasonable and obtainable substitutes. A great 
future awaits all of the Industrials mentioned above, accord­
ing to the statement made by Mr. T. 0. Richards, of General26Motors Research Laboratories, who said:
The United States will need twice its 
steel capacity by I960 and a great deal more 
aluminum than the war. peak capacity. If full employment and high level consumption can be 
achieved by the people of the world, in the 
years ahead, the big problem will be where 
to find enough materials of all kinds, not where to look for markets.
Results of the University of Washington survey in the
field of aluminum consumption were published in Chapter XII
27of the book, Aluminum. Several facts of importance are to 
be noted concerning the nature of the survey and the results 
of the study from the standpoint of elasticity of demand.
The survey was conducted in the years 1942-1943 with the 
purpose in mind of determining the approximate postwar 
consumption of aluminum. A total of 200 companies, widely
^ Ib i d .. p. 251. 
27Ibld.. pp. 249-69
dispersed both in an industrial and a geographical sense* 
constituted the sample taken for the survey* Questionnaires* 
Interviews* letters* and conferences in the field were all 
used as means of obtaining the information* with the result 
that usable reports were obtained from 135 different com­
panies* The summary of the data obtained bias been given 2d
as follows:
Out of a total of 200 interviews 135 usable reports were obtained* Of course, 96 companies reported a prewar annual consumption (1940) of 
51 million pounds of aluminum; 75 reported an 
expected annual postwar consumption of 65 million pounds at 15 cents per pound for the virgin metal; 
while 61 companies expected to use 104 million pounds if aluminum were 10 cents per pound* The 
sise of the sample is further illustrated by the data on employment and volume of business reported 
by 62 of the companies* These companies gave employment to a total of 266*300 workers or an 
average per firm of 4*600* the range being from6 employees to 93*000* Volume of business for 
these 62 firms totaled #1*600 million in 1940* 
an average of $2'6 million per firm, ranging from 
#45*000 to #650 million* Of the 62 firms, 27 
expeeted an increase of business after the war*7 expected a decrease and the others no change*
The average increase expected by the 27 was 40 per cent while the decrease anticipated $26 million per firm for the 62 companies reporting 
holds for the 135 which supplied usable reports* the total volume of business in 1940 represented 
by the sample was #3*510 million or 30 per cent 
of the total value of expenditures for durable 
consumers9 and producers9 goods in which aluminum 
was used in 1940*
Ibid*, p. 254
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Fifeures obtained in the course of the survey indicated 
an interesting comparison in probable postwar consumption of 
almainna in all industries when two prices Tor the metal 
were quoted* At a price of 15 cents per pound, it was in­
dicated that demand Tor aluminum by all industries might 
reqeh the Figure of 1,428,629*000 pounds* At the lower
price of 10 cents per pound, it was estimated that the total
29consumption might approximate 1,890,300,000 pounds* Other 
. estimates were made in the survey, but all of them indicated 
a potentially great expansion in the aluminum industry in 
the long run if costs were kept low and prices were quoted 
with some relationship to the costs involved. Some partic­
ular Industrial fields, according to the survey, indicated 
that differences in prices of aluminum would have little or 
no effect at all upon their consumption of the metal* Some 
of these industrial categories showing definite inelastic 
demands for aluminum are as follows: railroads, blast-furnaces
and steel mills, aircraft, aluminum foil, busses, radios, 
engines——gasoline, diesel, and steam— and hardware* Con­
sumption by these eight Industry groups was estimated for the 
postwar period to be relatively stable, regardless of a 
price of 15 cents or a price of 10 cents* Price assumes
29Ibid.. p. 256
ZtJd
much less Importance in such industries, it was stated, be­
cause lightness is essential and relatively small quantities 
are consumed*
Industries placed into the category of having elastic 
demands Tor aluminum constituted a total of 21 in number. 
Price was indicated to be of great importance in these in­
dustries, where a price of 15 cents per pound would call 
forth between 711 and 733 million pounds of aluminum, while
a price of 10 cents would result in a potential demand
30between 1,178 and 1,200 million pounds of the metal. The 
industrial users which indicated the greatest potential 
expansion in the demand for postwar aluminum products were 
the automobile industry, the architectural and building 
Industry, truck trailer manufacturing, and electrical regu­
lators and switches production. Competition with other 
materials was pointed out as being a decisive factor in 
the price—demand relationships in these industries.
All of these facts from the survey constitute im­
portant food for thought in the economic theory of postwar 
economics of the aluminum industry. Events that have taken 
place in the field of aluminum fabrication since the war 
ended bear directly on the whole problem. Assuming that
Ibid.. p. 258.
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certain industrial groups did Indicate that their demand 
lor aluminum was relatively inelastic, the situation does 
not preclude the possibility of changes in the demand curves 
lor these users of aluminum* The railroad industry may be 
taken as Illustrative of the situation* It was indicated 
as an important demander of aluminum* but demand was regarded 
as relatively inelastic* Potential postwar demand was pre­
dicated upon the assumption that- the railroad industry would 
use as much aluminum at 15 cents as it would at 10 cents per 
pound* This could be true* but the situation does not 
preclude the possibility of an entire change in the demand 
curve for aluminum in the railroad Industry, as it might 
occur when streamlined trains* refrigerator cars, and 
boxcars can be made of aluminum in competition with steel* 
This is an important consideration to Alcoa and to Reynolds 
both* because each company already has made a bid for mar­
kets in the railroad industry* The race for additional 
marketing outlets became so torrid at one time that both of 
these companies made claims of having built the first
31aluminum boxcar* Such competitive enterprise as this 
could result in gaining many new markets and changing the 
so-called inelastic demand areas into profitable outlets 
by changing their demand curves*
Aluminum Reborn,H Fortune * (May, 1946), o p  • tit. »
pp. 103 ff.
Areas of elastic demand in the aluminum industry ©an 
he cultivated by aluminum producers through the processes of 
cost reductions accompanied by price reductions* This would 
be in direct contrast with the situation in prewar years, when 
monopoly power maintained a wide gap between costs and prices 
in the aluminum industry. An economic philosophy of abundance, 
with constant close relationships between costs and prices, 
and with profits being earned on the basis of large volume 
of output and low unit profits, could result in greater con­
sumption of aluminum products throughout the country and 
substantial returns to all three producers in the field of 
aluminum production as of 1947*
The philosophy of scarcity practiced by Alcoa from 
its Inception, restricted production and high prices (with 
low voltoae of output and high returns per unit) could be 
the future bane of the aluminum industry of the United States. 
It could hurt consumers and producers alike, and would result 
in the curtailment of aluminum consumption and the lowering 
of the standard of living for the people as a whole. Both 
elasticity of demand and changes in demand can be carefully 
watched by the producers, with the possibility that greater 
and wider markets for the metal can be cultivated and main­
tained. These new market possibilities will not open up 
automatically^ but they can be ncultivated sedulously, not 
only through cost and price reductions but also by developing
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mew alloys, sow fabrication methods, and other adaptations32o f  the versatile new metal to new uses*"
Regional markets for aluminum in the postwar period 
are of interest in economic analysis of the industry, mainly 
because of the geographical differences between producing 
areas and eventual marketing areas for the metal* No exact 
data are available for a full consideration of this problem, 
but the statement has been made that "only about 37 to k>6 
per cent of the probable total market for aluminum lies in 
the geographical regions in which the reduction plants are 
found* In other words, over half the market lies in in­
dustrial centers chiefly in the vicinity of the Great takes
33in which no reduction plants exist*” This market situation 
is shown in a general way in the following table of estimates 
made In the University of Washington survey* The percentages 
given represent estimates made during the war, but this general 
analysis fits the postwar situation adequately enough to be 
of economic significance*
Xt will be seen from these data that the reduction 
plants in the Northeastern region of the United States have 
an adequate market close to the production facilities* The
32Ibid.
Engle and others, op. clt., p. 34#•
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market la that gaographleaX region is even greater than the 
local capacity to furnish aluminums ingot* Other regions in 
the United States are in the position of having to obtain 
markets outside of their oiaa territory of production* The 
Southeastern region and the Pacific Northwest, in particular 
offer scant marketing potentialities in comparison with the 
mOftat! hut their aluminum reduction facilities ar© great*
TABLE V
REGIONAL MARKETl FOR ALUMINUM
Geographic Region Protable Percentage of U* 3* Postwar Market for Aluminum
Probable Percentage of U, 3* Aluminum 
Reduction Capacity 
after the War
Mertheast 30-35 15-20Southeast 1-3 35-40Pacific Sorthwest 1-3 30-35Southwest 5-7 10-15Midwest 53-62 0
Bourses Engle and others, ou» cit*. p* 346#
The Midwest region has no aluminum plants within its borders, 
yet constitutes potentially more than one-half of the market 
fear aludsmi in the peacetime years* Consumer costs of the 
metal must include transportation costs, and for this reason 
the marketing problem In the Industry Is intensified* The 
smmary analysis made In the University of Washington survey 
Indicated that the various producing regions would ship to
213
those Biarkets which would yield the highest net profits 
over costs 9 with both rail and water transportation f tic ill** 
tie® being considered in the various cost analyses* Careful 
and extensive studies would be necessary to determine the 
exact potentially best market for each producing facility, 
both in terms of ingot aluminum and sheet aluminum* There 
are possibilities of more aluminum consumption in the South-* 
east* Pacific Northwest, and Southwest, but the producer® 
of aluminum probably will have to consider the necessity of
i
carrying out adequate sales and advertising program® in order 
to cultivate the markets*
Labor and Labor Relations in the Aluminum Industry:
Many facts of economic significance present themselves 
to the historian of labor and labor relations in the aluminum 
industry, of the United States* The Industry itself long has 
been noted as one which demands an intelligent and highly 
trained labor force, because the nature of the operations in 
the various type© of plants is such that skilled laborers 
are in constant demand* The character of the Industry in 
prewar years was such that little more than 30,000 workers 
were employed, even as late as 1939, and the industry ranked 
about fiftieth among the nation* s industries in terms of the 
number of employee®• iimployment increased rapidly, however, 
during the defense and wartime periods, and it has been
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estimated that by 1943 a total of 140,000 persons were at
work throughout the aluminum industry* This enlarged labor
fore# placed the aluminum industry among the ten leading
industries of the United States, judging by the number of
workers employed* Postwar operations have not demanded the
large labor force that was employed during the height of
wartime activities, but employment in the aluminum industry
remains at a high figure* Mo exact data are available on
total employment for the industry at the present time, but
it is to be assumed that with all three producers in the
field of primary production operating steadily (although
not at full capacity) the wage-earning group is large* In
34the words of the University of Washington observers:
The evidence is conclusive, however, that 
the aluminum industry is rapidly coming of age, 
and may even be.classed among the dozen indus­tries in the United States which employ 100,000 
workers or more* Effective use of man power is also indicated by the fact that the number of 
workers did not increase as greatly as did 
output *
Wages and earnings'in the aluminum industry have shown 
steady advances in recent years, In the same manner that pay­
ments to all employees have Increased* During the war the 
Labor Department classified the aluminum industry as being in 
the group of industries which pay the highest wages in the 
United States* Hourly wage rates advanced rapidly in aluminum
^Ibid* * pp. 103-04
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manufacturing after 1940* ao that by the middle of 1943 they 
were 40$ higher than in the former year# Variation in wage 
rates has been noticeable among the different geographical 
regions* but explanations have been made that such variation 
is due to differences in skill, the nature of the work* and 
the prevailing wage rate structure of the regions involved.
A trend toward greater uniformity of wages throughout the 
industry has been noted* but some questions have been raised 
as to the advisability of making a sudden change that would 
give the same wage rates in every section of the country# The 
issue was raised by the Aluminum Workers of America as early 
as 1942* on the assertion that labor should receive equal pay 
for equal work regardless of the section of the country in­
volved#
The War Labor Board, taking cognizance of the issue 
presented in regard to uniform wage rates, granted increases 
during the war to Southern laborers in the aluminum industry# 
The increases were based upon such factors as ability of the 
companies to pay the higher wages, costs of living in the 
geographical regions involved, and the iw^odiate effects on 
war production to be encountered as a result of higher wages# 
Wo general principle of standardization was ever affirmed by 
the War Labor Board, however, that wage rates throughout the 
country should be standardized immediately. The general
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philosophy of the Board in this respect is given in the
>5following statement:
The majority is satisfied that complete 
elimination of the differential would have an undesirable disrupting effect at this time 
on the general economy of the areas involved*
Since Southern industries generally are adjusted 
to prevailing differentials, a sudden elimina­
tion of the differential in a major industry, such as aluminum, is bound to disrupt directly 
and Indirectly the wage and labor policies of many other industries*
Eventual standardisation of wage rates on a nationwide basis
was envisioned by the Board, but the process was looked upon
as one which would be gradual over a period of years* A
general trend in all types of industries toward elimination
of regional differences is a recent characteristic of the
economy of the United States, apparently, and if the trend
continues in the future some of the regions with lower wage
rates will have noncompetitive advantage over other regions
in the production of aluminum* Other considerations will
occupy more attention than costs of labor if such a move
takes place* Power resources and technological improvements
may, under such conditions, claim more and more attention
than the wage situation in the aluminum industry*
/
One of the most pertinent facts that bear on friendly 
relations between labor and management in the industry is the
35Ibld.. P. 106
217
relatively m a l l  size of* the cost or labor as compared with
the final selling price of the finished aluminum product*
This relationship is of importance, as seen in the following 36
analysis:
Before the war, labor costs, in the reducing stage alone, were less than 5 per cent of the 
selling price of aluminum* Although the share of labor cost has increased tremendously since} 
the wax, by 1943 it was still under 10 per cent of the price of the product* Therefore, the 
operators can afford to be fair or even generous with their personnel* Furthermore, up to a 
recent period, there being only one aluminum producer in the industry made it easier to pass 
on to the consumer increases in labor cost* In 
a monopolistic situation, management and labor 
are frequently allied against consumers*
Strangely enough the most delicate situations have not arisen between labor and management 
but have come from jurisdictional conflicts 
between unions*
A high degree of unionism has characterised the 
aluminum industry for many years* Onion organisation in all 
the plants except Niagara Falls has become complete in the 
various phases of mining of ores, alumina reduction, and ingot' 
reduction* Unionization exists in rolling, extruding and 
forging plaints, but not to the great extent that it is found 
in the three phases given above* The familiar union device 
of the closed shop is very rare,, although collective agree­
ments between unions and the management of a majority of
Ibid.■ p. 113.
plants are In operation* Two types of union organisation 
exist* Reynolds plants, and some independent .firms 9 are 
characterised by the union shop* Facilities operated by 
Alcoa have been known for their maintenance of membership
37provisions* Both the American Federation of Labor and the 
Congress of Industrial Organisation have gained footholds in 
the aluminum industry, and each organization has a great deal 
ef strength* Neither organisation, however, has any claim 
to outstanding superiority, although the C* I. 0. unions have 
slightly greater strength than those of the A* F* of L» The 
plants of the Reynolds Metals Company are under the union 
domination of the A* F. of L*, while other companies (Alcoa 
and Raiser interests) are chiefly controlled by C. 1* G.
^"In a maintenance of membership, shop employees who were members on a specified date must remain in good 
standing as a condition of employment, but old employees who have not joined the union can retain tneir jobs with­
out belonging* New or old employees who join che union subsequent to the agreement must maintain good standing 
or lose their jobs*
"Under the union shop all employees must be 
members of the union in good standing as a condition of employment* The employer makes his own selection for 
hiring, but the new employee must join the union within 
a specified time* The union collects dues and each new employee, after the specified time, must be a member of 
the union•* See 4* E* Walters, Personnel Relations* (Sew York: The Ronald Press Company, 1945), pp• 48-49*
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official®, such as the Aluminum Workers Unions the Mine,
Mill anti Smelter Workers Union, and the 01© Casting Worker® 
Union*
Jurisdictional strife arising out Qf the conditions 
in the aluminum industry caused trouble during the war, when 
various union groups competed for recognition in some of 
the plants* A great amount of squabbling took place at the 
Cleveland, Ohio, plant of Alcoa, in 1942# This conflict was 
a battle between four different union factions, as follows:
(1) the American Federation of Labor; (2) the Aluminum 
Workers of America (C#I*0#); (3) the Mine, Mill and Smelter 
Workers (C#I*0#}; and (4) the United Mine Workers, district3250 (under John L# Lewi®)# Another crippling strike occurred
in Alcoa*8 plant at Edgewater, New Jersey, early in March,
1941# nb a time when the defense program was in full swing
39and aluminum product® were needed« Fortunately for the
^Two articles appearing in Business Week at the time 
are of interest: (a) "Alcoa Feud; FB± and Army Investigate 
Work Stoppages at Cleveland," Business Week. (June 13, 1942), 
pp# $5-26; (b) "Alcoa*s Headache; Jurisdictional Strife Growl­ing in Cleveland Plant," Business Week# (August 1, 1942),p#56«
^"Strike Cripples Aluminum Company Plant in Edg©water, 
New Jersey," Commercial and Financial Chronicle# (March 14, 1941)9 P- 16227 and "Siployees of the Aluminum Co# of America Plant Return to Work Fending a Settlement of Uispute," Com­
mercial and Fipapojpj Chronicle* (March 29, 1941), P- 2000.
220
defense and war efforts* 'these strikes were settled in such 
a manner as to assure continued production of the plants* and 
the Industry was not plagued with other big strikes during 
the period of hostilities* Amicable relations apparently 
hare continued thus far since the war* because no additional 
X&bor troubles have threatened on a large scale during the 
past two years*
Many additional women secured jobs in the aluminum 
Industry during the war* This situation arose as a result of 
the manpower shortage* but the employment of great numbers 
of women resulted not only in the alleviation of the tem- 
porary shortage* but also in the determination of the fact 
that women were suitable for a wider variety of jobs in the 
industry* An account of the employment of women by Alcoa 
was given by Mr* R. C. Turner* who stated that women 40
employees of his company were "doing an excellent job*”
He recalled that the employment of women in the aluminum 
Industry dated back before World War I* but indicated that 
jobs given to female employees in those days were specialised 
tasks such as packing* inspecting, and sorting* In dis­
cussing the World War II situation, Mr* Turner stated that
C. Turner, "Manpower Crisis; Putting Women to 
Work on More and More Jobs——Alcoa," Factory Management *
. Vol. Cl, (Bovember, 1943), PP* 39-94*
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^occupations are varied, ranging from crane operators to41
inspection supervisors.11 Pictorial displays accompanying
bis article gave ample p r o d  of* the wide range of* aluminum
Industry operations handled by women during the war, with
a sample of sixteen pictures showing as many different tasks
performed by women* It is not possible to determine the
exact number of women in the aluminum industry today, but
it is reasonable to as some that many lost their jobs when the
%wartime emergency was over* The number remaining in the 
industry would be greater than prewar years, presumably, 
because of the greater productive facilities and operations 
la the field of aluminum at the present time*
Probl«f* of Monopolistic Competition in the 
A l m d m a  Industry of the United States;
Studies in economic theory during the past two decades
have brought forth several works of importance in the field42
of monopolistic competition* These treatises have dealt 
with the middle ground between strict monopoly and effective
^ I b i d *
^Significant in the field have been such books as 
the following: Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition- (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933);
Joan Robinson, Tfte Economics o£ top erf e,qt Competition,(London: The Macmillan Company, 1933)» Robert friffin, 
Mono poll stic Competition £&d General Kquijibtii^(Caaihridge: Harvard University Press, 1940)*
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competition as they traditionally have appeared in principles 
of economics* The applicability of the ideas concerned with 
imperfect competition to the aluminum Industry may be readily 
seen in a variety of ways. They will be treated in this 
section from the standpoints of product differentiation, 
substitution, and competitive materials in the industrial 
and commercial world*
Product differentiation in the field of monopolistic 
competition was one of the basic ideas presented by Professor 
Chamberlin, Differentiation is one of the means of making 
comodi ties appear to be different* lack of homogeneity is 
one of the chief elements in such differentiation* Goods 
under perfect competition would be homogeneous 9 but under 
a system of product differentiation each producer attempts 
to make his own product appear superior in some way* Vari­
ations in products may take a variety of forms, as shown
43by Professor Chamberlin*s statement:
A general class of product is differentiated if any significant basis exists for distinguish­
ing the goods (or services) of one seller from 
those of another* Such a basis may be real or fancied, so long as It is of any importance what­
ever to buyers, and leads to a preference for one variety of the product over another* Where such differentiation exists, even though it be 
slight, buyers will be paired with sellers, not 
by chance and at random, (as under pure competi­
tion), but according to their preferences.
^^Edward Chamberlin, op. cit* * p. 56
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Differentiation may be based upon certain characteristics of the product itself, such as exclusive patented features; trade-m&rics; trade 
names; peculiarities of the package or container* if any; or singularity in quality* design* color* or style* It may also exist with respect to the conditions surrounding its sale*
Postwar economic analysis of the aluminum industry 
of the United States shows certain aspects of product 
differentiation similar to those mentioned above* The patent 
situation* which appears quite different today from what it 
was before the war* has brought about a significant change* 
Previous treatment has been given to the fact that certain 
basic patents were turned over to the Government* license 
free* by Alcoa early in 1946* This action established the 
possibility for a more adequate type of competition in the 
industry* tee of the recent comments made on aluminum
44mwmTpatents by the War Assets Administration is as follows:
There are no subsisting product patents 
on either alumina or aluminum as such* The majority of the alloys made from aluminum are 
likewise free of patents* However, Alcoa has ~a few patents covering special alloys of alumi­
num with other metals* These alloys are said to amount to only about 10 per cent of the 
total sales of aluminum alloys* Alcoa had in­
dicated a willingness to grant licenses to 
postwar operators* in most cases at a royalty 
of one—quarter of 1 cent per pound• In certain other cases the royalty aspect remains as yet 
undetermined *
44Aluminum Plants and Facilities* &£• , PP- 10-11,
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Original patents In the aluminum industry did give 
mono poll stic power to Alcoa, but such power has been greatly 
diminished as a result or recent events in the industry*. Some 
of the patents had run out, of course, even before the begin** 
ning of the defense program, but the history of* the Industry 
has shown that no other company had dared to compete with 
Alcoa until Reynolds established entry into the Industry* 
Professor Chamberlin mentions the fact that occasionally 
patents will stimulate competition in an industry through 
the development of rival processes* This possibility did 
not hntwime a reality in the aluminum industry during prewar 
years, since the electrolytic process continued to be used* 
Sven today no rival process has been proved to be of enough 
significance to take the place of electrolysis in aluminum * 
reduction* But both Reynolds Metals Company and the Kaiser 
Interests are in the field substantially at the present time, 
and the result may be great exploitation of potential new 
processes* It may be possible for such a process as the 
Loevenstein thermic manufacturing process to be proved
ieconomically practicable, although nothing definite can be 
«ald of it at present* In any event, it is reasonable to 
state that the postwar economics of the industry insofar 
as patents are concerned shows a trend away from the 
strictly monopolistic elements of prewar years* Certain 
process patents still have an aura of uncertainty about
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them* particularly (1) the direct--"chill"--casting of
ingot prior to fabrication* (2) the synthetic cryolite
and aluminum fluoride process* and (3) some miscellaneous
processes pertaining to heat treating* fluxing and de-45gassing the metal. The extent of licensing of these 
patents* or of permitting them to be used on a royalty 
basis* may be the determining factor in monopolistic com­
petition in terms of patents and product differentiation in 
the future*
Trade names* as indicated by Professor Chamberlin 
and other writers* have great influence in most fields of 
marketing of products* and aluminum is no exception in 
this respect* Prewar sales of a variety of aluminum 
products were made under the trademark^ of Alcoa and others 
in the field of altxminisa fabrication. "Bohnalite" pistons 
were sold by the Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, 
"lynite" pistons were sold by Alcoa* and in some Instances 
enjoyed the greater advantage of reputation established for 
them by the company. Aluminum ware* particularly kitchen 
utensils* was sold under a great variety of trade names* 
such as "Mirro," "Pure Aluminum^" "Wear-Ever*" "Princess*" 
"Eureka," and "American Maid*" Some of these products
^ I b i d A  p. 10.
Hendershot, op» cit.. p. 166. Alcoa exercised 
control over some of the companies producing aluminum ware, 
and gave them the advantage of its reputation*
enjoyed an advantage of reputation established by Alcoa, 
also*
To the extent that both Reynolds and Kaiser products 
are on the market today, and will compete with the prewar 
trademarks In the Held of aluminum, this type of product 
differentiation will assume importance. The element of 
monopolistic competition will continue to exist, inasmuch 
as any trademark at all adds the monopolistic character in 
the markets* "Kaiser Aluminum," distributed by Permanents 
Products Company, may assume an important role in the 
aluminum industry, and the Reynolds Metals Company*s trade­
mark (a representation of St* George and the dragon) may be 
just as important in the postwar scramble for markets. Both 
Kaiser and Reynolds have made great strides in gaining 
recognition for their aluminum products, and if both stay 
in the field this element of product differentiation will 
become increasingly important*
Specific qualities of lightness, conductivity, high 
strength (in alloy aluminum), and resistance to corrosion 
add a phase of monopolistic competition to aluminum* This 
was true in the prewar markets, and is carried over to the 
postwar marketing situation* Such qualities give aluminum 
an advantageous position in certain industrial and commercial 
applications, and may serve to aid in the extension of the 
metal into many new fields* Greater use of aluminum already 
has been noted in connection with the automobile, railroad
and building trades industries, and the trend probably will 
be continued» Aluminum, which was an essential and even 
®critical® metal during the war, will continue to have 
Sjpecific applications in many phases ©f industry and com** 
meree through the years to come*
Conditions or sale in the aluminum industry were 
Important features prior to World War II* It was charged 
many times that prices were determined for the market, and 
met in it, and that the degree of control exercised by Alcoa 
in regard to sales of its products was almost absolute* Even 
la the field of aluminum ingots this charge had validity be~ 
fere the war, and in the sales of various fabricated aluminum 
products it was more apparent* The entry of other producers 
into the field has changed this condition in the industry to 
& great extent, and aluminum consumers at least have a better
t
chance of evading undue pressure from any one company when 
purchases are made* Scarcity economics, as a philosophy
acceptable to the aluminum industry, may be supplemented by
a philosophy of abundance, but in all probability such a 
great change will be accomplished only over a period of
many years* Selling costs will continue to be an important
element in the aluminum Industry, because all of the companies 
will be called upon to do more advertising of their products,
A great deal of ninstitutional advertising” was done by Alcoa 
and others throughout the war, in spite of the fact that no
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great amounts of* aluminum products for civilian consumption 
were being put upon the market* Specific advertising of 
specific products will be more characteristic of the peace­
time advertising program of all companies concerned with 
aluminum and products derived from the metal*
Discussions of competition of aluminum with other 
metals, wood, and plastics have been prevalent in the 
literature of recent years* The possible substitution of 
the other materials for aluminum has been given a great 
amount of attention, particularly from the angle of prices 
for the metal in comparison with prices for other reasonably 
good substitutes• Goods of all types face this eventuality, 
however, because it is characteristic of the modern economic 
society to seek substitutes if any one material becomes too 
highly monopolised or too high in price* Even patented
products are "subject to the competitionoof more or less
47imperfect substitutes," and alis&inum must face the com­
petition from several directions* Metallic substitutes 
are at hand in the form of steel, copper, tin, lead, 
magnesium, etc*, all of which can compete in most fields 
on a basis of price many fields on a basis of technical 
and chemical properties* Magnesium, in particular, as it
^Chamberlin, op* clt *, p9 £$*
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has been developed during the last few years, looms as one 
of the greatest competitors of aluminum in the field of light 
metals# A most illuminating chapter on magnesium is con— 
tained in the book by Professor Engle and his associates#
The postwar position of magnesium is secure, and it may 
become one of the greatest threats of aluminum in a variety 
of ways* Plastic materials, together with wood, will 
continue to play important roles as effective competitors 
to both aluminum and magnesium*
Problems of International Competition and Cartels 
In the Postwar Aluminum Industry:
Conditions of domestic monopoly in the production of 
primary have been alleviated considerably in the
alvBBinum Industry of the United States during the years from 
1940 to 1947* Disposal of government plants to two competi­
tors of Alcoa resulted in prospects for peacetime competition 
in this country* Plans as announced by both Reynolds and 
Kaiser Indicate the coi tinuance of these two companies in 
various phases of the industry. But the big problem of 
international competition 'must yet be faced. It Is this 
probability of International competition, or the lack of 
it through Influences brought to bear by cartels, that 
concerns us briefly at this point.
^Engle and others, <j£. eit.. Chapter XVII.
Ciscussions of possible international competitive
conditions in the industry since the end of the war have
revolved chiefly around the possibility of Canadian competi-
49tlon in the field of primary production* Genuine concern 
has been shown by domestic producers, to the extent that 
fear has been expressed that Canadian aluminum may invade the 
American market in large quantities* The fear is based upon 
the fact that costs of production admittedly are lower in 
Canada, and that it might be possible to invade the markets 
of the United States in spite of the tariff on aluminum*
Costs of production are based to a great extent on costs of 
hydroelectric power, and power costs at the world famous 
Shipshaw development are lower than those in the United 
States* As unusual feature connected with waterpower 
development in that area is the fact that financial assis­
tance of the United States was instrumental in the wartime 
expansion of the Canadian aluminum and power industries*
This cost phase has been described in a most interesting
^Typical of such discussions are the following 
articles which show the trend of thought on Canadian 
aluminums
(a) "Aluminum Reborn," Fortune. (May, 1946), oja.cit.
(b) "Canadian Aluminum Price Cut May Capture World 
Market," Iron Age. Voli CLVII, (May 9, 1946), p. 119*
(c) "Kingdom of the Saguenay— Canada," Iron jVge, 
Vol. CLV, (April 5, 1945), pp* 113~14*
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and convincing manner by Fortune (May, 1946), and Is quoted
here In full, as follows:
From the power-cost angle, however, the 
chief threat to the new aluminum competition 
is not Alcoa but its dear friend and relation, 
the Aluminum Co* of Canada, ltd* Alcan, a minor subsidiary of Alcoa until 1923, is now bigger 
than its putative parent* From? a 1939 ingot 
capacity of 175 million pounds, Alcan shot up to a capacity of over one billion pounds—  
making the company the largest producer in the 
world* More important from the standpoint of competitors, its capacity is geared to the 
world9s largest private hydroelectric power developaent——the fabulous Shipshaw project on 
the Saguenay River in Quebec* Alcan, using Shipshaw power {peak capacity: over a million 
kilowatts#, can produce aluminum at an energy cost of half a cent per pound* Other factors make it possible for Canadian aluminum to be 
delivered at a cost of 7 to £ cents, while the best II* 3* cost prospects are 10 to 11 cents*
The reason is simple if slightly amazing*
A lean9 s war expansion--which Included the $70- million Shipshaw development and a $12 3-million 
investment in aluminum production facilities—  
was financed by advances and loans from the b*S«, British, and Australian governments* A total 
of $63,500,000— or almost enough to build Shipshaw— was advanced interest free by the 
0* S. Metals Reserve Company in 1941 and 1942, on contracts providing for the eventual delivery 
of 1*4 billion pounds of Canadian aluminum*
(Three per cent interest was applied retro­
actively after a mighty squawk by the Truman Committee in 1943*) The Canadian Government—  
public—power—conscious as it is supposed to 
be— also contributed its bit by allowing 
"accelerated amortization0 from Alcan9 s war 
profits of $164 million out of the total $193 million investment* The British Government 
too, chipped in by providing abatement of its
^"Aluminum Reborn,* Fortune* (May, 1946), cit»f 
pp* 103 fT*
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#55*600,000 loans to the extent# that no postwar 
use was made of the facilities built by the loans*
But the U* S*——laying aside the argument that Alcan was able to fill this country* s 
aluminum needs at a critical time for all the 
Allies— paid the Canadian piper through the 
nose* Escalator clauses in the contracts brought 
the average price to l£*6 cents a pound* The difference between that and the American price 
resulted in payment of over #40 million more 
for Canadian aluminum than would have been paid to U* S* producers* Because of the rigid contract 
terms* Canadian aluminum was pouring in when U*S* production was being cut back, and today the entire government-surplus stockpile of 371 million pounds of primary aluminum has the Made-in-Canada sign on it* Furthermore, U* S* power projects—  
which would have made earlier production in this 
country possible— were curtailed while Shipshaw got double-A priorities for generator shafts and 
other critical materials*
Alcan, dismissing the conclusions of the Truman Committee* the Senate Small Business Committee, and other U* S. investigating agencies, 
says it got nothing out of the deal but a white 
elephant that is now generating "more taxes than 
electricity*** But looking further into the future, 
It is noteworthy that Aluminium, Ltd*— the holding 
company that was established by Alcoa to take over 
most of its foreign properties in 192B— owns not only Alcan but a worldwide system of bauxite mines, 
transportation facilities* power projects, and alumina* reduction, and fabricating plants In Great Britain, Germany, Australia, Italy* 
Switzerland* Sweden, Norway, Spain, India, and China* The majority of stockholders of Aluminium, 
Ltd*, and Alcoa are identical, and the formerfs President, Edward K* Davis, is the brother of 
the latter*s Chairman, Arthur V* Davis* Whether 
or not Alcoa encourages Alcan to jump the 3~C€snt U* 3* tariff wall with a certain amount of low- 
cost Canadian aluminum remains to be seen* But 
it could*
The role of the United States in various dealings 
with the Canadian aluminum Industry has b en the subject of 
rather caustic analysis by Charlotte Muller, who as early a©
1945 pointed out the economic Implications of Canadian
competition with United States aluminum producers,* Excerpts
from her article, "Aluminum and Power C o n t r o l s h o w  the
51reactions of many observers, as follows:
Broader implications of the way in which 
Shipshaw was built and paid for are of public 
interest# The source of the Shipshaw funds is 
the advances and loans of the United States supplied to a private enterprise for power 
construction under unprecedented conditions*Ro control over the project is retained by the United States*....The Government of the United 
States retains no title to the plant it has taught into being through financial contribu­
tions* This nans counter to the practice of the Defense Plant Corporation, instrument of federal 
financing of wartime industrial investment with­
in our borders* (The Metals Reserve Company, which negotiated the Canadian contracts for 
the United States is, like the DFC, a subsidiary 
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation*}
Meanwhile, construction of public projects and transmission lines in the United States was 
curtailed by the Office of Production Management 
and by the War Production Board on grounds that 
a shortage of essential materials and generators prevented their completion* Four million kilo­
watts scheduled for utilisation in 1944 or later were cancelled, about half of this amount being public construction at Grand Coulee, TYA, Shasta 
and Keswick Dams in California, etc*****
Advocates of public power fear the postwar 
consequences of the grant of financial resources 
to Shipshaw* * * * .Because of low power and labor
^Charlotte Muller, "Aluminum and Power Control,”
Public Utility Sfi2Q2jBaiaa> Vol* KXX,
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coats, Shipshaw will be in an advantageous position to moot competition from any DPC 
aluminum plants in the United States which 
might Tall into independent hands after the war* Alcan will indeed be able to lead the 
world in aluminum production. With the aid of cheap Saguenay power Alcan, it is pre­
dicted, will cut aluminum prices below those 
of copper, and aluminum will replace gold as the chief Item in the Canadian balance of 
payments. While this potential development would be a boon to aluminum users the world 
over, it might remain merely potential, or at least might not be brought to full realisation 
for some time, if Alcan should be able to take a leading part in forming a new world cartel*
The Aluminum Company of Canada, Ltd., did cut prices 
o b  ingot aluminum to a level of 13*25 cents per pound about 
the middle of 19M>» This represented a price in the United 
States equivalent to 12*04 cents per pound, when converted 
Into U. S. currency* The low price was still not competitive 
with American aluminum, however, because the tariff of three 
cents per pound tended to equalise the Canadian and American 
prise situations. It was pointed out at the time that the 
lowering of the price was not made in contemplation of pro­
motional activities in the United States. The new low price 
did give the Aluminum Company of Canada an opportunity to 
dominate the market for ingot aluminum in other countries.
The potential productive capacity of the company’s plants—  
at Arvlda, Beauharnois, Isle Malign©, La Tuque, and Shawinigan 
Falls— could be used effectively in world-wide competition for 
alumlmmi markets. Comment in Pittsburgh, Alcoa headquarters, 
was significant, since it was indicated that "additional labor
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costs and operating costa have narrowed down the margin of
profit on aluminum so that price cutting at this time is
52unwarranted in the American market• ” This was the reaction 
In 1946, at the time aluminum was selling at 15 cents per 
pound in the American markets, and apparently still Is the 
philosophy of all three producers of aluminum in the United 
States* The price of almnlnum made in the United States 
probably can be held at 15 cents for several years, especially 
if prosperity continues* Alcoa would not start such a price 
reduction campaign, because the company might face charges 
of a price war with the new competitors* The Reynolds Metals 
Company and the Kaiser interests would not want to cut prices, 
because they are both relatively new in the aluminum Industry 
and might be classified as infant industries desiring the 
high prices in order to continue profitable operations* Low­
ering of the tariff barrier might be the economic solution 
to the problem, but such a move would find much political 
opposition In Congress*
The question of a postwar international cartel in the 
aluminum industry is one which involves a special study, 
which Is not within the scope of the present survey of the 
wnwq industry* Some pertinent facts may be presented,
^"Canadian Aluminum Price Cut May Capture ttforld 
Market,” Iron Agfi, (May 9, 1946), sit.
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however, to show the possibilities inherent in the situation*
Much has been written about the prewar international aluminum 53
cartels* Two distinct and widely divergent streams or 
thought have arisen in regard to prewar participation of 
Alcoa in the international aluminum cartel activities* One 
stems from the writing of Dr* Louis Marlio, prewar chairman 
of the International Aluminum Cartel from 1926 to 1939, and 
for twenty years managing director of the French Aluminum 
Company* Dr* Marlio, according to Dr* Harold G. Moulton, 
of the Brookings Institution, was in a position to write 
with authority about the aluminum cartel* The statement 
made by Dr* Marlio concerning Alcoa is of significance, and
54it is quoted as follows;
It should be stated here that the Aluminum 
Company of America did not participate in any of 
the aluminum cartels with which the author was 
associated* While shareholders of the Aluminum Company of America own a majority of the shares 
of stock of the Aluminium Company, Ltd*, of Canada, the latter is not a subsidiary corpora­tion* Moreover, officials of Alcoa did not 
participate in the negotiations between the 
European groups and the Aluminium Company, Ltd*Hone of the agreements contained restrictions of
53Tw o outstanding books bearing directly on the 
subject are; Louis Marlio, The. Aluminum Cartel* (Washingtons 
The Brookings Institution, 1947); and George W. Stocking and 
Myron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action* (New xorks The Twentieth 
Centruy Fund, 1946)•
^Louis Marlio, o p * q jt*. pp. 30-31.
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M y  sorb pertaining to sales to or exports from the United States# Nor were there any secret 
understandings between Alcoa and the Alliance with respect to markets or otherwise#
Another viewpoint concerning the relationships
existing between Alcoa and Aluminium, Ltd., (Alted), has
h e m  well presented by George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins,
who have stated that wAlcoa and Alted have common control” and
that "the two companies have operated precisely as though
they were, in law, the single business enterprise which they
55obviously are in fact." Furthermore, referring specifically
to the rold of Alcoa in the field of international aluminum
56cartels, these writers have stated:
The production controls directly affected the trading prospects of cartel members in the 
United States and in all other markets, domestic and export. The cartel managers were all prac­
tical businessmen, and they most certainly were not leaving the door "wide open" for Alcoa, their 
most formidable potential rival, to expand its business at their expense* They had ample ground 
for assurance on this vital point from (1) Alcoa9s kinship with Alted, <2) Alcoa*s record not only as 
a cartel cooperator but as a cartel leader for more than three decades, and (3) Arthur V# Davis9 personal participation in the initiation and 
detailed elaboration of the Alliance scheme.
The actual operation of the Alliance bears 
out this interpretation of Alcoa’s relationship 
to it as a "silent partner.19 Through the associa­
tion of the brothers Davis, Alcoa frequently, if
^George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, op# cit., 
pp. 256—57*
56ibld.. p. 265.
mot regularly, obtained information regarding 
Alliance stocks and price policy, and even re— 
ports on its financial condition* Moreover* as 
in the cartels before World War X, Alcoa through Alted apparently exercised a predominant in— fluence in the conduct of the Alliance*
Precise judgment of the degree of "authority11 to
be attached to the divergent statements of Dr* Marlio and
those of Dr* Stocking and Dr* Watkins is difficult, and
perhaps is unnecessary here* The writer would subscribe
more readily to the viewpoints of the latter writers, and
would agree with a recent book review of Dr* Marlio1 s book,
57In which the following statements were madej
As former Chairman of the International Aluminum Cartel, M* Marlio is frankly defending his cartel against all comers* To the American 
reader* it will appear curious that the blood relationship of the Aluminum Co* of America and 
its Canadian sister concern is given so little emphasis* While M* Marlio enumerates only four 
aluminum cartels, Stocking and Watkins***** 
list at least eight* He is unconvincing when 
he argues that cartel price policy has not discouraged civilian consumption; the use of 
a 1 \imi nma in the automobile industry, for example, 
appears to have declined because cartel arrange­
ments pegged its price*
«****For the future, M* Marlio recommends full publicity and compulsory registration of 
eartels*
Dr* Marlio9s conclusions are in direct contrast to 
the commonly accepted ideas on cartelization* He defends 
the cartel idea energetically, declaring that international
57«Yhe Aluminum Cartel," (Book Review), Fortune. 
Vol. XXXVI, (July, 1947), p* 10.
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trade was not# impeded by artificial restrictions on the
market by the cartel, at least after 190g. He stated with
emphasis that aluminum usage was not restricted by the
policy or artificially maintaining high prices* Stabilisation
of price in periods of depression was defended on the ground
that such a policy advances, rather than retards, the entire
process of recovery* Retardation of technological progress
was vigorously denied by Dr* Marlio, and he stated that
»oste of the primary purposes of the aluminum cartel was to
promote technical research and discover new uses for the 
5*metal*11 He goes further to add that "such an association 
(cartel) has neither the power nor the wish to suppress com­
petition but only to limit it for a fixed period of time*
596ompetlt Ion. direct or indirect survives*" Denials of 
promotion of inefficiency through the protection of high cost 
producers were given a prominent place in Dr* Marllo’s con­
clusions, and he stated that leadership in the cartel "passed60
more and more into the hands of the lowest-cost producers*"
He was critical of efforts of government cartels as such, 
particularly in the matter of price reductions through 
government cartel action* Pear of control of such a government
5®Louis Marlio, op* clt*. p# 109* 
59lbid* . pp. 109-10.
60ibid.. P. in.
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cartel by high—cost producers was one of the chief critic
cisms given. Political considerations, rather than economic
reasoning, might be the guiding and controlling factors in
such government cartels, according to Dr. Marlio.
All of these ideas as expressed by Dr* Marlio have
been given brief treatment here, because the writer believes
that they may be indicative of the type of writing that is
apt to catch the public eye in the postwar world* The worst
danger lies in complacent acceptance of such attempts to
delude the general public by such 11 whitewash” methods* All
the evidence given by such men as Stocking, Watkins, and
Wendell Berge (for many years a great public servant in the61Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice) shows a
preponderance of opinion against such ideas of the great
public service of cartels In general and the aluminum cartel
in particular* A special study of cartels was made by the
Temporary national Economic Committee in 1941* It gives
ample evidence that the outstanding characteristics of cartels
are restriction of production, high prices, restriction of
technological progress, division of markets, and the main-62
tenance of high and rigid prices. The whole purpose of
51Wendell Berge, Cartels; Challenge to a Free World.
(Washington: Public Affairs Press,1944)•62Cartels* Eeport of the Hearings Before the Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 25, (Washington: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1941)•
cartels Is to foster control over markets and to eliminate 
competition* The danger to the aluminum industry in the 
postwar era is this type of activity on an international 
scale* Vigilance on the part of the United States may be 
necessary tp maintain the degree of competition now existent 
in the aluminum industry, and to foster even more effective 
competition than is now apparent in the industry* Canadian 
competition may be feared by the aluminum producers of the 
United States, but it is more to be desired, from the stand-* 
point of the consuming public, than international cartel!za- 
tlen of the aluminum industry*
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